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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to provide a theoretical and 
empirical explanation of the question: How do conflicts
within a party affect its coalitional behaviour insofar as 
such conflicts may influence the bargaining power of party 
elites in the parliamentary arena? There are three major 
themes around which the theoretical explanation is organized. 
The first theme is that 'party institutionalization' and the 
nature of intra-party conflicts are important factors in 
shaping the ability of the party elites to neutralize 
internal conflicts. The second theme - a particular 
application of the first - is that the strength of a party in 
the parliamentary bargaining plane (i.e. its relative 
bargaining power) lies in its organization weakness. The 
third theme reveals that political parties, which are 
characterized by the existence of heterogeneous and diffused 
mechanisms for internal dissent, can handle internal 
conflicts in a variety of ways without forcing members to 
leave the party.
Based upon a comparative analysis of intra-party 
conflicts and minority governments in Denmark, Norway, 
France, Italy and the U.K., the study suggests that weakly 
institutionalized parties can enter into conflict inducing 
coalition negotiations without risking their hold on their 
membership, whereas inter-party negotiations can lead to 
disintegration of highly institutionalized parties as members 
may be forced to leave the party as their primary mechanism 
for expression of discontent.
A major implication of this study is that in multi-party 
systems in which minority situations occur, the most 
attractive strategy (i.e. in terms of bargaining power) for 
highly institutionalized parties occupying a governmental 
position is the formation of informal minority governments, 
whereas the most attractive strategy for weakly 
institutionalized parties is the formation of formal minority 
governments.
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"THE DYNAMICS OF MINORITY RULE: INTRA-PARTY 
POLITICS AND MINORITY GOVERNMENTS IN 
WESTERN EUROPE"
1
1. INTRODUCTION: THE LACUNA OF COALITIONAL BEHAVIOUR
There is a serious shortcoming in the study of 
coalitional behaviour. At a time when a prolific output of 
worthwhile scholarly enterprises continues, one must surely 
be struck by the fact that even the finest works have often 
neglected the role of intra-party politics. The aim of the 
thesis is to provide a theoretical and empirical explanation 
to the query which may be formulated as follows: How do
conflicts within a party affect its coalitional behaviour 
insofar as such conflicts may influence the bargaining power 
of party elites in the parliamentary arena? Acute intra­
party conflicts seem most likely to occur when the 
governmental parties control less than half of the seats in 
parliament (i.e. minority situations), due to the complexity 
of securing a parliamentary majority and the need to co­
operate with untraditional partners. Therefore, a comparative 
analysis of minority governments in five West European party 
systems will be undertaken.
The pace of electoral change in most of the West 
European countries during the last decade and the frequent 
occurrence of minority governments has been such as to make 
this subject important for a theoretical and empirical 
investigation. At the same time, there is a traditional
2
sense in which minority governments are not worth specific
analysis because of their ineffectiveness and short-lived
characteristics.^ One of the appraisals, lessening minority
government's importance, comes from Giovanni Sartori and is
worthy of quotation above all because it recalls the lack of
motivation toward research of this topic:
[...] minority single party governments do materialize, 
but they do so either as a result of miscalculated 
Indian wrestlings, or on the basis of a precise calculus 
(such as shedding unpopular, if necessary, policies), 
and otherwise as disguised coalitions and transitional 
caretaker governments. In any case, minority single 
party governments are - in the context of limited and 
moderate pluralism - 'feeblg' governments, even though 
they may not be shortlived.
Clearly, such a statement has not always coincided with 
the high incidence of minority governments in west European 
party systems. Minority governments (or Cabinets) are 
governments formed by either one or few parties that 
together control less than half of the seats in the national 
legislature or, operationally, the lower house of bicameral 
legislature.^
Daalder's inspection of over 250 cabinets during 1918- 
1969 illustrates that 36.5 per cent of the governments held
4
office as a minority. Next to Taylor and Laver's study 
of 132 governments in 12 parliamentary democracies which 
shows 34.1 per cent to be minority governments, Herman and 
Pope's examination of 207 administrations in 12 western 
democracies reports 35.8 per cent of this cabinet type.^ 
Added to these findings, Lijphart reports 30.7 per cent of
3
minority governments in 2 0 countries over the period from 
1945 to 1980, whilst Luebbert's data on 12 parliamentary 
democracies yield a frequency of 37.2 per cent.^ In more 
recent surveys, Strom found that, during 1945-1987, the 
incidence of minority governments in 15 democracies is as 
high as 35.1 per cent, whilst Laver and Schofield's study of 
twelve European systems from 1945 to 1987 shows 33 per cent 
of minority governments.^
While the frequency of minority governments is often 
acknowledged, the full implication of their rule within the 
framework of parliamentary and semi-presidential systems have 
yet to be properly explored. The existing literature, which 
will be thoroughly analysed in the first two sections of this 
chapter, may be considered in three categories. The first 
and by far the largest category consists of works which have 
been considered minority governments to be a deviant case in 
the field of coalitional behaviour. Therefore, it is not 
entirely surprising that the topic has been neglected and 
that it has never been considered as the subject of a study. 
The second category contains a number of generally more 
recent studies of particular themes some of which have a 
bearing on the phenomenon of minority governments. Many of 
them are very close to the topic in question and few, if any, 
present an interesting view of these situations. The third 
category is made up of a small number of works on certain 
aspects or phases of minority situations, including mainly a
4
few studies of minority government formation and performance 
which grew out from a rational point of view. Apart from 
these few volumes, the topic has received little attention 
from political scholars and there is as yet no inductive 
study of west European minority governments as a whole.
There are two reasons why the comparative analysis of 
minority governments in Western Europe should be considered 
as one entity. First, these governments represent, in the 
last two decades, the longest period of continuous minority 
rule in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Ireland and for a 
short term, in Italy, the U.K., France and Portugal. This 
alone is worthy of attention in academic and political 
realms in which minority governments are held in low esteem 
and are generally regarded as exceptions to the normal 
practice of politics. The second reason is that during 
minority rule far-reaching patterns of intra-party conflicts 
and parliamentary co-operations are being evolved. A 
substantial part of the following thesis examines the visible 
and tangible evidence of these trends.
The key objective of this chapter is to explore the 
lacuna of coalitional behaviour. Firstly, the theoretical 
context of minority governments is specified by reviewing 
the most widely suggested conditions favouring their 
formation and performance. The second section reviews what 
coalitional theory has had to say on what happens if parties 
are not 'unitary actors'. Finally, the main argument of the
5
thesis and the research strategy are presented.
1.2 THE STUDY OF MINORITY GOVERNMENTS: FORMATION, AND 
PERFORMANCE
Following the traditional sense in which minority 
governments are not worthy of a specific analysis because of 
their ineffectiveness and short-lived characteristics, the 
first priority is to specify the theoretical context of the 
topic.
Understanding minority governments as reflections of 
severe systemic crisis, Ernst Friesenhahn argued that the 
formation of a minority government can be no more than an
p
emergency measure and indicates a crisis situation. 
Similarly, Klaus von Beyme concurs that, 'According to the 
basic rules of the parliamentary system, every minority
9
cabinet is an unwanted crisis symptom'. An additional 
crisis-oriented explanation by Michael Taylor and Valentine 
Herman, evaluated minority governments as coalition 
frictions in otherwise stable party s y s t e m s . T h e  
importance of these arguments can hardly be over emphasized 
as neither the locus nor the magnitude of a crisis under 
which minority governments are most likely to form is 
examined. As minority cabinets could either be equated with 
severe systemic instability, such as riots and strikes, as 
well as a result of cabinet instability, students of politics 
are left with a vague description of the topic.
6
other explanations have emphasized the structural
properties of the party system. Associating minority
governments with irrationality and miscalculation, Giovanni
Sartori claimed that party system fractionalization (i.e. the
probability that two members drawn at random from the
universe belong to different parties) enhances minority
government formation.'Moderate  pluralism', Sartori
argued, was the type of party system in which minority
cabinets are most likely to form. Such an argument seems
reasonable as the larger the number of parties, the more
difficult it may be to build a parliamentary majority, and
the greater the probability of minority government formation.
Conversely, the number of minority cabinets should decline as
12one approaches a pure two-party system.
Further explanations have tended away from the mono­
casual strategy towards a more complex observation. Based on 
the ideological character of the political parties and their 
interaction in multi-party systems, Dodd has suggested that 
cabinet coalitional status and cabinet durability are 
determined by the interaction of three party system variable: 
cleavage conflict, fractionalization and instability.^^ 
Whereas the former is relevant as a constraint on the a 
priori willingness of parties to negotiate, the latter two 
are important due to their influence on certainty of 
information in the parliamentary arena.
Incremental changes in the above-mentioned variables
7
influence minority government formation as follows: (i) in
conditions of high cleavage conflict, parties should show a 
less generalized a priori willingness to bargain and thus 
minimum winning and minority cabinets are formed, and (ii) in 
conditions of high cleavage conflict, cabinets in 
fractionalized and unstable party systems are non-durable 
minority governments. Dodd concluded that minority govern­
ments are particularly probable solutions when party systems 
suddenly become more fractionalized.
Dodd's argument is supported by Powell who posited that 
extremist systems, in terms of majority producing and 
linkages between groups and parties, have less durable 
executives and more frequent minority governments.^* An 
average 15 per cent vote for extremist parties during 1965- 
1975, which characterized extremist systems, indicates the 
strength of such parties as the major explicator of executive 
instability.
At the opposite extreme from the conflict-based view of 
minority government formation, another category emphasizes 
the relevancy of political culture and heritage. Linking 
minority government formation to macro-political regime 
characteristics, Gregory Luebbert reported that this type of 
cabinet is most common in consensual regimes (i.e. those with 
high legitimacy and consensus-building) and virtually absent 
in competitive regimes (i.e. those which lack high degree of 
legitimacy and consensus-building). This was due to the
absence of the parties' need for government co-operation in 
consensual regimes, whilst, in conflictuel regimes, minority 
governments result from the inability of the parties to co­
operate.
Emphasizing consensus relationships in the parliamentary 
party system, Hans Daalder proposed an approach which is 
complemented by a repertoire of responsible parliamentary 
government vis-a-vis crises of political development or other 
historical l e g a c i e s . S u c h  an approach developed mainly 
in Norway, Denmark and Sweden where responsible government 
resulted from a process of mass mobilization of counter­
establishment forces. As parliament became a strong 
'democratic' forum, a belief in majority principles was 
developed, tempered by a judicious appreciation of the need 
for executive government. In minority situations, therefore, 
minority cabinets and ad hoc coalition arrangements for 
specific policy goals were preferred over the theoretical 
alternative of proportional-based cabinets.
The final explanation which will be considered focuses
18on the proximate conditions of government formation. 
According to this view, minority governments form only when 
all other options have been exhausted, or when no other 
options exist. Such cabinets will tend to be formed under 
conditions that are often tied to the negotiation process 
itself, such as limited choice, failure of negotiation and 
lower-order preferences.
At this stage, the critique of the above survey is of
relevance. There is evidently minimal support for any of the
19above explanations of minority governments. Nor do these 
accounts commend themselves in terms of clarity, generality, 
or parsimony. Such theories, thus, would have only modest 
predictive power. By associating minority government with 
unstable and conflictual party systems, these studies 
established the conventional view of the topic.
Whatever the merits and deficiencies in these early
undertakings, indisputably it is Kaare Strom's research of
minority government formation which today remains the single
scholarly advance on the topic. Based on the assumptions
that the underlying motivation of parties is to influence
policy-making in the national assembly and that parties seek
to maximize their long-term as well as short-term utilities,
Strom presents a rational choice theory of minority
20government formation. Basically, Strom explains minority 
governments as the result of rational choices made by party 
leaders under certain structural constraints. More than 
anything else, he claimed, it is the anticipation of future 
elections that predisposes party leaders to opt for minority 
governments. Consequently, under-sized governments are most 
likely to form in political systems where elections are 
competitive and decisive (i.e. in terms of the cost of 
governing) for coalitional bargaining power. Furthermore, 
minority governments are promoted by institutions that
1Ü
enhance the power of the parliamentary opposition vis-a-vis
21the government.
The availability of formal institutional structures that
allow the opposition to influence policy seems to help
account for the frequency of minority governments in Norway,
France, Italy, and Sweden. Yet, the way Strom measures the
influence of the parliamentary opposition does not help to
account for the endemic nature of minority government in
Denmark, or its frequency in Finland. Both systems in which,
according to Strom, the opposition is accorded only moderate
22influence over policy. Following Strom, academic
observers might be led to expect a greater role for minority 
cabinets in Belgium, Iceland and Portugal, all systems which 
he scores high on opposition influence but which do not in 
practice have numerous minority governments.
Added to the above-mentioned explanations concerning 
minority government formation, questions regarding the 
performance of such cabinets were raised. Studies on such
topics have generally revolved around two criteria, namely,
23stability (i.e. viability) and legislative effectiveness.
For the former, several studies show that minority
24governments tend to be the least durable cabinet type. 
The importance of such arguments can hardly be over 
emphasized as the main problem of quantitative duration 
studies is that the result is dependent substantially on the 
rules by which governments are counted. Regarding the
11
legislative effectiveness, minority governments are
conventionally portrayed as governments of lowered
effectiveness, and ones that may result in decisional
25paralysis and passiveness in policy formation. Not
surprisingly, a pervasive erosion of political responsibility
may result, together with a possible loss of control over
2 6crucial decision-making processes.
Beyond the above-mentioned negative assessments was the
problem of how minority governments attain legislative
coalition. Herman and Pope distinguished between supported
and unsupported minority governments and found the former
category to account for a majority of their cases. Hans
Daalder raised the question of whether minority cabinets are
in reality majority cabinets 'in disguise' but found little
27supporting evidence. Debate about the pervasiveness of
support agreements was due to the lack of an operational
definition of what a support agreement is. Surely, if
government coalition should be thought of as including the
external support parties, as well as those which receive
portfolios, then there would be no minority governments
requiring special explanation.
With regard to this problem, Ian Budge suggested a
differentiation between minority governments and support 
28parties. He argued that policy considerations provide 
good reasons for some excluded parties supporting minority 
governments whenever the existing government offers a better
chance of the supporting party's policies being put into
effect than any of the other likely alternatives.
Additionally, where government's policy is only marginally
better, the costs involved in a governmental crisis may well
induce it to maintain support at critical junctures.
An even less rigorous explanation of how minority
governments function directs our attention to the effective
decision point in legislatures. A near majority, Herman and
Pope claimed, is in many cases as good as a real 
29majority. Still, the question of the proportion of
seats required by a minority government for it to be 
'winning', remaines vague. Taylor and Laver's study, 
which analyzed government coalitions which include support 
parties, suggested two ways of dealing with this question:
The first was to treat the threshold (the proportion of 
seats required by a coalition for it to be 'winning') as 
a parameter, which may vary from country to country and 
from one theory to another. This entails, of course, a 
certain loss of generality in the theories, and does not 
in any case lead to dramatic improvements in most of 
them. The second approach is to abandon general 
explanation entirely, and treat the minority governments 
as 'deviant cases', to be 'explained' by special ad hoc 
factors (such as the presence of a near-majority party, 
or immobilisme, oj the need for a caretaker 
administration).
Replacing the majority winning criterion with a 
viability criterion, Ian Budge and Michael Laver have 
recently looked at the way in which particular legislative 
strategies may be used to force the government's hand over
13
32policy. 'A protocoalition V', they claimed, 'will form a
government if there is no alternative coalition A which is
supported by parties controlling more legislative votes than
those supporting V and which all supporters of A prefer to
33form rather than V . Expressed in these very general 
terms, minority governments are viable if they cannot be
defeated on the basis of patterns of support in the 
legislature. Clearly, however, such a general criterion of 
government viability is too vague to be of any real empirical 
use.
The most comprehensive study of minority governments
performance was conducted by Kaare Strom. As the
government's objective is to purchase support for its
legislation at the lowest possible cost, Strom argued,
'Everything else being equal, minority governments would
34prefer purely ad hoc coalitions'. The reasoning behind
this conclusion lies in the ad-hoc nature of the negotiations 
during which a minority government can in each case select 
the least 'expensive' coalition partner available. Although 
minority governments can choose between a variety of 
strategies when building legislative coalitions, their 
strategy choices depend on institutional conditions, the 
objectives of the parties both in government and opposition, 
and their relative bargaining power.
The critique of Strom's study strikes upon the very 
nature of the assumption that the party is a 'unitary
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actor' (i.e. a single bargaining entity). By adopting a 
rather tough operational definition, Strom managed to avoid 
the trade-off, faced by party elites, between party strategy 
and cohesion. Consequently, his research was confined to 
the inputs and outputs of coalition bargaining and lacked a 
detailed analysis of the intra-party forces which affect this 
process. However, the key fact in studying parties' 
behaviour is that they are complex organizations comprised 
of many individuals, each with his or her own agenda. 'A 
party', Katz and Mair state, 'is itself a political 
system'.
Internal conflicts seem most likely to occur as a result 
of parliamentary co-operation due, among other factors, to 
the uneven distribution of the benefits of office within a 
party. Furthermore, acute intra-party conflicts are most 
likely to occur in minority situations as a result of the 
complexity of securing a parliamentary majority and the 
probable need to co-operate with untraditional partners. 
Strom's analysis, therefore, fails to break free from one of 
the shackles of conventional coalition theory that has proved 
most irksome to specialists in the politics of the European 
coalition system.
Having accurately specified the lacuna of coalitional 
behaviour, the next aim is to present a serious shortcoming 
in the study of intra-party politics and coalition theory. 
In other words, what has coalition theory had to say on what
15
happens if parties are not unitary actors?. It will be shown 
that with the exception of the works of Gregory Luebbert, 
Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, coalition theory has 
had little to say on the above question. The expansion of 
the coalitional behaviour lacuna to the study of intra-party 
politics thereof enhances a greater understanding of the 
existing theoretical and empirical gap.
1.2 INTRA-PARTY POLITICS AND COALITIONAL BEHAVIOUR
Our claims on behalf of intra-party forces may well have 
been determined by our proximity to the European context. 
Yet, Strom clearly encounters problems in integrating the 
influence of the opposition into his general scheme and 
prefers to adopt a rather tough operational definition 
concerning intra-party politics, for which his inventive view 
is not a convincing solution. The reader will notice, 
however, that in isolating this shortcoming of Strom's work, 
the thesis simultaneously hints at an alternative route of 
explaining majority building by minority governments.
The sheer ambition of publications aspiring to 
contribute to a construction of a coalition theory, and the 
conceptual abstraction inherent in the task, has surprisingly 
produced only a narrow range of studies concerning the impact 
of intra-party politics on coalitional behaviour. Gregory 
Luebbert was first to devote exclusive attention to this
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topic by proposing a theory of coalitional behaviour which 
was based fundamentally upon the assumption that party 
leaders are motivated above all by the desire to remain party 
l e a d e r s . T h i s  assumption means that party leaders will 
always strive to minimize party disunity by attempting to set 
the party's attitude toward participation in a coalition on 
preferences that produce the least disunity. From this 
perspective,
[...] the leaders' task is to insist on preferences that 
are sufficiently focused that they generate the widest 
possible support within the party, but sufficiently 
vague and opaque that they do not engage in government 
formation the-disagreements that are a constant feature 
of any party.
Therefore, preferences that embody contested principles of
policy or programme direction, rather than those that concern
timing, amounts, rates of change, and contingencies, are
decisive in government formation. The reason for this lies
in their impact of minimizing disunity by being derived from
the most widely shared values within a party and because they
directly engage the party's most basic sense of purpose. As
the thesis shares Luebbert's assumption, the consequences
concerning the nature of decisive preferences provide
insightful guidelines.
A refreshing improvement in studing the topic is
illustrated by Laver and Shepsle's approach to modelling
38government formation. Two innovative ideas were raised
by the authors: first, treating government coalitions as
17
being governments as well as coalitions; second, considering 
the credibility of policy proposals made during coalition 
bargaining. These two important matters are linked by a 
common concern with the qualitative allocation of cabinet 
portfolios among parties, as the latter may be taken to imply 
a credible commitment to implement the ideal policy of the 
parties in the relevant policy jurisdiction. In other 
words, the policy promises that are made when governments are 
formed are limited to those that can be implemented by 
placing portfolios in the hands of those politicians who have 
private incentives to carry them out; no other policy 
promises are credible.
Elsewhere, precisely this has been the nature of
39explanations of minority government formation. Once
again, for a proposal to replace a status quo it must be a 
credible contender. 'While a proposal can contend against 
the status quo only if it is preferred by a legislative 
majority', Laver and Shepsle claimed, 'this in no sense 
requires that the participants in the proposal themselves 
constitute a legislative m a j o r i t y O n  this matter, 
minority governments, which both authors define as 
'governments whose participants do not constitute a 
legislative majority', are treated in the same way as any 
other government.
Laver and Shapsle's approach focuses on the period of 
government formation during which party discipline reaches a
18
maximum. After this stage, however, intra-party conflicts 
may evolve, undermining the 'credebility' of a proposal by 
exerting pressures on Cabinet members. As each alliance 
partner re-commits itself to parliamentary co-operation by 
voting in favour of the coalition over critical divisions, 
the 'credibility' of a proposal can be continuously 
evaluated. In other words, a partner's strategy will be 
dependent on the extent of promises' implementation. 
Theoretically, therefore, an approach that views coalition 
maintenance as a continuous process of alliance formations 
can effectively capture the notion of a 'proposal 
credibility' and intra-party dynamics. As the thesis' 
interest lies in the latter, it examines the intra-party 
consequences of alliance politics by considering coalition 
maintenance as a continuous process of alliance formations.
Finally, the leap required in shifting from the more 
formal works cited above and inductive-based comparative 
studies is what today defines the lacuna of coalitional 
behaviour. There is a yawning gap between specialised and 
detailed enquiry into individual party organizations with an 
appropriate theoretical conceptualization and the broad sweep 
of surveys involving a large number of cases. Where there 
surely ought to be a stock of middle-level, cross-national 
comparison of party organizations over a limited and logical 
selected sample of party systems, there is very little at 
all.
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1.3 THE CONCEPT OF 'PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION' AND THE 
DYNAMICS OF MINORITY RULE
A substantial reason for the lack of studies concerning
party institutionalization lies in the obsession of political
scientists to analyse parties as existing social and
political phenomena rather than being concerned with the
actual transformation of social and political forces into
institutionalized structures. Institutionalization, that is,
'the process by which organizations and procedures aquire
41value and stability', was approached in the 1950s and 
1960s by Maurice Duverger and Samuel P. Huntington, 
respectively. Whereas the former outlined two models of 
party development, internally and externally generated 
p a r t i e s , t h e  latter presented a similar view by dividing 
the process of party system development into four phases: 
factionalism, polarization, expansion and institutionalizat- 
icn.«
Undoubtedly, it was Angelo Panebianco's Political
Parties which shed new light on the role of party institu-
44tionalization in party behaviour. Party institu­
tionalization, according to Panebianco, can be measured on 
two scales: (1) the organization's degree of autonomy vis-à- 
vis its environment, that is, the extent to which the party 
is free from the influence of external or extra-party 
organizations, and (2) the organization's degree of
20
systemness, that is, the degree of interdependence of its 
different internal sectors . For the former, a party is 
autonomous whenever it is in a position to 'directly control' 
the exchanges with its environment, i.e. when it does not 
dependent on external organizations for the maintenance of 
its electoral and parliamentary activities. The converse 
position, dependency, being characteristic of parties whose 
'indispensable resources are in part controlled by other 
organizations'. For the degree of systemness, when an 
organization system allows its internal sub-groups a good 
deal of autonomy, its degree of systemness is low, and vice 
versa. The two dimensions of institutionalization are 
related, for a low degree of systemness often implies little 
autonomy vis-a-vis the environment, and vice versa.
Two 'ideal' types of parties were examined in 
Panebianco's comprehensive analysis, namely, highly and 
weakly institutionalized parties. Whereas a weakly
institutionalized party is characterized by a low degree of 
autonomy and a low degree of interdependence among the 
subgroups, a highly institutionalized one is characterized by 
a high degree of control over its environment and a high 
degree of interdependence among the sub groups.
Operationally, the difference between the two types is 
based on five indicators of party institutionalization.*^ 
Firstly, the degree of development of the central extra- 
parliamentary organization. The rule here is that a highly
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institutionalized party possesses a developed central 
bureaucracy whereas in a weakly institutionalized party the 
central bureaucratic apparatus is weak and embryonic. A 
highly institutionalized party is thus both more 
bureaucratized and centralized than a weakly institution­
alized party. Secondly, the degree of homogeneity of 
organizational structures at the same hierarchical level. In 
highly institutionalized organizations, for example, the 
local associations tend to be organized in the same way 
throughout the national territory whilst in the weakly 
institutionalized ones the local associations are likely to 
be quite heterogeneous. Thirdly, the method of finance. The 
more highly institutionalized the party, the more probable 
that it has at its disposal a revenue system based on a 
regular flow of contributions from a plurality of sources. 
The less institutionalized, the less continuous and regular 
its flow of funds, and the less diversified its financial 
sources. Forthly, relations with the external collateral 
organizations. A highly institutionalized party dominates 
its external organizations (such as trade unions) whilst a 
weakly institutionalized party is dependent on external 
organizations. A weakly institutionalized party can be 
also characterized by either no relations with external 
institutions, only precarious ones, or the collateral 
organizations are weak and not vital. And finally, fifth, 
the degree of correspondence between a party's statutory
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norms and its actual power structure. Such a correspondence 
tends to be greater in highly institutionalized parties. 
Hence, people, groups or associations formally outside a 
highly institutionalized party cannot play leading roles 
within the organization.
The Dynamics of Minority Rule accepts Panebianco's 
classification without delving into the theoretical and 
practical problems which complicate his approaches. The 
thesis, for example, does not share Panebianco's conception 
that political parties are characteristically/historically 
weakly or highly institutionalized. Instead, it defines 
'party institutionalization' very loosely as the ways 
political authority and the instruments of control over 
internal uncertainty are distributed within a party. Based 
on this definition, the above-mentioned indicators will 
determine whether a party is weakly or highly institution­
alized during a given period.
The nature of the structural context in which party
elites operate as a variable in coalitional politics has been
raised by few scholars. Sven Groennings, a pioneer in this
field, has argued that the more centralized parties are, the
47stronger they are as coalition actors. He suggested
that.
[...] the more centralized the party structure, the 
easier it is for the party to remain in the coalition. 
The a priori hypothesis that a party weakened by 
factional dispute will find it difficult to formulate a 
coalition policy leads quickly to the hypothesis that 
the greater the organized dissensus within a party, the
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lesser is the tendency to coalesce, even if the 
dissensus has nothing to do with coalition policy. It 
should be noted, furthermore, that it is easier for a 
party with loose central control to coalesce with 
another party of the same character than one with tight 
discipline, because a highly centralised party can 
present a threat to a loosely structured party.
A similar conclusion has been reached by Panebianco - that
alliances amongst parties inevitably destabilise the less
49institutionalized organizations.
A logical problem is created here: Why are highly
institutionalized parties considered to be effective 
coalitional actors if they lack the internal flexibility 
necessary to adjust to dissent among their members?. At the 
outset, one might expect that highly institutionalized 
parties would possess more defences with respect to internal 
challenges, as their instruments of control over such 
uncertainties are concentrated in the hands of the party 
elites. Such parties, however, lack mechanisms for the 
diffusion of dissent such as dissensions in parliament and 
factions within the party. The absence of these mechanisms 
does not allow them to handle internal dissatisfaction in a 
variety of manageable ways. Such parties are, therefore, at 
a disadvantage when they enter parliamentary negotiations.
The above-mentioned applications of party institution­
alization to coalition politics, therefore, raise a paradox. 
Literally formulated, the strength of a party in the 
parliamentary bargaining plane, that is, its relative 
bargaining power, lies in its organizational weakness. Based
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on this paradox, the thesis suggests that organizational 
weakness, that is, the existence of heterogenous and diffused 
mechanisms for internal dissent, allows the party to cope 
with internal dissatisfaction in a variety of manageable ways 
without forcing members to resign or leave the party. As a 
result, weakly institutionalized parties can enter into 
conflict inducing coalition negotiations with other parties 
without risking their hold on the elites' members and the 
party followers. Highly institutionalized parties, on the 
other hand, lack the internal fluidity necessary to adjust to 
dissent among its members. When inter-party negotiations 
induce conflict and dissent among the party's membership, 
members may be forced to leave the party as their primary 
mechanism for expression of dissent. The lack of 
organizational fluidity, therefore, can lead to party 
disintegration when it enters serious coalition negotiations 
with other parties.
In describing this interplay of 'challenging' intra­
party environment and 'adopting' elites, the intent is not to 
depreciate the nature of the inter-party conflict itself. On 
the contrary, precisely because political parties can be seen 
as actually divided into competing sub-groups the nature of 
intra-party conflict retains a fundamental role in the 
elites' ability to cope with internal conflict. Top party 
elites (“i.e. cabinet ministers and/or party leader) differ in 
the extent they control intra-elite (e.g. within the
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parliamentary group) and elite-follower conflicts. The fact 
that parliamentary group members are interested primarily in 
'selective incentives' emphasizes their dependency on the top 
party leadership. This, in turn, enhances the elites' 
ability to control their behaviour. Less influence can be 
exerted on party followers, however, as they are primarily 
interested in 'collective incentives'.^^ Consequently, the 
elites' ability to cope with dissenting behaviour of 
parliamentarians is likely to be greater than their ability 
to cope with hostility of party followers.
The two explanatory variables namely, party institution­
alization and the type of intra-party conflicts are 
considered critical factors in shaping the bargaining power 
of participants in political coalitions. The model is based 
on the assumption that party elites are motivated above all 
by the desire to remain party leaders. In other words, the 
central features of party policy are selected by leaders so 
as to minimize dissent within the various sections of the 
party. The model, broadly speaking, is driven by policy- 
based, rather than office-based preferences.
The thesis suggests that in multi-party systems in which 
a minority situation occurs, the most attractive strategy, 
that is, in terms of bargaining power, for highly 
institutionalized parties, occupying a governmental position, 
is the formation of informal minority governments. The most 
attractive strategy for weakly institutionalized parties, on
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the other hand, is the formation of formal minority cabinets. 
To support this hypothesis, a comparative analysis of 
minority governments in Denmark (1975-1990), Norway (1976- 
1990), Italy (1976-1979), the U.K. (1977-1978) and France 
(1988-1990), will be undertaken.
The fundamental methodological premise of the inquiry is 
that the best way to study intra-party processes and 
coalition bargaining is to talk with party elites 
systematically and listen carefully. From May 1989, through 
October 1990, I talked with 143 members of party elites in 
Denmark, Norway, France, Italy and the U.K. in open 
interviews lasting somewhat more than half an hour each. The 
systematic analysis of these interviews provides the basis 
for the discussion presented in this thesis.
Finally, the study's format is comprised of five 
empirically-based chapters, which follow the next chapter in 
which the theoretical framework is formulated. The third 
and the fourth chapters cover the Danish case during 1975- 
1982 and 1988-1990, and the Norwegian one during 1976-1990. 
They present the intra-party consequences of the following 
alliances: (i) informal minority governments involving
highly institutionalized parties in a governmental position, 
(ii) formal minority governments involving highly and weakly 
institutionalized parties, and (iii) formal minority govern­
ments involving weakly institutionalized parties. Whereas no 
intra-party conflicts were evident in the former, the
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dominant mode of internal conflict, evident in the two latter 
cases, was an intra-elite one.
The fifth chapter examines the intra-party consequences 
of the 'historic compromise' in the Italian polity during 
1976-1979. It covers the evolution of elite-follower and 
intra-elite conflicts within highly and weakly institution­
alized parties, respectively. The sixth chapter focuses on 
the intra-party consequences of the Lib-Lab Pact in the 
British polity during 1977-1978. It examines intra-elite 
and elite-follower conflicts within weakly institutionalized 
partners. An examination of the thesis' main argument in the 
semi-presidential French system during 1988-1990 is presented 
in the seventh chapter. It investigates intra-elite and 
elite-follower conflicts within weakly and highly 
institutionalized partners, respectively. The concluding 
chapter discusses the argument of the thesis and its 
implication for the study of coalitional behaviour.
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2. THE RESEARCH STRATEGY
This chapter presents a theoretical explanation to the 
query which may be formulated as follows; How do conflicts 
within a party affect its coalitional behaviour insofar as 
such conflicts may influence the bargaining power of party 
elites in the parliamentary arena?. Undoubtedly, intra-party 
politics is extremely complex. At a sufficiently detailed 
level, every party is unique, with its own organizational 
form arrived at on its own evolutionary track. Each stage of 
coalitional behaviour does not resemble any other as the 
'bargaining setting' normally differs. The approach, 
however, is to emphasize similarities amongst patterns of 
internal conflicts and coalition behaviour rather than 
differences.
The first section addresses on theoretical terms the 
role of intra-party politics in coalitional behaviour. By 
raising a paradox in Groennings and Panebianco's applications 
of party institutionalization to coalitional behaviour,^ it 
suggests that the strength of a party in the parliamentary 
bargaining plane, that is, its relative bargaining power, 
lies in its organizational weakness. It hypothesizes, 
thereafter, that in multi-party systems within which minority 
situations occur, a formation of formal minority governments 
is the most attractive strategy for weakly institution-
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alized parties whereas a formation of informal minority 
governments is the most attractive strategy for a highly 
institutionalized parties which occupies a governmental 
position.
To examine and explain the above hypothesis naturally
requires data. The second section thus presents the sampling
strategy - the 'most different system' design - upon which
the Danish, Norwegian, Italian, British and the French party
2
systems were selected. The variables that were chosen to 
differentiate between the systems, are those which Strom 
found to be the most significant explanatory factors of 
minority government formation - the potential influence of 
the parlimentary opposition and the decisiveness of the 
election for coalitional bargaining power.^
Obviously, once one begins to think seriously about 
gathering information from such an heterogeneous selection of 
party systems, one is struck by the degree to which such 
data, to the extent to which it exists, is in one way or 
another noncomparable from one country to another, or even 
from one party to another within the same country. Even for 
so rudimentary a question as intra-party conflicts, the data 
are often unavailable, and when available are even more often 
based on journalistic interpretations that are neither 
constructive nor specific. As a result, the final goal of
this chapter is to present the main method of data 
collection, namely, elite interviewing.
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2.1 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Precisely because party elites and members can be seen 
not as a unitary actor, but as divided into competing sub­
groups, party politics retains the fundamental role in 
alliance politics of being the basic element for the 
distribution of intra-party power. In this sense, one can 
see different subgroups or individuals having somewhat 
different attitudes to the party's coalitional behaviour. 
Such difference of attitudes within a party illustrate very 
clearly the 'bargaining problem' faced by party elites.
After presenting the basic assumptions which underline 
the model, the intent of the second sub-section is to explain 
the notion of 'bargaining problem'. According to Sjoblom, it 
refers to the need for party elites to reach some settlement 
in parliament, but, at the same time, the wish to settle on
4
terms favourable to themselves. The purpose thereafter is 
to present its two components, namely, the interaction 
problem, which goes from the extreme of intra-party 
disagreement to the opposite extreme of conflict, and the 
bargaining power, which implies the power of a party to bind 
itself.^
A substantial part of the third sub-section incorporates 
'intra-party conflict' and 'bargaining power' into the 
process of coalitional behaviour whilst establishing the
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relevancy of party institutionalization as an intervening 
variable in the relationships between the two. The fourth 
sub-section, presents the paradox in the application of party 
institutionalization to coalitional behaviour. Based on the 
paradox, the last sub-section suggests the typology which 
schematizes the interaction between the type of intra-party 
conflicts and the level of party institutionalization.
2.1.1 BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
While Schilling's concept of 'bargaining power' suggests 
that parties are necessary and important in determining who 
governs, it does not follow that parties are equally 
important in determining what governments do. Two basic 
assumptions must be made if parties are expected to make 
policy in a governmental or oppositional position: (i) 
parties have policy intentions, and (ii) it is possible to 
identify which 'part' of a party determines its policies.
From the perspective of practical analysis of political 
parties, it is necessary to assume that parties are more or 
less motivated by the strength of their policy preferences. 
A substantial reason for this lies in the inability of party 
elites to attract enough adherents (i.e. to create an 
effective organization) on the basis of office as an end in 
itself. Some party members can be enticed by the hope of
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future office or by the pleasures of association with men 
close to power. But incentives must be offered to attract 
activists, financial contributors and volunteers. Policy, 
which is an end in itself, provides the necessary inducement.
Additionally, by assuming that parties aim at achieving 
policy objective, the extent to which those outside 
government can effect policy can be evaluated. Legislative 
strategies, such as defeating governmental bills or providing 
an external support in critical division, can force the 
government to change its policy outputs. Of course, a 
party's ability to make such moves depends upon the extent to 
which it is pivotal in the legislature. If a party is 
pivotal, given its parliamentary strength in terms of seats, 
then it will be pivotal whether it is in or out of 
government. If it is not pivotal, then government membership 
can make no difference to its legislative voting power.
The model also assumes that it is possible to identify 
which 'part' of a party determines its policies. A 
substantial reason for this lies in the fact that party 
behaviour grows out of the independence of party elites as 
bargaining actors. Parties have to be regarded as 
independent bargaining actors in two significant respects. 
Firstly, they are strategic actors, that is, the special 
position they occupy in the political system enables them to 
initiate party system change as well as to alter its 
direction to their own advantage.^ They are also 'adaptive
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actors', i.e. they have to be able to adapt if they are to 
cope with changing circumstances.*^ In all these respects, 
party elites play a decisive part.
A third assumption which concerns the motivation of 
party elites is also of prime importance. The model assumes 
that party elites are motivated above all by the desire to
p
remain party leaders. In other words, for party leaders 
in office, it is more important to remain party leaders than 
to remain in office. If intra-party conflicts threatens 
their positions, rather than stay in government they will 
leave office to remain party leaders. One can hardly expect 
a party leader to be thrown out of office following a 
miscalculation of the trade-off between party cohesion and 
strategy. Rather, it is reasonable to expect a gradual 
erosion in the leader's position within the party following 
such circumstances.
To sum up, the model is based on the assumptions that 
parties have policy intentions, and it is possible to 
identify which 'part' of a party determines its policy. 
Additionally, it assumes that party leaders are motivated 
above all by the desire to remain party leaders. These 
assumptions provide the context within which the notion of 
'winning' in the intra- and inter-party arenae can be 
defined.
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2.1.2 THE BARGAINING PROBLEM
The basic perspective guiding this analysis is the
presumption that most political conflict situations are to be
seen essentially as bargaining situations, that is to say,
situations in which the ability of a party to gain its ends
is, to a significant degree, dependent upon the choices or
decisions made by other parties. When two or more parties
experience conflicts of opinion, they will decide to bargain
because they wish to resolve their differences in a
mutually beneficial way. Each party comes to the bargaining
table with a certain power base, with alternatives upon which
it will be willing to concede or refuse any conditions
desired by its opponents. The bargaining process is thus
shaped by the tactics which parties use to gain their desired
ends. In this case, according to Schelling, winning
[...] does not have a strictly competitive meaning; it 
is not winning relative to one's adversary. It means 
gaining relative to one's value system; and this may be 
done by bargaining, by mutual accommodation, and by 
avoidance of mutually damaging behaviour [...].
Viewing conflict behaviour as a bargaining process provides 
us with an image of the bargaining problems which party 
elites may face. In multi-party systems, a 'bargaining 
problem' refers to situations in which there is a need for 
party elites to reach some settlement in parliament, but, at 
the same time, they wish to settle on terms favourable to 
t h e m s e l v e s . T h e  bargaining problem can be divided into
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two components: (i) the interaction problem within a party,
and, (ii) the bargaining power of a party.
An interaction problem within a party may vary from
mere disagreements on the one hand to extreme internal
conflicts on the other. For the purpose of this thesis, in
which the focus is on the latter extreme, intra-party
conflict is taken to signify intra-elite (e.g. within
parliamentary group) and elite-follower (e.g. elite contra
party members) conflicts, following an alliance, which result
in a deterioration of the party's stability and cohesion,
respectively.^^ Operational criteria, both of which are
necessary to designate an internal dispute as an intra-party
conflict, include: (i) party elites' perception of the
intra-party strife as an attempt to change their coalitional 
12behaviour, and, (ii) patterns of organizational decline, 
i.e. exit and voice by party members.
To resort to voice, rather than exit, signifies an 
attempt to change the coalitional behaviour of the party 
elites. Voice is defined, according to Hirschman, as 'any 
attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from an 
objectionable state of affairs [...]'.^^ Thus, voice can 
be graduated all the way from faint grumbling to violent 
protest; it implies articulation of one's critical opinions 
rather than 'cumbrous' exit, defection or resignation.
We have at our disposal at least seven indicators of 
organizational decline which are shown in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1 Indicators of Organizational Decline following 
Intra-Party Conflicts.
level of intra-party conflict 
intra-elite elite-follower
patterns of EXIT
organizational
decline VOICE
resignation of 
elite member/s
^dissensions in 
parliament 
*petition 
*appeal to party 
elites with the 
intention of 
forcing a change 
in party strategy
decline in party 
membership
♦demonstrations 
♦petition 
♦appeal to party 
elites with the 
intention of 
forcing a 
change in 
party strategy
Intra-elite conflicts may be manifested by the pursuit of
the exit option, namely, resignation of elite members, and/or 
the voice option, namely, dissensions in parliament,
petition, and an appeal to party elites with the intention of 
forcing a change in party strategy. Elite-follower conflicts 
may be manifested by the pursuit of the exit option, namely, 
a decline in party membership, or/and the voice option, 
namely, demonstrations of party activists, petitions, and an 
appeal to party elites with the intention of forcing a change 
in party strategy.
Bargaining power refers to the power of a party to bind 
itself.^* Self binding is closely related to the
credibility of threat which depends on how visible to the
threatened party is the inability of the threatening party to
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rationalize its way into or out of its commitment. From an 
intra-party point of view, the credibility of a party's 
threat is significantly affected by the ability of party 
elites to cope with internal conflicts. In the parliamentary 
arena, both voice and exit are costly in terms of a party's 
bargaining power. The cost of devoting even a modicum of 
elites' time and resources to resolve internal conflict 
undermines their bargaining power. Elites' perception of 
credibility of threats can provide an accurate picture of 
intra- and inter-party dynamics. For operational purposes, 
therefore, bargaining power will be defined as the power of a 
party to commit itself to parliamentary co-operation over its 
'decisive preference' as perceived by the party and the 
competitor elites.
According to Bacharach and L a w l e r , t h r e e  assumptions 
are in order:
(i) Power is the essence of bargaining - it is assumed 
that bargaining power pervades all aspects of bargaining and 
is the key to an integrative analysis of context, process and 
outcome. It is the major construct by which party elites 
organizes its experience in bargaining. The concept of power 
adopted here is therefore a tactical approach to power.
(ii) Bargaining is a process of tactical action - a 
tactical approach to power accepts the distinction between 
potential and actual power, but discerns a third dimension 
the use of power. This approach views potential power in 
terms of power tactics, thus the focus is on the use and 
effectiveness of specific tactics. Party elites select 
tactics from a relatively wide range of options in order to 
improve their power position. The tactics deal with 
different dimensions of bargaining power, and therefore, 
party elites will use different dimensions of bargaining 
power to evaluate and make decisions about different tactics.
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(iii) Bargaining power is subjective power - bargainers 
continuously process information imperfectly, and this 
information forms the basis for their tactical action. 
Parties can only estimate the resources or commitments of 
their opponents. Perceptions are a crucial mean in such 
relations.
Bargaining power, therefore, must always be expressed 
relative to another's bargaining power, that it has no 
meaning as applied to a political party. Once a party's 
decisive preference is perceived as being accomplished by the 
actors involved in an alliance, we can conclude that the 
party possesses a relatively high level of bargaining power 
in the relevant arena.
As noted earlier, voice and exit are likely to be active 
mechanisms primarily with respect to the more substantial 
inter-party relationships. Elite and party members will 
ordinarily base their decision on past experience of elite 
reaction to dissenting behaviour. As a result, one might 
expect constant evolution of new directions of expressing 
dissatisfaction, especially with regard to the voice option. 
Yet, the central point of Hirschman's analysis was that the 
presence of the exit alternative can tend to atrophy the 
development of the art of v o i c e . T h e  existence of the 
exit option in the realm of party politics, thus, indicates 
that our indicators of organizational decline cover the 
range of alternatives to internal opposition.
So far it was argued that party elites which face intra­
party conflicts function largely as a negotiation organ for
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the various member or groups even before the party declares 
its bargaining position. Each bargaining position reflects 
the elites' trade-off between party cohesion and its alliance 
strategy. Each position therefore is a product of internal 
compromise which might effect the bargaining power of the 
party. Attention now turns to an intra-party perspective of 
coalitional behaviour.
2.1.3 THE PROCESS OF COALITIONAL BEHAVIOUR: THE RELEVANCY OF 
'PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION'
Constructing legislative majorities can be considered 
the aim of any party which has policy intentions. For 
participants in minority governments, the problem of
constructing legislative majorities differs from those
operating in majority situations. Multi-party competition 
in a majority situation offers a party two alternatives: 
government or opposition. Minority governments, on the 
other hand, direct their strategy towards 'externally
supported' type of government (i.e. explicit or implicit
understanding that the parties in question will support the 
government). A variation of 'externally supported' minority 
government occurs when there is an understanding, possibly 
formal, that the party in question will abstain on critical 
divisions. 'Formal' refers to prior negotiation between 
the government and the party supporting it, which results in 
an explicit, comprehensive and more than short-term contract.
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It was already argued that the central elements of 
bargaining are the tactical moves and countermoves (e.g. 
alliance strategy) by which parties attempt to resolve the 
bargaining problems. There are different ways that the idea 
of inter-party commitments may be applied to bargaining 
relations in minority situations. Strom differentiates 
between formal and informal minority governments.^^ 
Whereas the former refers to an administration whose 
legislative support is negotiated prior to formation of the 
government through explicit, comprehensive, and more than a 
short-term contract, the latter lacks the above-mentioned 
features. In the Strom's categorization, therefore, the 
relationships between the government and the party supporting 
it were the only ones which were taken into consideration.
From an intra-party point of view, the importance of the 
formal relationship amongst coalition partners is as relevant 
as the formal relationship between the government and the 
party supporting it. Both sets of relationships share the 
same pattern of potential evolution of conflicts (e.g. 
internal conflicts seem most likely to occur following a 
formal alliance than an informal one). As a formal alliance 
in minority situations can be traced in the relationship 
amongst coalition partners as well as the relationship 
between the government and the party supporting it, it is 
reasonable to classify both sets of relations under 'formal 
minority government'.
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In minority situations, party elites which continuously
face conflictuel situations, will use tactical moves and
countermoves in the parliamentary arena in an attempt to
resolve the bargaining problem. They will have to commit
the party to co-operative relationships in such a way as to
ensure party cohesion. This brings out very clearly - as
Figure 2.1 shows - the significance of intra-party conflicts
and their consequences with respect to coalitional behaviour.
Figure 2.1 indicates that the fundamental relationships
considered here are those pertaining to a party's leadership,
linkages between the leadership and the party base, and the
effect of these considerations on the party's coalitional
behaviour. Internal relationships are not only a matter of
democracy, but also a matter of manageability. Under these
circumstances, party institutionalization, which effects the
elites' ability to cope with internal conflicts, becomes an
intervening variable in the relationship between intra-party
18conflicts and bargaining power.
Figure 2.1 The Process of Coalitional Behaviour
Intra-Party — Bargaining Power — ►  Coalition Behaviour 
Conflicts A
Intervening Variable:
Party Institutionalization
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By raising a paradox in Groennings and Panebianco's 
applications of party institutionalization to alliance 
strategy - in the next section - the factors that influence 
bargaining power of party elites in the parliamentary arena 
will be identified.
2.1.4 THE PARADOX
As noted earlier, the nature of party
institutionalization as a variable in coalition politics has
been raised by Groennings who maintained that the more
centralised they are, the stronger parties are as coalition 
19actors. A similar view is presented by Panebianco who
concluded that alliances amongst parties inevitably
20destabilize the less institutionalized organizations.
A logical problem is created here: Why are highly
institutionalized parties considered to be effective 
coalitional actors if they lack the internal fluidity 
necessary to adjust to dissent among their members?. At the 
outset, students of politics might expect that highly 
institutionalized parties would possess more defences with 
respect to internal challenges, as their instruments of 
control over such uncertainties are concentrated in the hands 
of the party elites. Such parties, however, lack mechanisms 
for the diffusion of dissent, such as dissension in 
parliament and factions within the party. In contrast, it is
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the weakly institutionalized parties that are characterized 
by mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent, as well as the 
ability to establish new mechanisms, such as the formation of 
new factions.
The above-mentioned applications of party 
institutionalization to coalition politics, therefore, raise 
a paradox. Literally formulated, the strength of a party in 
the parliamentary bargaining plane, that is, its relative 
bargaining power, lies in its organizational weakness. The 
mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent allow the party to 
handle internal dissent in a variety of manageable ways 
without forcing members to leave the party. As a result, the 
weakly institutionalized party can enter into conflict 
inducing coalition negotiations with other parties without 
risking its hold on its own elite and party members. The 
highly institutionalized party, on the other hand, lacks the 
internal fluidity necessary to adjust to dissent among its 
members, and therefore is at a disadvantage when it enters 
parliamentary negotiations. When inter-party negotiations 
induce internal conflicts, members may be forced to leave the 
party as their primary mechanism for the expression of 
dissent. In other words, a highly institutionalized organiz­
ation can lead to party disintegration when such a party 
enters serious coalition negotiations with other parties.
As noted earlier, top party elites (i.e. cabinet 
ministers and/or party leader) differ in the extent they
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control intra-elite and elite-follower conflicts. The fact 
that parliamentary group members are interested primarily in 
'selective incentives' emphasizes their dependency on the top 
party leadership. This, in turn, enhances the elites' 
ability to control their behaviour. Less influence can be 
exerted on party followers, however, as they are primarily 
interested in 'collective incentives'. Consequently, the 
elites' ability to cope with dissenting behaviour of 
parliamentarians is likely to be greater than their ability 
to cope with hostility of party followers. Given the above- 
mentioned paradox, such an evaluation seems to be manifested 
acutely in an highly institutionalized context.
The main questions that follow are: (i) How do intra­
elite and elite-follower conflict, which evolve during a 
coalition's life-span, interact with the degree of party 
institutionalization? and, (ii) How does the relationship 
between internal conflicts and the level of party 
institutionalization affect the party's bargaining power in 
the parliamentary arena? These questions will be adressed 
in the following section.
2.1.5 FACTORS INFLUENCING BARGAINING POWER: A TYPOLOGY
Intra-party conflicts and party institutionalization can 
be considered separately from one another, so that different 
degrees of institutionalization need not affect the evolution
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of intra-party conflicts, nor need the latter alter 
institutionalization. The relationship between internal 
conflicts and the level of party institutionalization is 
shown in Figure 2.2.
To begin with, all four cases represent party elites 
which face intra-party conflicts. The cases are not
exclusive because intra-elite and elite-follower conflicts 
can occur within a party at the same time. It is reasonable 
to suggest, however, that in the case of any one particular
Figure 2.2 A Typology: Factors Influencing Bargaining Power
Type of
Intra-Party
Conflict
intra­
elite
elite-
follower
Party Institutionalization 
high weak
party, either intra-elite or elite-follower will 
ordinarily be the dominant conflict mode. The subsidiary 
conflict is then likely to manifests itself to such a limited 
degree that it will never become destructive for the simple 
reason that, if the decrease in the degree of cohesion and/or
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stability proceed, the job of destruction is accomplished 
single-handedly by the dominant conflict mode.
Generally speaking, a highly institutionalized party 
drastically limits its internal actors' margin of 
manoeuvrability. When intra-elite conflicts occur within a 
highly institutionalized party as a result of its coalitional 
behaviour (i.e. case 1), resignation of elite members 
probably seem to be the main alternative of expressing 
dissatisfaction. This is mainly because no dissenting 
activities in parliament and decision-making bodies within 
the party are allowed by the organization. Similarly, when 
elite-follower conflicts evolve within a highly 
institutionalized party due to its coalitional behaviour 
(i.e. case 3), activists and militants might leave the party 
or express their dissatisfaction by extremist actions outside 
the party (riots and violent demonstrations, for example) due 
to the lack of mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent.
On the other hand, when intra-elite or elite-follower 
conflicts occur within a weakly institutionalized party, 
following an alliance (i.e. cases 2 and 4), it is reasonable 
to expect dissenting voices, rather than exit. As one can 
express his\her disagreement from the party line within the 
party, there is no immediate need for exit. From the elites' 
point of view, it can mobilize dissatisfaction through the 
internal network, controlling the evolution and the direction 
of the conflict.
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with regard to neutralizing different types of internal
conflicts, it is important to note that top party elites tend
to exert greater influence on elite members than on party
activists, as the former are primarily interested in
selective incentives, that is, benefits that the organization
distributes only to some of the participants and in varying 
21amounts. Consequently, the elites' ability to cope with
dissenting behaviour of their members is most likely to be 
greater than their ability to cope with followers' hostility. 
This evaluation seems relevant to weakly, as well as, highly 
institutionalized parties.
The ability of party elites to deal with internal 
conflicts affect the party's bargaining power in the 
parliamentary arena. The advantage of the weakly 
institutionalized party in pacifying intra-elite 
dissatisfaction is translated into a superior position in the 
parliamentary bargaining plane. It is reasonable also to 
expect a similar translation, although to a lesser extent, 
with regard to followers' hostility. On the other hand, the 
disadvantage of the highly institutionalized party in 
pacifing internal opposition is translated into an inferior 
position in the parliamentary bargaining arena. Such a 
pattern is most likely to be acutely manifested when 
followers' hostility emerges.
The above discussion brings out very clearly the 
following set of hypotheses:
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1. If intra-elite or elite-follower conflicts occur within 
a weakly institutionalized party, as a result of its 
coalitional behaviour, the party elites tend to 
possess a relatively high level of bargaining power.
If intra-elite conflicts occur within a highly 
institutionalized party, as a result of its coalitional 
behaviour, the party elites tend to possess a relatively 
low level of bargaining power (i.e. as they are most 
likely to modify their coalitional behaviour after 
failing to neutralize such conflicts).
If elite-follower conflicts occur within a highly 
institutionalized party, as a result of its coalitional 
behaviour, the party elites tend to possess an extremely 
low level of bargaining power and/or modify their 
coalitional behaviour immediatelv after such conflicts 
emerge .
In order to capture the complexity of bargaining power, 
cases in which internal conflicts do not occur should be 
taken into account. Two additional factors are of relevance. 
Firstly, intra-party conflicts are most likely to evolve as a 
result of a formal, rather than an informal alliance, as the 
former is more binding and visible than the latter. 
Secondly, a governmental position gives an advantage to the 
party\ies occupying it in terms of control over policy 
formation and implementation. The final hypothesis can now 
be formulated as follows:
As long as a highly institutionalized party which 
occupies a governmental position forms informal 
alliances, it tends to avoid intra-party conflicts and, 
thus, possesses a relatively high level of bargaining 
power.
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The reasoning behind hypotheses 1 and 2 lies in the 
nature of the internal conflicts and the existence of 
heterogeneous and diffused mechanisms for internal dissent. 
As noted earlier, internal opposition within weakly 
institutionalized parties tends to pursue the voice option, 
whereas internal opposition within highly institutionalized 
parties tends to pursue the exit and the voice (mainly 
outside the party) options. A substantial reason beyond this 
lies in the lack of mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent 
within the latter type of parties. Exit and\or dissenting 
voices outside these parties appear to be the only option for 
the expression of dissent. On the other hand, internal 
dissatisfaction within weakly institutionalized parties can 
be expressed via dissenting activities within the internal 
network.
Elites within weakly institutionalized parties therefore 
tend to resolve internal conflict without having to modify 
their coalitional behaviour. Elites within highly
institutionalized parties, on the other hand, tend to resolve 
internal conflicts by modifying their coalitional strategy. 
The flexibility of the former parties, in terms of their 
ability to pacify internal opposition is immediately 
translated into a superior position in the parliamentary 
bargaining plane. The disadvantage of the highly 
institutionalized party is translated into an inferior 
position in the parliamentary arena.
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Hypothesis 3 is based on the relatively greater control 
of party elites on their members, compared with the control 
they possess over their followers. Thus, intra-elite
conflicts tend to be less difficult to cope with, compared to 
elite-followers conflicts. In other words, we can expect 
varying measures to be implemented by party elites in order 
to cope with different types of internal conflicts.
Within weakly institutionalized parties, dissatisfaction 
of parliamentary group members is most likely to be 
neutralized by the elites' acceptance of dissenting 
activities and the formation of new factions. Hostility of 
party followers may require a resignation threat by the 
leader in addition to the above-mentioned measures. Within 
highly institutionalized parties, dissatisfaction of 
parliamentary group members may require imposing structural 
constraints on the day-to-day operation of the government 
(before modifying the party's alliance strategy). Followers' 
hostility may require an 'articulation of ends', as well as a 
change in the party's alliance strategy. A weakly institut­
ionalized party can take advantage of its mechanisms for the 
diffusion of dissent in order to deal with both types of 
internal conflicts. It seems reasonable to expect, 
therefore, that the difference between the elites' control 
over its members and the party followers will be acutely 
manifested in an highly institutionalized context (hypothesis 
3) .
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with regard to hypothesis 4, highly institutionalized 
parties which occupy a governmental position can minimize the 
possibility of intra-party conflicts by forming only informal 
alliances. Highly institutionalized parties which adopt such 
a strategy tend to possess a relatively high level of 
bargaining power in the parliamentary bargaining plane. By 
negotiating each issue separately and on ad-hoc basis,such 
parties can in each case select the least 'expensive' 
coalition partner available. 'Expensive' refers to a 
partner's ability to threaten the stability and cohesion of 
the party under study. Clearly, a strategy of ad hoc 
coalitions is especially profitable if there are many 
feasible coalition partners.
The object of the these arguments in no way implies a 
general theory of minority governments. The modest objective 
is rather to study the impact of intra-party conflicts on 
parliamentary co-operation in minority situations. It seeks 
no less but no more than to show that, over cases observed 
and within the period designated, intra-party conflicts faced 
by party elites bore a direct impact on the party's alliance 
strategy.
2.2 A SAMPLE OF WEST EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEMS
The above hypotheses clearly indicate that systemic 
factors are not given any special place among the possible
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predictors of party behaviour in the parliamentary arena.
Rather, the strategy focuses on the variation in coalitional
behaviour at a level lower than the party system, namely, the
level of political parties. Consequently, the 'most
different systems' design was adopted as the sampling 
22method. Such a strategy eliminates factors different­
iating between political systems by formulating hypotheses 
that are valid regardless of the systems within which the 
observations were made. Still, the goal remains the obvious 
aim in any comparative analysis, to account for, in casual
terms, the observed patterns in an accurate, general and
23parsimonious way.
As we seek maximal heterogeneity in the sample of
systems, the first step is to identify the factors which
signify differentiation between party systems. Given the
thesis' definition of coalition maintenance, it is necessary
to consider systemic variables which explain majority
building in minority situations. Strom's explanatory
variables - the potential influence of the parliamentary
opposition and the decisiveness of elections for coalitional
24bargaining power - spring immediately to mind. This is
not to say that factors other than the above are less useful 
in differentiating amongst party systems. It is rather to 
stress that the sampling method follows the logic of 
coalitional behaviour processes which was outlined in the 
theoretical framework.
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The potential influence of the parliamentary opposition,
which measures the benefits of governing, represents the
structural opportunities for legislative influence open to
opposition. The greater the potential influence of the
opposition, Strom claims, the lower the relative benefits of
governing, and the higher the probability of minority 
25government. In line with this argument, a five-point
index of the potential influence for oppositional influence,
based on the properties of parliamentary committees, was
constructed. The index aggregates the following indicators:
the number of standing committees, whether the standing
committees have fixed areas of specialization, whether such
jurisdiction correspond to ministerial departments, whether
there are any restrictions on the number of committee
assignments per legislator, and finally, whether committee
chairs are proportionally distributed among the parliamentary 
2 6parties. Each government's score - shown in Appendix 2.1
- is simply the sum of positive values; thus the hypothetical
range is from 0 to 5.
Whilst the potential influence of the parliamentary
opposition, measures the policy costs of being in opposition,
the decisiveness of election taps costs of governing in
future elections. As oppositional influence and electoral
decisiveness increase, Strom predicts, the parliamentary
bases of the governments formed should diminish, and the
27likelihood of minority government formation increase.
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The latter variable has four components operationalized as
follows: the identiflability of viable government
alternatives, electoral competitiveness or volatility,
electoral responsiveness (i.e. governments be formed by
parties that have gained rather than lost seats in the
election), and finally proximity (i.e. government be formed
28in close proximity to general elections. A summary of
electoral decisiveness scores by country - shown in Appendix
2.2 - presents all four component variables.
Consequently, Denmark, Norway, France, Italy and the 
U.K. were chosen as the focus of research since they were 
found to be 'different' with respect to the above-mentioned 
variables. With regard to the potential influence of the 
opposition (Appendix 2.1), whilst the U.K. is characterized 
by a low influence of opposition (scored only 1), Norway can 
be considered a classic example of high oppositional 
influence (scored 5). Additionally, Italy, France and 
Denmark, which scored 4, 4 and 3 respectively, can, to a
lesser extent, be included in the latter group. With regard 
to electoral decisiveness (Appendix 2.2), the above five 
party systems vary along all four component variables. The 
U.K. is characterized by the highest level of electoral 
decisiveness whilst high levels were also recorded in the 
Danish and Norwegian systems. Italy and France, on the other 
hand, are characterized by relatively low levels of electoral 
decisiveness.
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Having reduced the sample of minority governments under 
study to those operating within five different political 
systems enables a greater measure of analytical depth. The 
particular combination of Denmark, Norway, Italy, France, and 
the U.K., furthermore, recommends itself for three reasons. 
Firstly, it captures a possibly extreme leap in patterns of 
coalitional behaviour, found within the European context in 
moving, for example, from the Mediterranean to the 
Scandinavian arena. Secondly, precisely because all cases 
represent numerous examples of minority government. Lastly, 
the fact that all countries chosen have illustrated both 
short- and long-lived minority governments, enhances the 
validity of any generalization.
With the countries under examination identified, 
attention now turns to the types of minority governments 
chosen. As noted earlier, two main types of inter-party 
commitments in minority situations can be traced - formal 
and informal minority governments. Table 2.2 presents the 
inter-party relationships in minority situations which fall 
in the scope of our study. The effort is therefore invested 
in trying to shed light on elites' ability to cope with 
internal conflicts and the derived consequences in the 
parliamentary arena. Such an undertaking, it should be
stressed, is exceedingly ambitious, for it means that party 
elites within a specific type of party organization have 
the same mechanisms to cope with intra-party conflicts.
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Given the type of party organization and the nature of 
internal conflicts, therefore, coalitional behaviour in 
minority situations could be effected at the same way across 
political systems.
Table 2.2 A Sample of Minority Governments
Government
Formation
date
Demission
date
Governmental
Parties
Type of 
Min. Gov.
Norway
Nordli I Jan 76 Sep 77 DNA Informal
Nordli II Sep 77 Jan 81 DNA Informal
Brundtland I Feb 81 Oct 81 DNA Informal
Willoch I Oct 81 Jun 83 CP Informal
Willoch III Sep 85 May 86 CP,KrF,SP Formal
Brundtland II May 86 Oct 89 DNA Informal
Syse Oct 89 Nov 90 CP,KrF,SP Formal
Denmark
Jorgensen II Feb 75 Feb 77 SD Informal
Jorgensen III Feb 77 Aug 78 SD Informal
Jorgensen IV Aug 78 Sep 79 SD,V Formal
Jorgensen V Oct 79 Dec 81 SD Informal
Jorgensen VI Dec 81 Sep 82 SD Informal
Schluter IV Jun 88 Dec 90 CPP,V,RV Formal
France
Rocard Jun 88 May 91 PS Informal
Italy
Andreotti III Jul 76 Jul 77 DC Informal
Aug 77 Mar 78 DC Formal
Andreotti IV Mar 78 Jan 79 DC Formal
U.K.
Callaghan Mar 77 Jul 78 Lab. Formal
Source; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1976-1990.
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To sum up, the fundamental purpose is to explain why 
coalitional behaviour varies across political systems. By 
concentrating on the level of political parties, the sampling 
net was targeted to catch party elites in five different 
political systems. To be able to assess what lies beneath 
different alliance strategies, factors commonly measured but 
varing in their levels, were explicitly built into the 
research design. These factors are being thoroghly 
investigated in numerous cases across political systems.
2.3 A SURVEY OF ELITES
The best way to learn about the impact of intra-party
politics on coalitional behaviour is to explore the attitudes
29and perceptions of party elites across political systems. 
The inquiry thus lies at the juncture of two important 
approaches to the study of politics, namely, elite theory and 
political culture. The former offers two related, but 
distinct, propositions.^^ The first is that in any 
political system some actors are more important than others 
and merit closer scrutiny from academic observers. The 
second is that they constitute a relatively unified and 
autonomous group. The major premise of the political culture 
approach is that the character and development of a political 
system is conditioned by the elites' perceptions and
o8
attitudes.
As shown in table 2.3, 143 members of party elites in 
Denmark, Norway, Italy, France and the U.K. were interviewed 
during 1988-1990 (see list in Appendix 2.3). Those
politicians were chosen according to three criteria: (i)
formal position in the party heirarchy, (ii) evaluation of 
local academics, and (iii) recommendation of local 
politicians. The sampling net thus was targeted to catch 
politicians at the top of government and party heirarchy, 
such as prime ministers, ministers, party leaders and the 
leaders of parliamentary groups.
Table 2.3 A Sample of Elites: Size, Dates of Field Research 
and Period under Investigation
Party Period under
System investigation
Period of Number of
field research interviews
Denmark 
Italy 
The U.K. 
France 
Norway
1975-1990
1976-1979
1977-1978 
1988-1990 
1976-1990
May, 1989 
Oct, 1989 
Feb, 1990 
Apr, 1990 
Oct, 1990
38 
16 
30 
20
39
In order to probe the formal and informal nuances of
intra-party politics and coalitional behaviour, an open-ended
un-structured interview instrument was employed. The reason
for this lies in the fact that the open-ended questions have
32the virtue of greater response validity. The interviews 
were recorded and all the interviewees were told at the 
beginning that the interview will be an atributional one.
59
At the end of each interview, an informal un-recorded 
discussion was conducted especially in order to elicit 
sensitive data concerning intra-party power struggles and 
conflicts. Additionally, in order to increase the
reliability of the data gathered during the interview, a 
twofold strategy was implemented. Firstly, any interviewee's 
perception of intra-party conflict was confirmed by at least 
another elite member. Secondly, attitudes of at least three 
elite members concerning aspects of coalitional behaviour 
were taken to signify the party's view on this matter.
Naturally, the actual value of elite interviewing 
depends on whether they offer a central or secondary means of 
fulfilling a research project, and this depends first and 
foremost on the kind of problems being examined, but also on 
the availability and quality of alternative sources. This 
general remark applies particularly to political parties in 
liberal democracies as a field of study. Since parties are 
relatively open institutions they are usually reported on in 
detail in the press and their own documentation may be 
reasonably available to researchers. Given the need of 
controlling for memory or political bias or situational 
problems in interviews, secondary sources, such as official 
statistics and newspapers, provide a useful basis for 
corroborating interview material.
A comparative study like the present one obviously runs 
risks because methodological difficulties rise geometrically
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with the number of countries studied. These difficulties 
alert us to the need for constant sensitivity to the genuine 
pecularities of each country. But if we are to understand 
the full complexity of intra-party conflicts and their impact 
on coalitional behaviour, the benefits of explicit cross­
national comparison far outweigh the perils.
b l
3. INTRA-PARTY POLITICS AND MINORITY GOVERNMENTS IN 
DENMARK, 1975-1982, 1988-1990
The aim of this chapter first of all is to demonstrate 
that the formation of informal minority governments is the 
most attractive strategy for highly institutionalized 
parties. When such parties form formal minority 
governments, elites' members may be forced to resign as their 
the primary mechanism for the expression of dissent. When 
weakly institutionalized parties enter into formal 
agreements, however, internal dissatisfaction tends to be 
absorbed internally, through the network which allows for 
dissenting behaviour.
Secondly, its purpose is to establish that both highly 
and weakly institutionalized parties tend to insist on 
decisive preferences that are sufficiently focused to 
generate the widest possible support within the party. In 
the case of highly institutionalized parties, however, the 
elites tend to impose structural constraints on the day-to- 
day operation of the government (such as, the establishment 
of an inner cabinet and a principle of mutual veto in 
decision-making processes). Due to the lack of mechanisms 
for the diffusion of dissent, those parties are forced to 
modify their coalitional strategy in order to maintain party 
stability.
With regard to the impact of intra-party conflicts on 
parties' bargaining power, it will be shown that as long as a 
highly institutionalized party in a governmental position 
form informal minority governments, it tends to avoid
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internal conflicts and, thus possesses a relatively high 
level of bargaining power. However, once such a party forms 
a formal minority government, its disadvantage in mobilizing 
internal dissatisfaction is translated into a relatively 
inferior position in the bargaining arena. On the other 
hand, the flexibility of the weakly institutionalized party 
in neutralizing internal opposition is translated into a 
relatively superior position in the bargaining arena.
To support hypotheses 1, 2 and 4, this chapter examines 
the formation, maintenance and collapse of Danish minority 
governments during 1975-1982 and 1988-1990. The objective is 
to explain majority building strategies by highly and weakly 
institutionalized parties and their intra-party consequences. 
The chapter begins with an introductory section which 
provides the data concerning trends in Danish politics in the 
early 1970s.
The second section seeks to establish that the 
fundamental reason for the formation of the SD-V government 
in 1978 was the desire to form a stable co-operation which 
could adhere to a long-term economic policy which could bring 
about economic recovery. It will be shown that in the months 
following the coalition agreement, a conflict within the 
party's parliamentary group was recorded. The leader of the 
SD group in parliament, Jens Risgaard Knudsen, resigned 
following the conclusion of the SD-V accord. It will be 
demonstrated that in an attempt to pacify the intra-elite 
conflicts, the SD leader imposed structural constraints on 
the day-to-day operation of the coalition government. It
d3
will be argued that the failure of the SD elites to 
neutralize the internal opposition - highlighted by the 
break-up of the coalition government - was translated into an 
inferior position in the bargaining plane. With regard to 
the SB's relative bargaining power during 1975-1978 and 1979- 
1982, it will be shown that as long as the SD elites had 
formed informal alliances, the party avoided internal 
conflicts and, therefore, possessed a relatively high level 
of bargaining power.
The third section examines the conflicts between the RV 
parliamentary group and members of the cabinet over the 
formation of the CPP-V-RV government coalition during 1988- 
1989. It will be shown that in order to pacify internal 
opposition, the RV elites acquiesced and allowed decisions 
against government policy to be taken by party bodies. 
Dissatisfaction was, furthermore, neutralized by a confid­
ential agreement concerning the coalition strategy over 
potentially controversial issues, and the establishment of a 
special committee in parliament which enhanced discussions 
over foreign and security matters with the main opposition 
party, the SD. Due to the successful resolution of the 
intra-elite conflict, the analysis concludes that the 
bargaining power of the RV was not undermined. Perhaps, it 
can be argued, the RV's bargaining power increased as it 
took advantage of the conflict which evolved within its 
elite, demanding more concessions from its coalition partners 
in order to pacify its internal opposition.
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3.1 PARTY STRENGTH AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Danish politics, from the 1970s onwards, grew out of a 
major realignment which was manifested nation-wide in the 
1973 elections. It must be conceded, however, that from the 
1920s the wider political system was characterized by 
stability in terms of voter support, legislative policy­
making, a high predictability of cabinet formations and 
fairly long durations of governments in office.^ A partial 
explanation for the unique long-term stability can be derived
from the description of the Danish political system as a
2
'consensus system', which facilitated the development of a 
'working multiparty system',^ within a 'homogeneous and
4
secularized' political culture.
From its beginning, the parliamentary party system 
contained a core of four 'old' parties, namely the Social 
Democrats, the Radical Liberals, the Agrarian Liberals and 
the Conservatives, which could trace their history back to 
the ninteenth century. Additionally, a small and changing 
number of other parties, such as the Communist and the 
Justice party, were represented in the Folketina from 1932 to 
1960, and from 1926 to 1960, respectively. Following World 
War II, the four parties commanded almost 90 per cent of the 
seats, dominating the Folketina.^  However, the long-term 
trend of declining popularity for the 'old' parties may be 
partially explained by the shrinking support for the Liberal 
party due to the narrowing of the party's traditional 
supporting group of farmers.^
d5
Before going any further, it is appropriate to clarify 
the factors that contributed to the defeat of five incumbent 
parties in a single election. Among the most frequent cited 
long-term factors of change was the rapid shift to a 'service
7
society'. This process bore a direct impact on the
relationships amongst voter - social class - party, toward 
deteriorating bonds between the voter and the party 'in a 
way the old parties are suspended in the air, representing
p
something which no longer exists'.
Equally important, are a number of relatively shorter- 
term factors operating in Danish politics during the late 
1960s and early 1970s, such as tax reform, municipal reform, 
the liberalization of pornography and abortion rights. These 
reforms met with heavy criticism from many sectors of the 
population, thus increasing polarization among the parties in 
parliament and among voters and politicians. The defection 
of Erhard Jakobsen, the right-wing Social Democrat, 
furthermore, led the Prime Minister to dissolve the 
Folketina; and the defector to form the Center Democrats. 
Additionally, the formation of the Progress Party by Mogens 
Glistrup raised the need for change while intensifying the 
wave of political protest.
Yet, even among the parties riding the wave of political 
protest and social unrest, few old-timers - the Communist and 
the Justice Parties - had succeeded in entering into the 
party system due to their principled and unrelenting 
opposition to European integration and to Denmark joining the , 
EEC. Beside the new Christian People's Party which was
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formed with the main purpose of objecting to 'moral decay and
9
cultural nihilism', two new parties entered parliament 
representing a new party type. The CD cast itself as a new 
party without a traditional programme, aimed mainly at 
defending private property without rejecting the basic 
principles of the Welfare state and giving more emphasis to 
cultural issues. The Progress Party positioned itself as a 
popular movement operating against the 'old' parties.
The major realignment, however, did not preclude the
formation of subsequent minority governments in the Danish
polity. Understanding Danish post-war politics requires an
explanation for the frequent occurrence of minority
governments. Only three of 27 governments during 1945-1991
have not been minority c a b i n e t s . A  partial explanation
can be found in the Danish Constitution which does not
elaborate much on the process of government formation. In a
parliament as fragmented as the Folketina this leaves ample
room for manoeuvre. Consequently, a gradual development of
informal rules have filled the vacuum left by the 
12Constitution. Again, those rules can make the process of 
government formation rather complicated. A recent study, 
however, concluded that three factors (namely, strongly 
organized and future-oriented parties, decentralized and 
relatively nonhierarchical parliaments where opposition 
parties can be influental, and finally, highly competitive 
elections) account for the predominance of the minority type 
by inducing political parties to 'defer the gratification of 
holding office'.
67
Of primary relevance here is the classification of 
Danish parties according to degrees of institutionalization. 
As demonstrated in Appendix 3.1, whilst the SD and the SF can 
be classified as highly institutionalized parties, the KrF, 
the CD, the GPP, the V, and the RV can be considered weakly 
institutionalized parties. Additionally, the Progress Party 
is considered a deviant case due to the overwhelming, 
dominating presence of its founder, namely Mogens Glistrup. 
It is characterized by the existence of a cohesive dominant 
coalition despite the absence of institutionalization.
Logically, one can expect sharp differences in the 
willingness of MPs to follow the party line in votes in 
parliament. However, in the Danish case, as in other 
Scandinavian political systems, legislation is generally 
initiated by the presentation of the report of a royal 
commission representing all interested sections of opinion. 
It is then tendered for comment to the relevant interest 
groups, and is decided on by the deliberations of a 
parliamentary committee, whose major aim is to produce
proposals which can be unanimously agreed by the plenary
14body. Differences of opinions and power struggles which
occur within the parties are usually settled in party group 
meetings. Additionally, decisions are considered binding 
upon all the MPs of the party and non-compliance in important 
matters is met with s a n c t i o n s . N o t  surprisingly, parties 
are disciplined in their legislative voting behaviour and 
function as relatively cohesive actors in final divisions.
In the mid-70s, Denmark faced very serious economic
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problems which were triggered off by the first oil price 
increases during October-December 1973. Additionally, 
following the 1975 general elections, political difficulties 
were created as the Danish political parties had to face a 
minority situation. Whereas the Liberal Party almost doubled 
its representation in the Folketina. the loss of support 
experienced by the RV, KrF, CPF and CD, together with the 
increase in the seats of the SF, C, and LV, had the effect of 
perpetuating the pre-election absence of a majority for 
either of the two traditional blocs of the Danish spectrum 
(see Appendix 3.2). Following the subsequent resignation of 
the Liberals' minority government led by Poul Hartling, the 
parties had to confront another minority situation. This 
parliamentary situation provides the starting point for the 
analysis. How did it influence tactical considerations of 
party elites? What were the new patterns of government 
formation, maintenance and collapse which evolved from 1975 
to 1989? These questions will be investigated in light of 
the rich material which was furnished by the Danish case.
3.2 SD ELITES BETWEEN FOLLOWERS' HOSTILITY AND DECISIVE 
PREFERENCES OF 'ECONOMIC RECOVERY' AND 'GOVERNMENT 
STABILITY', 1975-1982
The SD alliance strategy during 1975-1982 grew out of 
Anker Jorgensen's desire to form a stable co-operation which 
could adhere to a long-term economic policy which could bring 
about economic recovery. The adoption of the decisive 
preference of 'economic recovery' by the Liberal Party led to 
a visible convergence of opinion with the SD which enabled a
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shift of the latter strategy from informal alliances during 
1975-1978 to a formal alliance during 1978-1979. In the 
months following the coalition agreement, a conflict within 
the SD's parliamentary group was recorded. The leader of the 
SD group in parliament, Jens Risgaard Knudsen, resigned 
following the conclusion of the coalition accord. As a 
result of the conflict, the SD elites imposed structural 
constraints on the day-to-day operation of the government, 
and, finally, modify their alliance strategy by further 
pursuing informal alliances during 1979-1982. The
development of the SD's coalitional behaviour and its intra­
party consequences are the focus of the following sub­
sections.
3.2.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SD'S ALLIANCE STRATEGY
The position of Anker Jorgensen within the SD and the 
decisive preferences of his alliance strategy are critical 
factors in the development of inter-party co-operation during 
1975-1982. At the outset, Jorgensen's position during 1972- 
1977 seemed relatively restricted as he was elected in a way 
more reminiscent of a 'coup'. According to his memoirs, he 
was hand picked mainly by Jens Otto Krag, Erling Dinesen and 
K.B. A n d e r s e n . T h e  1975 and 1977 elections, however, 
gradually strengthened his position. Additionally, his 
experience as the former President of Denmark's largest 
trade-union federation (the National Union of General 
workers) combined with ten years parliamentary experience and
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two years as a prime minister contributed to the dominant
position he enjoyed during 1977-1982. A substantial reason
for the overall support he enjoyed at the level of the party
organization is suggested by the editor of the SD's newspaper
Aktuelt. Bent Hansen:
He became Prime Minister at a time when the Danish 
Social Democratic Party needed a popular leader with 
social engagement and reared in the type of environment 
that the Social Democratic Party represents politically. 
His two immediate predecessors had an academic 
background, and notwithstanding their great 
qualifications there was a political-psychological need 
for a leader who had his origin in the midst of the 
Social Democratic Party's electorate. On top of that, 
Anker Jorgensen was given the difficult task of uniting 
the Danish labour movement after the question of Danish 
membership of the EEC had divided the movement [...]
Both in his capacity as trade union president and prime 
minister he was authoritative and reserved. These were 
however qualities that were closely bound up with these 
taxing functions, and they were offset by a both humane 
and personal openness in all other relations, whether on 
a high intellectual level or down to earth.
At the level of the party organization, therefore, it is 
reasonable to suggest that Jorgensen enjoyed a dominant 
position.
In addition to the position of Jorgensen, another 
crucial factor in explaining the development of the SD's 
coalitional behaviour during 1975-1982 were the decisive 
preferences upon which alliances were formed. Given the 
serious economic problems, triggered off by the first oil 
price increase, and the political difficulties created by the 
1973 'electoral earthquake', it is hardly surprising that the 
main reason for the formation of the SD 's alliances during
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Table 3.1 List of Events in Denmark, 1975-1989 
9\1\75 General elections.
13\2\75 Formation of Jorgensen's II minority government. 
11\3\75 A statutory two-year income policy passed.
22\1\77 Dissolution of the Folketina.
15\2\77 General elections.
25\2\77 Formation of Jorgensen's III minority government. 
15\4\77 Collective agreement for two-year period passed.
17\2\78 Mogens Glistrup found guilty of tax fraud.
28\8\78 The formation of Jorgensen's IV minority SD-V gov. 
28\9\79 The SD-V minority government collapses.
09\79 Dissension within the FrP. FrP Congress endorses
Glistrup's approach ruling out any co-operation. 
23\10\79 General elections
26\10\79 The formation of Jorgensen's V minority government. 
12\11\81 The rejection of the government's economic programme 
8\12\81 General elections.
30\12\81 The formation of Jorgensen's VI minority government. 
23\11\81 Four-year goal sentence imposed on Glistrup.
3\9\82 Resignation of Jorgensen's VI minority government. 
10\9\82 Formation of Poul Schluter's I minority government. 
7\12\82 The government defeated over defence issue.
16\10\82 The main provisions of the 1983 budget passed.
5\1\83 The government defeated over defence issue.
2\6\83 The government survives a vote of no-confidence.
3\11\83 SD proposal enjoining the government to work 
'actively' to halt the arms race was passed.
1\12\83 A SD proposal passed instructing the government
to refuse to take any responsibility for deployment. 
15\12\83 Resignation of Schluter's I minority government 
after being defeated over the 1984 budget.
10\1\84 General elections, formation of Schluter's II gov. 
23\2\84 The 1984 Budget passed by 79 votes to 27.
05\84 The government defeated over defence issues
29\6\84 An agreement on defence budget for 1986-1989.
11\3\85 Glistrup released from prison.
29\3\85 The government's energy plan defeated.
14\11\85 The government defeated over defence issue.
19\11\85 Local elections
12\85 The 1986 Budget passed in the Folketina.
21\1\86 Schluter's government unable to sign the 'Single
European Act' following lack of Folketina's support. 
27\2\86 A referendum over the 'Single European Act', 56% 
in favour and 43% against.
20\5\86 The government defeated over defence issues.
12\86 Adoption of the 1987 Budget.
8\9\87 General elections, formation of Schluter's III gov. 
10\9\87 Resignation of Anker Jdrgensen as SD leader.
10/87 Appointment of Svend Auken as SD leader.
14\4\88 Government defeat over nuclear weapon policy.
10\5\88 General elections.
3\6\88 Formation of Schluter's IV minority government 
Source ; Keesina's Contemoorarv Archives. 1975-1989.
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1975-1979 was the desire to form a stable government which
could adhere to a long-term economic policy which could bring
18about economic recovery. As the Liberal Party has also
19adopted 'economic recovery' as its decisive preference, a
visible convergence of opinion with the SD caused a
shift of the latter's strategy from informal minority
governments during 1975-78 to a formal one during 1978-79.
The idea of using an economic umbrella as the central
energiser of the SD-V coalition was suppose to generate the
widest possible support within both parties. However, the
coalition agreement, which provided for the implementation of
an economic stabilization plan to tackle the adverse economic
conditions, was not sufficiently vague and opaque to minimize
party disunity. The accord reached between the parties
involved an understanding that three economic policy
proposals strongly supported by the trade-unions would not be
pursued. These proposals were: (1) a tax reform, (2)
housing reform and (3) the introduction of wage-earner co-
20ownership of industry ('economic democracy').
Not surprisingly, in the months following the coalition
agreement a strife between the party and the trade-unions was
recorded, as well as a conflict within the SD parliamentary
group. Consequently, a change in Jorgensen's decisive
preference was evident during 1979-1982. In addition to
'economic recovery', 'economic democracy' became a decisive
preference upon which informal minority governments were
21formed during this period. Given the extent of the
economic crisis in this period and the toughest measures
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necessary to combat it, the preference of 'economic recovery' 
remained of utmost relevance. Economic democracy, on the 
other hand, was taken-up in order to heal the breach within 
the SD parliamentary group and between the party and the LO.
The above discussion concerning the position of Anker
Jorgensen within the SD and the decisive preferences of his
alliance strategy provided the background for the development
of the SD alliance strategy during 1975-1982. Due to the
fact than the SD and the parties to its left lacked a
majority, the SD entered into informal alliances with the
CPP, KrF, CD and the RV during 1975-1978. A classic example
was the agreement between the SD and these parties over the
passage of the 1976 budget which provided for the
introduction of heavier penalties for breaches of current
collective wage agreements and a complete wage and price
freeze. Although Jorgensen went back on the first part of
this agreement, following the strong opposition from the LO,
the four above-mentioned parties voted with the SD on
22December 1975 over wage and price freeze proposals.
Given the ad-hoc nature of informal minority
governments, the SD elites could select the least 'expensive'
partner available. Two examples concerning the inclusion of
the RV in some of the 1977 alliances and its exclusion from
others spring to mind. In April, co-operation between the
SD, RV, V and the CPP resulted in the adoption of an
emergency bill giving legislative effect to the collective
23agreement for a two-year period. Similarly, on September 
6 , 1977, the government which was supported by these
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parties secured parliamentary approval for a package of
increases in indirect taxes on petrol, tobacco and 
24spirits. On the other hand, the RV was excluded from
the agreement amongst the SD, V, KrF, CPP, and the CD over a
25four-year extension of the defence budget in March 1977. 
Obviously, as there were many feasible partners, the SD 
elites could oppose the demands of the RV and the extreme 
left-wing parties without risking its legislation over this 
issue.
The above pattern of ongoing and relatively successful
SD informal alliances was modified during 1978-1979 towards a
2 6formal minority government with the Liberal Party. As
noted earlier, in the year following the 'historical
experiment', trade union opposition became increasingly
militant. In addition, conflicts evolved within the SD
elites. As a result, the SD elite was forced to modify both
its alliance strategy and decisive preferences in order to
maintain its stability. Based on the decisive preferences
of 'economic recovery' and 'economic democracy', a shift from
a formal minority government to informal ones was evident
during 1979-1982. In November 1979, for example, few bills,
which were described in a Financial Times' report as Denmark's
'toughest price and wage freeze since wartime emergency
measures', were adopted by large ad-hoc majorities whilst
27narrow majorities were recorded for other bills.
Perhaps the most important question that should be 
raised at this stage concerns the intra-party consequences of 
the SD alliance strategy which the analysis now turns to.
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3.2.2 THE INTRA-PARTY CONSEQUENCES OF THE SD'S ALLIANCE 
STRATEGY
In fact, during the period in which informal minority
governments were formed, i.e 1975-1978 and 1979-1982, no
intra-party conflicts were recorded. However, differences of
opinion between Jorgensen and parliamentary group members,
with regard to preferable parliamentary partners, were
recorded during the former period. Whilst Jorgensen prefered
to co-operate with the Liberal Party, members of the
parliamentary group found it much easier to co-operate with
the Conservatives. As Svend Jakobsen recalled:
The Prime Minister, Anker Jorgensen, was more in favour 
of co-operation with the Venstre than the Conservatives. 
He saw the Conservatives as the party to the right [..] 
Some of us were discussing the situation already in the 
middle of the 70's because in concrete discussions it 
was much easier tOgnegotiate with the Conservatives than 
with the Venstre.
The reasoning by certain members of the SD's elite to
prefer the CPP rather than the Liberal Party as a partner for
parliamentary co-operation, probably, lay in their perception
of the CPP profile as closer to the SD line. Bent Hansen,
who was at that time a chief editor of the Social
Democratic's newspaper, 'Aktuelt'. explained:
In a way, I think that the Conservative Party compared 
with the Venstre, is more close to us [...] We have more 
interests in common because, we want full employment and 
we want the industry and the economic life to have good 
conditions. First of all employment and secondly, to 
enhance the possibilities of increase standards of 
living and making social reforms. And I think that the 
Conservative Party which has its roots in the urban- 
bourgeoisie circle, has some idea in common with us, 
they also want standards of living increasing [...] the 
Venstre is a very reactionary party.
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The importance of the above difference between Anker
Jorgensen and some elite members can hardly be
overemphasized. After all, the SD alliance strategy involved
mainly informal alliances with the CPP together with other
centre-right parties. The participation of the Liberal Party
in some of the SD legislative alliances during 1977,
moreover, was only on an informal, ad-hoc basis which did not
antagonize centre-right elements within the party elites.
However, it was due to the shift in party strategy from
informal minority governments to a formal one during 1978-
1979 that the above difference within the party elites (which
also reflected the difference between the party line and the
trade unions's approach) resulted in intra-party conflicts.
At the outset, the fact that the LO is strongly involved in
SD politics and there is reciprocal representation on the
executive committees of LO and the SD meant that any
conflict between the two would be reflected within both
elites. Furthermore, it was from the begining of the
negotiations between the SD and the V that Anker Jorgensen
could have expected a conflict to evolve within the SD
elites, as well as, between the party and the LO. As Karl
Hjortnaes recalled:
There have been very important negotiations over the 
weekend between the leaders of the Liberal Party and the 
leadership of the Social Democratic Party. By the end 
of the negotiations there was a very important meeting 
between Mr. Anker Jorgensen, the chairman of the Labour 
movement, Thomas Nielsen and Jens Risgaard Knudsen, the 
chairman of the Social Democratic parliamentary group. 
Thomas Nielsen and Risgaard Knudsen told Anker Jorgensen 
that they were against the majority government between 
the two political parties. They advised him that he 
should not go inside and form such a majority government
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[...]. For Thomas Nielsen it was very important to have 
a deal about 'economic democracy'. And he knew that it 
was impossible to have economic democratization in our 
firms so long as the Liberal Party was inside the 
governmegg. I think this was the reason why he was 
against.
Added to the dissatisfaction of Thomas Nielsen and Risgaard 
Knudsen was the coalition agreement that was concluded in 
August 1978. Based on the decisive preference of 'economic 
recovery', Anker Jorgensen signed an accord which provided 
for the implementation of an economic stabilization plan 
designed to consolidate the limited progress made by the 1977 
minority government. As previously stressed, the agreement 
involved an understanding that three economic policy 
proposals strongly supported by the LO would not be pursued 
throughout the SD-V co-operation. The accord, however, was 
not sufficiently vague to minimize party disunity.
In the months following the coalition agreement strong
opposition was evident within the party. At the SD Congress
in December 1978, an open dispute took place between Anker
Jorgensen and Thomas N i e l s e n . A c c o r d i n g  to Jorgensen's
memoirs, whilst the Prime Minister thought that there was no
alternative to the SD-V government, the LO chairman hoped
that the government would not survive the next 100 days.
Thomas Nielsen, furthermore, criticized the way the
government formation process had taken place and called it a
'coup'. He thus demanded a 'public apology' from Anker
Jorgensen. The latter, on the contrary, did not think he
32owed an apology, only an explanation. In the following 
days.
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[...] the strifes continue both internally and 
externally. [The] previous Minister of Finance, Henry 
Grünbaum, and George Poulsen, the new chairman of the 
Metal Workers Federation, urged a change of [party] 
chairman. But other leading figures within the party 
and the trade-unions went the opposite way and called 
for calm and ending the strife.
Yet, whatever the reason for the strife between the SD
and the LO (i.e. matters of principles or the personal
relationships between the two leaders), it was the conflict
within the SD parliamentary group which was characterized by
an unprecedented form of vociferous internal dissension.
According to Svend Jakobsen, the Fisheries Minister in the
SD-V government:
[...] I don't think we can say there was a leader, it 
was not organized inside the party. [•••] Inside the 
party group, I think Mr. Jens Risgaard Knudsen was the 
major opponent. Maybe there was a relation...he was 
former Secretary in LO, he was very strongly against.
[... ] When ministers came to the group it was many times 
very difficult for [them] to have the support from the 
group because [members of the group] often said [the 
item] was influenced by the Liberals. I would say 
[that] if ministers, as members of a Social Democratic 
minority government, would come with the same position, 
it would have been much easier to get the support from 
the group then when they come from the coalition 
government. At that.^ay you saw opposition in the 
parliamentary group.
In addition, the leader of the SD parliamentary group, Jens 
Risgaard Knudsen, resigned during the first meeting of the 
SD parliamentary group subsequent to the conclusion of the 
SD-V accord.
Knudsen, however, made no formal effort to organize
those MPs who opposed the SD-V accord. On the contrary,
I have not heard about Risgaard Knudsen position and his 
advice [before the meeting of the parliamentary group]. 
He could have phoned me or other persons in the
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Social Democratic parliamentary group but he.made the 
choice that he would not contact any person.
A substantial reason for Knudsen's inability or
unwillingeness to formally mobilize internal dissatisfaction
within the SD involves a discussion not only of 'attitudes',
as disembodied sets of ideas and values, but also of the
organizational context in which party politics is rooted.
A highly institutionalized party, Panebianco claims,
channels strategies of internal actors into specific and
obligatory paths, thus, neutralizing any attempt to challenge
the elite s t r a t e g y . G i v e n  the discipline record of the
SD parliamentary group, it was clear to Knudsen that any
formal attempt to mobilize support for its cause was doomed
to failure although 'inside the parliamentary group many
people were against the new government'. Besides,
differences of opinions also emerged within the LO. Whilst
the chairman, Thomas Nielsen, opposed the SD-V government,
37Poul Christensen, the SID chairman, favoured it. As a 
result, a cohesive internal opposition could not have been 
formed.
The instances of the internal disagreement within the
Liberal Party are of equal relevance. Within the
parliamentary group only Iver Hansen was against the
formation of the SD-V accord 'because he was more
38ideological, liberal and tended to be against socialism'. 
However, the importance of his opposition can hardly be over 
emphasized because after the coalition agreement was signed 
Hansen's dissatisfaction was neutralized by allocating him
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the portfolio of Public Works. It must be conceded, 
moreover, that neither patterns of voice or exit were evident 
within the Liberal Party. Hence, intra-party conflict did 
not evolve within this party.
However mutable the strength of the opposition within 
the SD may have been during 1978-1979, it prompted determined 
action from Anker Jorgensen to deal with the internal 
dissatisfaction. Basically, a three-fold strategy was 
implemented. Firstly, Jorgensen insisted on the decisive 
preference of 'economic recovery'. Secondly, he imposed 
structural constraints on the day-to-day operation of the 
coalition government. And, thirdly, he modified the SD 
alliance strategy. As the former strategy has already been 
dealt with earlier in this section, attention is focused on 
the latter two.
At the heart of Jorgensen's strategy to cope with the
intra-elite conflict lay the notion that imposing structural
constraints on the day-to-day operation of the coalition
government might ensure SD control over most governmental
decisions, thus, pacifing opposition within the SD elites.
Beyond maintaining the prime ministership and key ministerial
39portfolios (such as. Finance and Education) with the SD, 
a co-ordination committee (i.e. inner cabinet) was formed and 
the principle of 'mutual veto' in the governmental decision­
making process was established. The co-ordination
committee, which was comprised of four Social Democrats and 
three Liberal ministers, discussed issues before the 
ministers were allowed to publicize their o p i n i o n . T h e
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principle of 'mutual veto' was operationalized by
establishing a system of 'contact ministers'. SD ministers
had to contact Liberal ministers in order to get approval for
proposals they wished to promote, and vice versa.
The constraints on the day-to-day operation of the
government had an immediate impact on the process of
governmental decision-making. According to Jakobsen,
It was near disaster because the government was not well 
prepared. There were so many differences between the 
two parties. Also, the major issues where written 
partly on a paper [...] and all new items, all new 
cases, all new proposals were difficult to agree upon. 
The internal meetings in the government were very, very 
long. We discussed in the group of ministers [and] we 
discussed between the contact ministers. In the last 
part of the government's life the coordination committee 
discussed everything^£including] smallest things to 
place on the agenda.
Added to these difficulties in the day-to-day operation of 
the government, inherent in its structure, was the failure of 
the two parties to agree on how to implement a price and 
incomes policy. Not surprisingly, thus, neither the SD nor 
the Liberal Party were able to embrace their views fully 
without offending one another.
No matter how effective were the structural constraints 
on the day to day operation of the government, they failed to 
neutralize the dissatisfaction within the SD parliamentary 
group. As a result, Jdrgensen had to break up the formal 
alliance with the Liberal Party in order to maintain SD 
stability. In 1979, therefore, a shift in the SD strategy 
from a formal alliance to informal alliances was recorded. 
The above discussion concerning Jorgensen's strategy to
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deal with the intra-elite conflicts provides a necessary
background for an evaluation of the relative bargaining power
possessed by each actor. Basically, the failure of the
highly institutionalized SD to mobilize and thus control the
internal opposition, was immediately translated to an
inferior position in the coalition bargaining plane. As
Svend Jakobsen explained,
The major price was that we could not start economic 
democratization in Denmark. We had it as an important 
part of the package and also, in relation to the Labour 
unions, it was a very important thing [...] Therefore, 
there was a crash between Anker Jorgensen and Thomas 
Nielsen after the package. Only because of this we 
could not make a majority for establishing^Jhe first 
step on a way to economic democratization.
Therefore, the bargaining power in this context was 
manifested by the ability of one party to block the 
initiative of its counterpart. In this respect, the Liberal 
Party had succeeded in blocking the SD's main proposals of 
'economic democratization', tax and housing reform which were 
strongly supported by the LO.
Added to these influences was the fact that since only 
seven portfolios were allocated to the Liberal Party, each 
minister from that party controlled two SD ministers. This, 
in turn, contributed to the superior position of the Liberal 
Party in the bargaining arena. This was confirmed by Knud 
Engaard (Liberal), the Minister of Interior:
We had the double task and the double influence.
We could stop everything that we did not like [...] That 
is a problem with a coalition government between two 
parties of very different principles, that is, you 
cannot always have a compromise between principles and 
if you do not reach a compromise [...] then such a
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government yguld have to stay away from legislation in 
such areas.
It is however somewhat misleading to contend that the
inferior position of the SD during 1978-1979 reflects its
bargaining power during 1975-1978 and 1979-1982. On the
contrary, as long as informal alliances were formed by the SD
elites, the party possessed a relatively high level of
bargaining power. A classic example is the 1976 agreement
reached amongst the SD, RV, KrF, CD and the CPP which
provided for the introduction of heavier penalties for
breaches of collective wage agreements and a complete wage
and price freeze. In the face of strong opposition from the
LO the government on November 1976 went back on the first
part of this agreement. Still, the four above-mentioned
parties voted with the SD over the first part of their
44agreement.
Against this background, the RV represents a deviant
case with regard to inter-party co-operation, mainly because 
of the long tradition of SD-RV co-operations.*^ As Svend 
Jakobsen elaborated.
I think [that] because we were in that time co-operating 
very close to the Radical Venstre [...] it was that 
party that influenced the most [. .. ] Our closest 
relation, closest contacts [when] preparing and also 
when we were on action was with the Radical Venstre. I 
think on 1977 the Venstre had a part of influence 
because there were somg^contacts between the Social 
Democrats and Venstre.
Clearly, the long tradition of parliamentary co-operation 
between these two parties highlights the relatively high
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level of bargaining power enjoyed by the RV during 1975-1978 
and 1979-1982, compared with the rest of the SD's partners.
Thus, Lindblom's observation, that all affected 
interests can have at least some influence in the policy­
making process, appears to be v a l i d . T h e  bargaining 
power of the RV and the rest of the SD's partners did not lie 
in their ability to affect the outcome. Rather, some 
outcomes were designed with consideration of their position.
If, as Strom claims, 'everything else being equal, 
minority governments would prefer purely ad hoc 
coalitions',*^ a substantial reason underlying this lies in 
the consequences, in terms of intra-party conflict and 
bargaining power, of the SD alliance strategy. As long as 
the SD elites formed informal minority governments (i.e. 
during 1975-1978 and 1979-1982) no intra-party conflict 
developed and, therefore, the party possessed a relatively 
high degree of bargaining power. Once the pattern of ongoing 
and successful informal minority governments was modified by 
a formal alliance with the Liberal Party during 1978-1979, 
intra-elite conflict evolved. Due to the inability of the SD 
elites to pacify the internal dissatisfaction, which was 
mainly manifested by the resignation of the leader of the 
parliamentary group, the bargaining power of the party in the 
coalition bargaining plane was considerably undermined.
To conclude, the importance of a decisive preference is 
not restricted to the stage of coalition formation. The 
examples mentioned above and the overall analysis indicate 
that the key for the survival of a minority government is
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probably the decisive preference upon which it is formed. 
Such a preference has an important role during processes of 
government formation - to generate the widest possible 
support within the party. Similarly, a decisive preference 
has a critical role during processes of government 
maintenance - to enable government coalition partners and 
members of legislative coalitions to vote over the non- 
decisive issues according to the party programme rather than 
the coalition discipline. The net effect seems to be working 
in a direction of reducing the probability for the evolution 
of internal conflicts.
3.3 ARE INTRA-ELITE CONFLICTS BOUND TO LOWER A PARTY'S 
BARGAINING POWER? : THE CASE OF THE WEAKLY 
INSTITUTIONALIZED RV, 1988-1990
To understand why the intra-elite conflicts evolved
within the RV it is necessary to appreciate the parliamentary
situation which developed after the 1988 elections. A
dispute over how to react to possible visits of nuclear
warships to Danish ports led to a wider dispute concerning
Denmark's NATO and security policy. After having been
defeated in no less than 22 motions on security policy by an
'alternative majority' comprised of the SD, RV and the 
49SF, the government reacted by calling a new election over 
the issue. The main result of the May 1988 election was a 
drop in the Conservatives' vote from 23 to 19 per cent (see 
Appendix 3.2). Nevertheless, Poul Schluter began negotiating 
with the RV over a formation of a formal alliance.
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Clearly, the evidence and arguments presented by a large
number of commentators suggest that Schluter's aim was to put
an end to the alternative majority. A formal minority
government with the RV, CD and the KrF, however, imposed
certain constraints on the former. According to the KrF
leader, Flemming Kofod-Svendsen:
As far as I know, the Radical Venstre would not like 
there to be two great parties and three small 
parties in government. They wanted there to be 
only three parties because they hoped they could 
profile themselves better [...]. But Schluter mentioned 
that he had to choose a government between the four 
parties [namely], the Conservatives, the Venstre, the 
Radical Venstre and the Centre Democrats, and the three 
[i.e. the-Conservatives, the Venstre and the Radical 
Venstre].
Additionally, one of the main factors which enhanced the
formation of the CPP-V-RV coalition was the consensus-
oriented alliance strategy of the CD, and probably also the
KrF, which were excluded from the government. This strategy
is well described by the CD founder, Erhard Jacobsen:
For the moment, for instance, we do not have a great 
sympathy or great admiration for the government but we 
just have to realize that nobody else could form a 
government, and therefore, we will not do anything to 
harm the government. But, of course, if the government 
put forward a proposal directly against what we think 
is right [...] we will vote against it and they know 
that [...]. We are not part of the government 
background but, on the other hand, we will guaranttee 
that we will never take part in an action against the 
government with the intention of overthrowing the 
government because who would form another 
government?
As it was probably reasonable to assume that the KrF strategy 
would not deviate significantly from that of the CD, Schluter 
could consider both parties as 'sleeping partners'. This
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does not imply that the support of these parties was always 
forthcoming. Rather, it is to be stressed that the 
government could take for granted the CD and KrF's support 
over critical divisions, as defined by the government.
The CPP-V-RV coalition had still no majority in the 
Folketina. The government, therefore, had to form an 
informal minority government either with the SD or the FrP. 
The RV's elites, therefore, faced a dilemma over the former's 
strategy. As a governmental party it could not, of course, 
vote against government lines. Yet, the party's views 
concerning security and foreign matters were much more closer 
to the SD than to its coalitional partners. This dilemma was 
a major factor which contributed to the evolution of intra­
elite conflicts within the RV. Jorgen Estrup, a member of 
the RV's parliamentary group who informally led the internal 
opposition, explained:
The only really major split I can think of at the moment 
is the one we had last May or June just after the 
election, when there were discussions about forming the 
present government [...]. I was part of the reason for 
the split because I did not think it was a very good 
idea to form the present government, because [...] there 
was not any formal agreement between the three parties. 
So, I was a bit frightened that [we would have] too many 
cleavages and there would be too many problems that 
would have to be solved in that way and it would not be 
possible to follow a gjraight track to solve the rather 
big economic problem.
A debate as to whether to cooperate with the CPP and the 
V surfaced, therefore, between the RV's prospective 
ministers, namely, Niels Helveg Petersen, Jens Bilgrav- 
Nielsen, Ole Vig Jensen and Lone Dybkjaer, and the party's 
parliamentary group, most notably, Jorgen Estrup, Elizabeth
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Arnold and, to a lesser extent, the leader of the group, 
Marianne Jelved. The attitudes of the latter group had a 
number of dimensions, or 'cleavages' as Estrup termed, but 
these basically added up to controversial questions 
concerning security and foreign affairs and the mechanism 
which would enable their successful resolution.
As a partial explanation of the evolution of the intra­
elite conflict along the above-mentioned lines, reference to 
Appendix 3.1, in which the weakly institutionlized features 
of the RV are described, provides a convenient starting 
point. A weakly institutionalized party, according to 
Panebianco, is one in which the actors have more autonomy in 
order to compete with each other.Co n s e q u e n t l y , rather 
than applying the exit option, internal dissatisfaction is 
most likely to be expressed internally by the voice option. 
Given the seriousness of the discussions over the formation 
of the CPP-V-RV formal alliance, it is hardly surprising that 
the voice option was taken-up; members of the RV's 
parliamentary group had appealed to the prospective members 
of cabinet with the aim of changing their intention to 
cooperate with the GPP and the Liberal Party.
However, '[...] for voice to function properly it is 
necessary that individuals possess reserves of political 
influence which they can bring into play when they are 
sufficiently aroused'.^* This argument can be used to 
explain the further appeal of the parliamentary group to RV 
party activists and the mobilization of the activists' 
support to enhance the former's objectives. One political
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editor reviewed an attempt of the parliamentary group's
leader in mid-1989 to mobilize the activists' support towards
accepting decisions against the party lines as follows:
I guess the Radical Left has a number of more serious 
problems with their roots or even with the organs in the 
party. They just had a meeting [in their] main body 
with some 200 members [in which] they put forward a 
programme for an economic [policy] which on two 
essential points is quite opposite to what the 
government wants [...]. They put forward a programme 
which said they wanted a new pension [plan] which the
government does not [want], and it was part of the
agreement, when the Radical Left entered the government,
that they could not put forward proposals on a new
pension [plan]. And they [members of the parliamentary 
group] do not want to flatten out the taxes [whilst] the 
government wants to make them more flat, to take away 
[the] progressive [element]. So it is quite different 
from what the party stands for in the government. This 
proposal was put forward in the meeting by the leader of 
the parliamentary group, Marienna Jelved, and it was 
agreed by the vast majority.
The successful mobilization of the RV's activists against the 
party's positions does not imply that an elite-follower 
conflict evolved. It is simply a manifestation of the 
parliamentary group's ability to mobilize support of party 
members (against the elites' line) through mechanisms for the 
diffusion of dissent.
However inconsistant the strength of the RV's 
parliamentary group may have been throughout 1989-1990, it 
prompted determined action from the RV's cabinet members 
mainly at the stage of the alliance formation. A twofold 
strategy was implemented in order to neutralize and pacify 
the intra-elite dissatisfaction. A confidential agreement, 
signed between the RV's Minister of Environment, Lone 
Dybkjaer, and the V s  Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uffe
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Ellemann-Jensen, contained two key elements. Firstly,
There was actually a list of all those decisions of the 
parliament where the government had been in minority and 
it was an agreement about what could happen in the 
coming period for the new government if those items were 
brought up again. Would ^^ey cause trouble or could we 
somehow manage with them.
Besides this document, in which 23 controversial matters 
and the preferable strategy to tackle them were specified, 
there was also an accord which introduced a mechanism of co­
operation between the government and the SD over security and 
foreign policy matters. According to Jorgen Estrup,
There was a document spelling out what could be done 
with respect to forming the future decisions on foreign 
policy, so that you could be sure that there would be 
a majority backing them. Since the new government would 
have been a minority government, it would need to have 
at least the Social Democrats to accept its policy, and 
that was one of the crucial things for my party that you 
could make a formal instrument to secure that the Social 
Democrats would be backing the foreign policy. There 
was a document specifing that you could form some kind 
of a committee, or at least a body, that would make an 
expert analysis on foreign policy, security policy, 
which would support the discussion in parliament and be 
an instrument for forming, thus, consensus 
decisions.
It should be obvious from the content of the confidential 
agreement that the main objective of the RV in joining the 
government was to develop a broad co-operation with the CPP 
and the Liberal Party on the one hand and, over foreign 
affairs and security policy, with the SD on the other. To 
illustrate whether this aim has been realized, however, 
requires an evaluation of the co-operation with the SD.
Logically, one can expect that the break up of the 
alternative majority would be immediately manifested by a
91
decrease in the SD's participation in the winning sides in
final votes. However, a recent analysis of the final votes
in the Folketina suggests that the SD participation on the
winning side dropped marginally from 68 per cent in the first
session of 1987-1988 to 64 per cent in the second
58session. Given the fact that the SD position on the 
winning side remained almost unchanged (during the period 
examined in the above analysis) although the alternative
majority was broken up following the inclusion of the RV in
the government, we can conclude that some forms of co­
operation between the RV and the SD had evolved.
It is difficult however to answer the question 
concerning the extent of the co-operation between the SD and 
the RV throughout the period in which the latter held 
governmental positions. This is mainly due to the fact that 
the parliamentary forum (which was mentioned in the 
Dybkjaer - Ellemann-Jensen agreement), was established in 
November 1988 whilst our interviews were conducted in May 
1989. Some insight for a reasonable answer can be gained 
through the following description of Jergen Estrup:
We have not had any real trouble in parliament with 
foreign policy because we had the possibility to discuss 
it with the Social Democrats in the committee.
It is therefore reasonable to argue that the parliamentary 
forum which was established as a result of the Dybkjaer - 
Ellemann-Jensen agreement was a critical factor in 
maintaining a relatively high level of co-operation between 
the two parties.
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To show what this conclusion actually entails, however, 
requires a detailed analysis of the RV's relative bargaining 
power. As noted earlier, a weakly institutionalized party 
can mobilize internal dissatisfaction through mechanisms for 
the diffusion of dissent. In other words, intra-party 
conflicts, which evolve within a weakly institutionalized 
party, can be mobilized internally, i.e. without other 
parties being affected. However, the fact that in the RV's 
case external channels (as well as internal ones) were used 
to pacify the internal opposition suggests that intra-party 
conflicts within the RV may have been used as an excuse to 
gain concessions from the coalition partners. The Dybkjaer 
Ellemann-Jensen agreement exemplifies this argument. 
There is reason to believe that the RV probably possessed a 
relatively high level of bargaining power compared with its 
coalition partners. However, such an evaluation requires 
some degree of reservation.
Naturally, the fact that the Dybkjaer - Ellemann-Jensen 
agreement was a confidential one (even members of the RV's 
parliamentary group were not allowed to see the agreement) 
calls into question the importance of the CPP and V's 
concessions.^^ Furthermore, there is no reason to believe 
that the Schluter-led government changed its attitude, 
evident from 1982 to 1988, towards the importance of foreign 
affairs and security policy for its survival. Economic 
issues still seemed to prevail over all other issues. The 
fact that general elections were called in December 1990 over
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the issue of a tax reform illustrates this p o i n t . T o  be
on the safe side, therefore, the analysis concludes that the
RV's relative bargaining power was not undermined by the 
intra-elite conflicts due to their successful resolution. 
Perhaps, it can be argued, the RV possessed a relatively high 
level of bargaining power as the intra-party conflict, which 
could have been resolved internally, was used as an 
instrument to gain concessions from the coalition partners.
To sum up, intra-elite conflicts within the RV, 
following a formal minority government with the CPP and the 
V, were neutralized through both internal and external 
channels. Regarding the former, decisions against the
government line did not trigger off reactions of the RV's 
cabinet members although they were approved unanimously in a 
party forum. Regarding the latter, a confidential agreement 
was signed amongst the coalition partners. Following the 
successful mobilization of the internal dissatisfaction by 
the RV elites, it is reasonable to conclude that the party's 
bargaining power was not undermined. Perhaps, it can be
the RV possessed a relatively high level of bargaining power 
as the intra-party conflict, which could have been resolved 
internally, was used as an instrument to gain concessions 
from the coalition partners.
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3.4 CONCLUSIONS
The Danish case seems to support the argument that the 
formation of informal minority governments is the most 
attractive strategy for a highly institutionalized party. 
It was demonstrated that due to the formation of a formal 
minority government with the Liberal Party, a conflict within 
the SD parliamentary group developed. The leader of the SD 
group in parliament, Jens Risgaard Knudsen, resigned 
following the conclusion of the SD-V accord. It was 
furthermore shown that the lack of mechanisms for the 
diffusion of dissent within the SD forced Jorgensen to impose 
structural constraints on the day-to-day operation of the 
government. It was concluded that the failure of the party 
elites to neutralize the internal opposition - highlighted by 
the break-up of the coalition government by the SD - was 
translated into an inferior position in the bargaining plane. 
However, as long as the SD elites had formed informal 
alliances (i.e. 1975-1978, 1979-1982), no internal conflicts 
occured. Consequently, the party possessed relatively high 
level of bargaining power during the periods in which 
informal minority governments were formed.
With regard to weakly institutionalized parties, it was 
demonstrated that a conflict between the RV parliamentary 
group and members of the cabinet over the formation of the 
CPP-V-RV government coalition evolved during 1988-1989. In 
order to pacify the internal opposition, the RV members of 
cabinet acquiesced and allowed decisions against government
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policy to be taken by party bodies. Dissatisfaction was, 
furthermore, neutralized by a confidential agreement 
concerning the coalition strategy over potentially 
controversial issues. As a result of the successful 
resolution of the intra-elite conflict, the analysis 
concluded that the bargaining power of the RV was not 
undermined. Furthermore, it was argued that party elites 
can take advantage of the intra-elite conflicts following a 
formation of a formal minority government, demanding more 
concessions from its coalition partners in order to pacify 
the internal opposition. Such a tactic seems most likely to 
result in a relatively high level of bargaining power.
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4. INTRA-PARTY POLITICS AND MINORITY GOVERNMENTS IN NORWAY, 
1976-1990
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate firstly that 
the formation of informal minority governments is the most 
attractive strategy for highly institutionalized parties. 
By negotiating each issue separately and on an ad-hoc basis, 
such parties can select the least 'expensive' partner 
available, minimising the threat it poses to their stability. 
Such considerations are especially relevant when the party 
leader faces internal difficulties capable of undermining his 
position within the party.
Secondly, it demonstrates that an informal minority 
government whose support is provided by one set of parties 
cannot be maintained in the long run. The partners realise
that they provide external support whilst the governmental 
party enjoys policy influence and electoral benefits. Party
elites may therefore face a demand to form a formal minority
government. The purpose thereafter is to show that a weakly 
institutionalized party can shift its strategy from informal 
to formal alliances without having to face internal
conflicts. With regard to highly institutionalized parties, 
this chapter reveals that elites within highly institution­
alized parties tend to impose structural constraints on the 
day-to-day operation of the government and modify their 
alliance strategy in order to maintain their stability.
The effectiveness of the elites' ability to control 
internal dissatisfaction tends to affect their relative 
bargaining power in coalition negotiations. As long as
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highly institutionalized parties form informal minority 
governments, they tend to avoid intra-party conflicts and, 
thus, possess a relatively high level of bargaining power. 
However, once they form formal minority governments, the 
emergence of internal dissatisfaction is translated into a 
relatively inferior position in the bargaining arena.
To support hypotheses 2 and 4, this chapter examines the 
formation, maintenance and collapse of Norwegian minority 
governments during 1976-1990. This period was chosen in 
order to capture both Odvar Nordli and J.P. Syse's terms in 
office. The objective is to explain the different coalition 
building strategies by highly and weakly institutionalized 
parties and their intra-party consequences. The chapter 
begins with an introductory section which provides the data 
concerning trends in Norwegian politics. Significant 
changes in the party system and political parties are 
presented in the context of changes within Norwegian 
society.
The first sub-section analyses the positions of the 
party leaders, Odvar Nordli and Gro Harlem Brundtland, within 
the DNA during 1976-1981 and 1986-1989, respectively. It 
will be shown that whereas Nordli's position was undermined 
following a personal strife with Reuilf Steen, the party 
chairman, Brundtlant enjoyed a dominant position within the 
party. Against this background, it will be shown that the 
party leaders' position is not a relevant factor once a 
highly institutionalized party form informal minority 
governments. The second sub-section examines the DNA
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alliance strategy and its intra-party consequences. It will 
be shown that the DNA successfully avoided formal alliances, 
thus, no intra-party conflicts were evident during the period 
under examination. As a result, the DNA possessed a 
relatively high level of bargaining power during 1976-1981 
and 1986-1989.
The third section examines the intra-party consequences 
of the co-operation between the CP, the SP and the KrF,
during 1985-1986 (note that during 1983-1985, a majority 
coalition amongst these parties was formed). It will be
demonstrated that the formal minority government which was 
formed by these parties during 1983-1986 caused intra-elite 
conflicts within the highly institutionalized SP. By taking 
the prominent members of the SP in his Cabinet, together with 
accepting some constraints over the government's day-to-day 
operation, Kare Willoch, the Conserevative Prime Minister, 
was able to neutralize, to some extent, the internal
dissatisfaction within the SP. However, the continuation of 
the internal dissatisfaction within the SP forced the party's 
cabinet members to modify their alliance strategy. After the 
government was defeated in parliament, instead of co­
operating with the CP in opposition, the SP formed an 
informal minority government with the DNA.
The fourth section analyses the worsening intra-elite 
conflicts within the highly institutionalized SP during 1989- 
1990, which led to the collapse of J.P. Syse's government. 
It will be shown that the SP cabinet members faced a trade­
off between government solidarity and parliamentary group
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hostility, which was aggravated by the activities of the 
leaders of the parliamentary group and the party 
organization. This conflict forced SP cabinet members to 
adopt a two-fold strategy. Firstly, the establishment of a 
decision-making 'troika' which was comprised of the party 
leader, the leader of the parliamentary group and the party 
secretary. Secondly, the modification of the SP alliance 
strategy, i.e. break-up of the SP-CP-KrF formal minority
coalition. As this strategy indicates a failure of the SP
elites to pacify the internal dissatisfaction, the analysis 
concludes that the failure of the SP to neutralize internal 
opposition was the main factor which contributed to the
relatively high level of bargaining power possessed by the
CP.
4.1 PARTY STRENGTH AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Norway has a multi-party system where most parties are
strongly linked to distinct social groups,^ thus, although
it is a unitary state the political system is relatively 
2
decentralized. The system consists of seven parties,
which are, from left to right: the Socialist Left Party (SV), 
the Labour Party (DNA), the Liberals (V), the Christian 
People's Party (KrF), the Centre Party (SP), the Conservative 
Party (CP), and the Progress Party (FrP). Whereas the oldest 
parties are the Liberals, the Conservatives and the Labour 
Party, which were formed in the 1880s, all the other parties 
emerged in the twentienth century.
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Electorally, there have been a number of major changes 
during the post-war period. Whereas during 1945-1961 the 
Labour Party enjoyed a predominant position in the Norwegian 
polity,^ it did not gain a parliamentary majority during 
1961-1973 due to the erosion of support on its left (by the 
emergence of the Socialist People's Party), and on its right 
(by the strengthening of the non-socialist parties). The 
Labour Party, for example, obtained around 46 per cent of 
popular support during 1961-1969 elections, but its share 
declined to 35 percent in the 1973 election. The SP and KrF, 
on the other hand, increased their share of the popular vote 
from 9 per cent and 8 per cent, in 1965, to 11 per cent and 
12 per cent in 1973, respectively. The Socialist Left, 
moreover, gained 11 percent of popular support in the 1973 
election (see Appendix 4.1).
It was, however, the EC referendum in 1972 which was the 
catalyst for the 'political earthquake' which manifested 
itself by short-term swings of popular support and long-term 
party system changes. The debacle, sustained in the 1972 
referendum by those who advocated EC membership, was further 
reflected in the 1973 election when the DNA's strength was 
reduced from 46 per cent in 1969 to 35 per cent. The DNA 
regained this ground in 1977 but that election also saw the 
CP gathering strength within the non-socialist bloc, from 17 
percent of popular support to 24 percent (see Appendix 4.1). 
Evidence of long-term party system changes were seen by
4
increased fragmentation, volatility and polarization. 
The starting point of the analysis is, therefore.
characterized by the substantial weakening of the DNA, the 
growth of the extreme left and right, the Conservatives' 
resurgence and the atrophy of the non-socialist centre.^
Among the most frequently cited factors which 
contributed to the party system changes is the Norwegian 
cleavage structure. Six social cleavages, which are only 
partly cross-cut, have been identified as significant bases 
for the modern Norwegian party system.^ Firstly, a
7
territorial cleavage between the centre and the periphery. 
Secondly, a socio-cultural cleavage between the defenders of 
the two different versions of the Norwegian language. 
Thirdly, a moral cleavage that primarily concerns the 
production and consumption of alcohol. Fourthly, a religious 
cleavage between fundamentalist groups on the one hand and 
more liberal or secular groups on the other. Fifthly, a 
sectoral cleavage between the primary sector of the economy, 
(agriculture and fisheries) and other industries. Finally, a 
class cleavage between unionized workers and private
employers.
From the beginning, these cleavages have been
politicized successively and formed a cumulative pattern of 
party conflict. However, there have been a number of major
changes during the post-war period. Of the old cleavages,
the language division is no longer an important determinant 
of political preference, and the other cultural divisions are
o
relatively less important than they were. Additionally, 
the political individuality of the Southern and Western 
Norwegian periphery is generally less distinct, although it
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still manifests itself by overall preference for the centre- 
right parties. Moreover, whereas the area around Oslo has 
shown a marked evolution to the right, the inner east of the
9
North have retained a strong preference for the left.
It is however misleading to exaggerate the saliency of 
the old divisions. Norway, in some respects, is a rather 
homogeneous country. Consensus orientation is reflected in 
the political and the public s p h e res.Indeed, the lack 
of wide policy differences between the main political parties 
on such key issues as the maintenance of the welfare state, 
foreign policy and Norway's membership in NATO, emphasizes 
that inter-party differences tended to be more over means 
than ends. Yet, the assertion of Laegreid and Olsen that 
'there is a striking contrast between this willingness to co­
operate within the Storting and the unwillingness to make co­
operation formal to signal it to the environment',^^ raises 
a central question, addressed in this chapter, regarding the 
scarcity of formal coalitions at the governmental level.
In fact, more than two-thirds of all Norwegian cabinets
12(during 1907-1987) have been undersized. Of the 39
cabinets formed in minority situations, 32 have been one-
party minority governments, more than 82 percent.
Whereas Strom argues that the frequency of minority
government in Scandinavia can be explained as a rational
14response to a peculiar set of institutional conditions.
Bo Sarlvik lays much stress on the impact of 'two-bloc' 
p o l i t i c s . T h e  latter creates a situation analagous in 
some ways to two-party politics and provides a considerable
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inducement for the parties not to split. In other words, it 
pits a governmental bloc with one set of incentives against 
an informal oppositional bloc with another, all of which are 
unlikely to change during an inter-election period. Two- 
bloc competition is furthermore a major factor in explaining 
the limited permutations of government formation. Firstly, 
the Labour Party has eschewed coalition not only with non­
socialist parties but also with any of the smaller parties to 
its left. Secondly, the non-socialist governments have 
tended to be coalitions.
Undoubtedly, the Norwegian electoral system is a 
critical factor in the maintenance of 'two-bloc' politics. 
Since elections are by the Sainte Laaue system of propor­
tional representation, the overall effect of the Norwegian 
electoral system is not strictly proportional. According to 
Rokkan, the electoral formula had a three-fold effect: it 
strengthened the middle-sized non-socialist parties by 
reducing the overall representation of the Social Democrats, 
it reduced the pay-offs of mergers within the opposition, and 
finally, it helped the established parties by discouraging 
the formation of splinter groups and new parties. 
Moreover, the fact that the Storting has a fixed election 
term of four years, combined with the existence of
constituencies with few members, have been generally dis-
18advantageous for the smaller parties.
Of utmost relevance is the classification of Norwegian 
parties according to the degree of institutionalization
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Table 4.1 List of Events in Norway, 1975-1990
20-23\4\75
14-16\5\75
21\1\76
11-12\7\77
16-17\9\79
3\2\81
4\2\81
4\81
13-14\9\81
14\10\81
8\5\83
16\6\83
12\9\83
8-9\9\85
6-25\4\86
7-15\4\86 
2\5\86
2\5\86
22\5-5\6\86
17\6\86
8-9\86 
16\12\86 
12\6\87
13-14\9\87
18\12\87
23-24\l\88
12\4\88
6\6\88
11\9\89
16\10\89
9\90
DNA Congress elected Reiulf Steen as party 
chairman and designated Odvar Nordli as PM 
candidate.
The parties of the left-wing Socialist Election 
Alliance formally decided to transform themselves 
into the SF.
The formation of Nordli's minority government. 
General elections.
Local Elections.
Gro Harlem Brundtland was unanimously designated 
as PM candidate by Labour's leadership bodies.
Gro Harlem Brundtland took office as PM following 
Nordli's resignation for health reasons.
Harlem Brundtland elected chairwoman of the DNA. 
General Elections.
Kare Willoch took office as PM.
Formation of CP-KrF-SP coalition led by Willoch.
A proposal in the Storting to debate the question 
of the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe 
was defeated by a margin of one vote.
Local Elections.
General Elections
Industrial disputes over wage increases. 
Industrial disputes over wage increases.
Kare Willoch resign following his government's 
defeat of no-confidence motion by 79 to 78. 
Gro Harlem Brundtland formed a Labour minority 
government.
Selective strikes of local government workers. 
Austerity measures approved by Storting after an 
agreement with the KrF and SP.
Willock resigned as the Conservative's candidate 
for PM and was replaced by Rolf Presthus. 
The 1987 Budget was approved after the governmet 
secured the support of the SP and KrF.
Two motions of no-confidence presented by right- 
wing and centre-parties had failed to unset the 
government.
Local Elections.
The 1988 Budget approved with the support of SP 
and KrF.
J.P. Syse was elected unopposed as leader of the 
Conservative Party in succession to Presthus who 
died in January.
The Storting passed legislation effectively 
freezing wages which was supported by the SP. 
Storting approved a new law regulating the Oslo 
stock exchange supported by the SP and KrF. 
General Elections.
J.P. Syse formed a CP-SP-KrF minority government. 
J.P. Syse resinged as PM.
Sources : Keesing's Contemporary Archives. 1975-1990.
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during the period under study. As demonstrated in Appendix
3.1, whilst the DNA, the SV and the SP can be classified as
highly institutionalized parties, the CP and the KrF can be
considered weakly institutionalized parties. Additionally,
the FrP is considered a deviant case due to the overwhelming,
dominant presence of its leader, Carl Hagen. It is therefore
characterized by the existence of a cohesive elite despite a
relatively low degree of institutionalization.
Logically, one can expect sharp differences amongst
members of Storting in terms of their voting behaviour on
final divisions. The impact of 'two-bloc' politics however
provides a considerable inducement for the parties not to
split, Strom emphasized the 'high degree of control' that
19leaders exercise over their parties. Fitzmaurice
furthermore emphasizes the 'iron party discipline in
P a r l i a m e n t A  different explanation for the relatively
unitary action of Norwegian parties in Storting was raised by
Henry Valen. His observation that party elites are not in a
position to force their will by explicit threats, led him to
conclude that the cohesion of the Norwegian parties arises
21because legislators accept the norm of party discipline.
After the 1977 elections, Norway's parties had to face a 
minority situation due to the Storting ending up without one 
party or a bloc controlling more than 50% of the seats. 
Whereas the DNA gained 76 seats, the CP, SP and KrF had 
obtained 41, 12 and 22 seats respectively (see Appendix 4.1). 
This parliamentary situation provides the starting point to 
the analysis. How did it influence the tactical
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considerations of the party elites? What were the new 
patterns of government formation, maintenance and collapse 
which evolved during 1976-1990? These questions will be 
investigated throughout the following sections.
4.2 THE HIGHLY INSTITUTIONALIZED DNA: A TALE OF AN UNCHANGED 
STRATEGY OF INFORMAL ALLIANCES, 1976-81, 1986-89
At the heart of this section lies the notion that the 
highly institutionalized DNA successfully avoided any formal 
alliances during 1976-1990. Instead, the DNA's elites formed 
informal minority governments. Such a strategy was 
especially profitable when Odvar Nordli was facing a personal 
strife with the party chairman, Reuilf Steen, which 
undermined his position within the party. By negotiating 
each issue separately and on an ad-hoc basis, the DNA 
selected the least 'expensive' partner available, in terms 
of the perceived and actual threat it posed to its stability 
and cohesion. The analysis begins with examining the 
positions of Odvar Nordli and Gro Harlem Brundtland within 
the DNA during 1976-1981 and 1986-1989, respectively. It 
thereafter analyzes the DNA coalitional behaviour and its 
intra-party consequences.
4.2.1 The Position of Odvar Nordli (1976-81) and Gro Harlem_ 
Brundtland (1986-1989) within the DNA
Whereas Gro Harlem Brundtland enjoyed a pre-eminent 
position in the DNA, Nordli's position was significantly 
undermined by a personal strife with the party chairman. The
1Ü7
dominant position of the former was confirmed by all DNA MPs 
who were interviewed. Bjorn Tore Godal, for example, noted 
that:
She is a very thorough-working person, very democratic 
but also very firm when it comes to decisions. She, I 
think, is generally accepted, not only in the Labour 
Party but also among political observers and the general 
public, without discussion, the strongest political 
leader in the present Norway.
A different picture, derived from an unusual leadership
structure, is evident in the Nordli's case. It was at the
DNA congress in 1975 that the traditional practice of
combining the party chairmanship and, when in government, the
premiership, was modified. Whereas Reiulf Steen became party
chairman, Odvar Nordli was elected the party's candidate for
the premiership. The reason for such a modification lies in
the EEC issue which was the devisive issue of the 1975 party
congress. This issue was extraordinarily divisive in Norway,
reawakening the old centre-periphery cleavage in a way that
23significantly damaged the social democratic movement.
Since debate over the EEC issue continued among Labour's
leaders and members, even after the referendum of 1972, the
congress had to look for a compromise in order to maintain
party cohesion. The election of a party chairman and the
Prime Ministerial candidate blocked further potentially
damaging discussions over this issue. Odvar Nordli
summarised the reasons for the establishment of such an
unusual leadership structure:
The congress in 1975 was afraid that the discussion 
perhaps could do some damage to the party organization 
[...] If, at that time, the Congress would usually elect
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the party leader, quite sure it would be a divided 
Congress and I am afraid that this problem was enough to 
damage the organization in the party and in the trade- 
union. The other [reason] was that I represented the. 
rural districts and Steen the typical Oslo district.
In the years following the 1975 Congress and especially 
after the 1977 election, Nordli's position within the party 
was unchallenged. The height of success was clearly the 1977 
election in which the Labour Party obtained 42 percent of the 
vote which gave it and the SV an aggregate majority of one 
seat over the four non-socialist parties (see Appendix 4.1). 
Clearly, this victory was credited to the Prime Minister, 
Odvar Nordli, and enhanced his strong standing within the 
party.
It is interesting to note the rapid decline of Nordli's
position. The municipal elections in 1979 already pointed
to a decline in the popularity of the Prime Minister. In the
election, the DNA's share of the vote fell to 36 per cent
compared with 38 per cent in the corresponding elections in
1975, whilst that of the Conservatives increased to 29 per
25cent from 22 per cent in 1975. In the period following
the municipal election, the unusual institutional arrangement
for the party leadership began effecting the decision-making
processes. As Nordli recalled.
To begin with, we had no problem at all, but after some 
years, we saw that this construction was very very 
difficult to handle. I think in 1979, more and more, 
we saw that it was impossible for us to take care of a 
situation where you have a party leader outside the 
government and a Prime Minister inside the government. 
From time to time we had some open discussions between 
the party leader and the Prime Minister, especially when 
we discussed economic policy. But I cannot say he was 
an opponent [...] he had no organized body behind him.
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[It was] a personal conflict because Steen and I are 
very different as persons; Steen is an ideological 
political leader [whilst] I have a more pragmatic way in 
working with political questions. [At the end of 1979] 
he asked me to enter the government and in that way we 
tried to stop the discussions in the newspapers about 
the very very dangerous conflict between Steen-gnd I 
[...]. It was successful but it was too late.
Actually, there was no intrinsic rivalry between the 
government and the party. The lack of a specific issue over 
which internal opposition could evolve blocked any 
possibility of organizing a body to appeal to the DNA elites 
with the intention of forcing a change in its strategy. Yet 
within the highly institutionalized context of the DNA, one 
witnessed striking variation in party members perceptions of 
the strife's consequences. Whereas at the elite level the 
main effect of this personal strife appeared to be a 
regrettable nuisance, the grass-roots was affected as the 
disagreement between the two leaders was fought out in the 
media. To ordinary members, this created the impression of 
a party in the midst of a turbulent storm. It can be 
concluded, therefore, that whereas Brundtland enjoyed a 
dominant position within the DNA, Nordli's position was 
undermined by a personality strife with the party chairman.
4.2.2. The DNA's alliance strategy and its intra-party 
consequences
During Nordli's and Harlem Brundtland's terms in office, 
the DNA formed informal minority governments. This
strategy reduced potential negative 'influences' stemming 
from the party's alliance strategy. Therefore, the internal
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opposition, especially during Nordli's period, could not 
rally itself over the issue of alliance strategy since the 
party committed itself to the least binding inter-party co­
operation. This direction is confirmed by Labour MP, Bjorn 
Tore Godal,
There has been strong tendency in the Labour Party to 
avoid any organized co-operation with anybody in a 
formal agreement. Not since the 1930s has our party 
gone into a formal agreement with any other party.
Its really the.basic belief that we are strong enough in 
our own right.
This legislative strategy was duly implemented during
1976-1981 and 1986-1989. For the former period, potential
alliance partners were mainly the SP, which lost 9 seats (42
per cent of its share) in the 1977 election, the SV, which
lost 14 seats (87 per cent of its share), and the Liberal
Party, which maintained its 2 seats in the Storting (see
Appendix 4.1). For the latter period, potential alliance
partners were mainly the SP, which increased its share of the
seats from 11 to 12 in the 1981 and 1985 elections, the KrF,
which improved its share of the seats from 15 to 16, and the
SV, which improved its share of the seats from 15 to 16,
during the same elections (see Appendix 4.1).
The SP's external support was clearly expected during
the astounding redistribution of wealth in favour of the
rural population which began in 1976. During 1986-89,
however, its support, which was usually accompanied by the
KrF support, was also evident firstly on June 1986 when the
government's austerity measures were approved by the Storting
28after an agreement with the SP and KrF. Similarly, the
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1987 budget was approved in revised form in December 1986,
the government having secured the support of the SP and 
29KrF. In December 1987, the 1988 budget was also approved
with support from the SP and KrF.^^ Additionally, in
April, 1988, the Storting passed legislation effectively
freezing wages and dividends, which had been proposed by the
government and was supported by the SP.^^ Finally, in
June, 1988, the parliament approved a new law regulating the
Oslo stock exchange, which had been proposed by the
32government and supported by the SP.
The SV, unlike the SP and KrF, gradually developed its 
alliance strategy towards the DNA throughout the 1970s and 
the 1980s, following changes in the composition of its elite. 
During 1976-1979, a democracy-communism cleavage, which had 
emerged within the SV following a partial merger with the 
Communist Party in March 1975, led to a sharp decline in its 
parliamentary strength (see Appendix 4.1). Consequently, 
neither the DNA nor the SV intensively looked for co­
operation opportunities with each other during 1976-1979. 
During 1979-1989, on the other hand, informal alliances 
between the DNA and SV were formed mainly due to the 
ascendancy of Hanna Kvanmo as the dominant SV leader.
In fact, this is an understatement. One must look very 
carefuly into Hanna Kvanmo's style of leadership and position 
within the SV in order to understand the party's alliance 
strategy. Theo Koritzinski, the SV chairman during 1983- 
1987, has described the above as follows:
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In many instances she would function in an authoritarian 
sense [...]. She had so much charisma and status outside 
the party , so, in any conflict within the party when it 
was evident that it is Hanna Kvanmo on the one side and 
other people on the other side, the media and most of 
the voters would, as a sort of an^jnstinct, have the 
symphathy on Hanna Kvanmo's side.
Hanna Kvanmo, therefore, took advantage of her position in 
order to enhance DNA-SV informal alliances. Politically, it 
was no surprise that a co-operation was formed as both 
parties were ideologically on the same side. Yet, according 
to Kvanmo, there were views within the SV against co­
operation with the DNA,
[...] but I decided. The younger people were so afraid 
off being accused of not being independent so they often 
tried to break compromises that we had reached. But I 
always said: if we can get a little further then we take 
the compromise, if it is impossible to do anything we 
can [...] tell the public that we go [our way] but with 
the flag on the top.
In spite of internal disagreement concerning the issue, the 
development of co-operation opportunities did continue. A 
proposal for close co-operation with the DNA, which was 
suggested by the party chairman. Berge Furre at the meeting 
of the National Board in Spring 1982, was rejected. However, 
a proposal by Theo Koritzinski to form an electoral pact 
amongst the SV, DNA and the Left Liberals in the 1985 
elections was accepted by SV's decision-making bodies but 
rejected by the DNA.^^ At the SV's 1987 convention, the 
issue of formal co-operation between the DNA and the SV was 
discussed and a few months later an eight point program was 
prepared to be put forward to the DNA.^^ Finally, the 
1989 SV's convention under the new leadership, clearly.
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signalled its willingness to enter a formal agreement.
The relationships between the oppositional parties also
contributed to the relatively secure position of the Labour
minority governments during 1976-1979 and 1986-1989. During
the former period, the CP elites followed a clear and
coherent alliance strategy towards the non-socialist parties
demanding that the CP views should be accepted as the
prevailing non-socialist views (a detailed analysis of the CP
strategy is provided in the next section). In other words,
the CP aimed at establishing a necessity for a non-socialist
37co-operation on the basis of its own manifesto. Not
surprisingly, therefore, CP co-operation with the SP and the
KrF was rejected by the latter two.
During 1986-1988, internal disagreement surfaced between
Rolf Presthus and Jan P. Syse (the CP chairman and the leader
of the CP parliamentary group, respectively), on the one
hand, and Kare Willoch and Jo Benkow (the former Prime
Minister and former party chairman, respectively) on the
other. Whereas the former leaders were in favour of forming
a formal alliance with the SP and the KrF, the latter
opposed such a move. According to a Conservative MP, Per-
Kristian Foss,
The mistake was made in the years 1986-1988 and it was 
a shifting strategy whether to be an opposition party or 
to be a coalition partner in the government. This 
strategy, I think, shifted too often and that reflect 
the disagreement in the leadership [...]. This conflict 
was not a question of left or right wing, so, the 
ideological question, I think, has been very little 
discussed in the party leadership. There has been a 
broad agreement on the political position but in 
question of tggtical manoueveres you will find this 
disagreement.
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Probably as a result of the internal disagreements, the CP
lost ground both in the parliamentary and the electoral
arenas. In the Storting, two motions of no-confidence,
presented by the right-wing and centre parties on June 12,
1987, failed to unseat the government because of divisions
within the oppositional parties. Tabled by the Conservative
Party, SP and KrF, the first motion in protest against the
government's plan to reduce subsidies for the agricultural
sector failed to gain the FrP support which objected to all
forms of state subsidy in principle. The second motion, on
the government's overall economic policy, was supported by
39the FrP, but not by the SP. In the electoral arena,
moreover, the Conservatives obtained only 22 per cent of the 
votes in the 1989 elections, compared with 30 per cent in the 
1985 election (see Appendix 4.1). To conclude, due to the 
insistence of the Conservative elites on a dominant position 
for their views within a potential centre-right alliance 
during 1977-1981, and the internal disagreement within the 
Conservative Party concerning alliance strategy during 1986- 
1989, the DNA minority governments during these periods could 
act securely.
With this in mind, we can now turn to an evaluation of 
the relative bargaining power of the DNA during the periods 
under study. The bargaining power of the highly
institutionalized DNA during 1976-1981 and 1986-1989 grew out 
of its alliance strategy - the formation of informal minority 
governments. That the DNA possessed relatively more
bargaining power than its alliance partners is doubtful. By
115
negotiating each issue separately and on an ad hoc basis, the
DNA selected the least 'expensive' partner available, i.e.
the one which would not threaten its internal stability and 
cohesion.
For the former period, the Prime Minister, Odvar Nordli
could summarize the DNA's bargaining power as follows:
You cannot co-operate with different parties without 
giving something, but I could give those gifts from the 
programme of the Labour Party. If you find it at the 
right time, its all right. So, I must say , in the five
years I was Prime Minister of a minority^government, I
had no great problems in the parliament.
The dominant policy influence of the DNA was evident
following the wave of economic democratization reforms in the
1970s which included improvement of working conditions,
enhancing industrial democracy and the decentralization of
banking examplifies the relative high level of bargaining
41power possessed by the DNA.
Minor concessions to the alliance partners - namely the
SP and KrF - were also evident during 1986-1989. From the
perspective of the DNA elites, the SP could be considered as
being the most co-operative party. As Einar Forde, the
leader of the DNA parliamentary group, put it:
By far, the easiest party to negotiate with is the 
Centre Party for a very pure and simple reason: that is 
because this is an extreme degree [of] a pragmatic- 
oriented party, oriented towards their own interests. 
They will always make a deal on the judgment of what 
they get. There was very little ideology in it agg it 
was very clear a case of take-and-give relations.
Clearly, this is not to say that the SP and KrF had no impact 
on the policy process and its outcomes. It is rather to
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stress that Lindblom's observation that all affected
interests can have at least some influence in the policy
43making process appears to be valid. Thus, the SP and
KrF's bargaining power did not lie in the ability to affect 
outcome, but rather some outcomes were designed with
consideration of their position.
In conclusion, the DNA successfully avoided any formal 
alliances during 1976-1990. Instead, it's elites formed
informal minority governments. By negotiating each issue 
separately and on an ad-hoc basis, the DNA selected the least 
'expensive' partner available, in terms of the threat it 
posed to the DNA stability and cohesion. The fact that no 
intra-party conflicts were recorded during the period under 
examination significantly contributed to the relatively high 
level of bargaining power possessed by the the DNA during 
the period under study.
4.3 COPING WITH CONFLICTS WITHIN,ONE OF THE COALITION 
PARTNERS: THE ADVANTAGE OF KARE WILLOCH'S DOMINANT 
POSITION WITHIN THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, 1981-83, 
1985-86.
As a partial explanation for the evolution of the co­
operation between the CP, the SP and the KrF, during 1981-83 
and 1985-1986, the position of Kare Willoch within the CP 
provides a convenient starting point. Undoubtedly, Willoch 
could be considered a very experienced politician, having 
being elected a member of the Storting in 1957, becoming
parliamentary leader in 1970, and between 1970-1974, also
44serving as Chairman of the party. His leadership style
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and position within the CP are well described by Lars Roar
Langsleth, the party ideologist, as follows:
Willoch is ,in my eyes, a high-ranking leader with a 
very impressive grasp for all branches of political 
life, and very energetic in argumentation [...]. He was 
very different in government, especially, when that 
government was enlarged [...]. He had an intuitive 
feeling of where the ground for a compromise might be 
and was very sensitive for this. In his own party, he 
had always been much tougher, in a way, claiming to have 
the right position himself in every question but he was 
really a mediator and was highly respective, always 
loyal as a Prime Minister [...]. His traditional 
background has of course been economic. He has, from 
time to time, been accused of being always only 
concerned with economic problems. [...] His position 
was unquestionable.
Willoch's position was further enhanced by the party's
performance in three consecutive elections under his
chairmanship. Whereas in the 1973 election the Conservatives
gained 17 per cent of the vote, in the 1977 and 1981
elections, the party gained 24 per cent and 31 per cent of
the vote, respectively (see Appendix 4.1).
The CP alliance strategy during the 1970s and the early
1980s grew out of Willoch's agenda of creating the necessity
for non-socialist co-operation on the basis of the CP
programme. According to Willoch,
We had reasonably good contacts [with the non-socialist 
parties], but, admittedly, the Conservatives at that 
time followed their strategy in the direction that we 
wanted; that our view should be more or less accepted as 
the prevailing non-socialist view and we wanted to 
establish a necessity for a non-socialist co-operation 
on the basis of Conservatives' ideas which is a 
contradiction in terms but it was successful, it 
worked.
Not surprisingly, both the SP and the KrF refused to enter a 
government coalition which would have been dominated by the
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CP in policy and personalities.
Still, the very nature of Willoch's skills enabled him
to form the informal alliance during 1981-1983. A
substantial reason for this lay in Willoch's decisive
preference of 'fighting inflation' which was adopted by the
SP and the KrF in order to establish some visible convergence
of opinion with the CP.*^ Given the adverse economic
trends which were apparent from 1980 (such as, falling
competitiveness in the non-oil industrial sectors, rising
48inflation and increasing unemployment), it is hardly
surprising that the preference of 'fighting inflation' did
not alienate the non-socialist elites and party members. It
was sufficiently focused to generate the widest possible
support within the parties involved.
In 1983, however, both the SP and KrF demanded a direct
participation in the government. From the CP point of view,
as the Prime Minister noted.
There was a discussion whether the smallest parties 
would be invited to participate in the government, but, 
[in] reality, there was no choice [for further excluding 
them]. Of course there would not be a majority in 
Parliament without their support and they would probably 
not support it for long if they were not invited to 
participate [...]. There was no choice. Reality was, I 
think, that the two small parties were tired of 
supporting a government. They thought that the effect 
was that the government took the praise and they took 
the blame [...]. This is very much simplified, of 
course, but there was a tendency to feel like that.
Clearly, this does not mean that the CP had to considerably 
modify their alliance strategy following the SP and KrF's 
demand to participate in the government. Rather, it is to 
stress that the SP and KrF entered a coalition which was
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dominated by the CP in policy and personalities. The fact
that the 1983 cabinet comprised 11 Conservatives, all
retaining their previous positions including the four major
posts of Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs, Finance and
Defence, with four new KrF ministers and three from the SP,
suffices to underline the argument.
The source of the intra-elite conflict within the SP was
basically an organizational one, namely, whether the focus of
intra-party power should lie in the parliamentary group or
the cabinet members. As elected represetatives, SP members
of the parliamentary group refused to serve as a 'rubber
stamp' for governmental decisions. In fact, this is an
understatement. Anne Enger Lahnstein, the deputy leader of
the SP parliamentary group during 1983-1986, explained the
principals of the group's strategy:
That is the way we behave in my party [.. ]. I can not 
remember another way of behaviour of the group. Of 
course, we are here elected from the people to take care 
of special issues. So our people in the government 
negotiate with the other parties and must made a 
compromise, and then we have to do something with it 
inside the parliament. Of course we are not only 
providing votes for the government. We also have to 
think by our own and we have responsibility for what we 
are doing. That is my basic attitude to this. For them 
[SP cabinet members], this was a problem.
Clearly, the demand of the SP parliamentary group to have a 
'say' in policy formation meant that SP cabinet members were 
not able to embrace policy fully without causing offence to 
the group.
Less acute intra-elite conflicts surfaced between KrF 
Cabinet members and the KrF parliamentary group, mainly due
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to the conciliatory position taken by the latter. A partial
explanation to the evolving intra-elite conflict within the
KrF was due to the lack of information possessed by the
parliamentary group, rather than matters of principal.
According to the head of the KrF Secreteriat, Arne Synnes:
Looking on the question from different position, I think 
the tension was there from the very beginning; it was on 
the taxation system, privatization questions, subsidies 
to the different sectors. It was partly a question of a 
lack of information because they [members of the 
parliamentary group] did not know the reason why they 
[cabinet members] have compromised. There is always 
the question were they fighting hard enough, or have 
they just been absent from the discussion or didn't 
push. It was also the question that the Centre Party 
and the Christian People's Party had 10 of 19 ministers 
but it seemed the Conservatives that arranged the 
economic policy as a whole.
It is indeed hardly surprising that in the years following
the formal alliance, the SP, and to a lesser extent, the
KrF parliamentary groups militantly opposed numerous items.
Eight days after the coalition was formed, for example, a
proposal was made, by SV, SP and Liberal MPs, that the
Storting should again debate the question of the deployment
of nuclear missiles in Europe before their deployment went
into effect. The proposal was only defeated by a margin of
one vote, with only handful of KrF and SP's MPs voting with
the Government.
The discussion up to now is not to suggest that the CP
was unaffected by the formation of the 1983 formal alliance
with the SP and the KrF. Local elections held on September
541983, in which the CP's losses were evident, were
interpreted in the party as a reaction towards the extension
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of the government. Additionally, frustration within the
party organization had evolved 'towards all the compromises
55within the coalition'. The internal dissatisfaction,
which was expressed within the party organization primarily
by two regional leaders, Per-Hysing Dahl and Lars Lefdal, was
mainly channeled against Jo B e n k o w . T h e  latter, at that
time, held both the party chairmanship and leadership.
According to Benkow,
In fact, quite a few of the grass-root were dissatisfied 
with [the] Prime Minister's politics [and] with the work 
of the government, and they decided to take it out [on] 
someone. They could not take it out on the Prime 
Minister [...]. I think Mr. Willoch had a part in it 
because in his view I made promises in the 1981 election 
campaign concerning the taxes which [he] found too large 
in extent.
Following the internal pressures, Benkow resigned as party 
chairman and was succeeded by Erling Norvik. The above- 
mentioned internal difficulties did not challenge party
strategy as they were channelled against Benkow, rather than
0
Kare Willoch. Again, the dominant position of Willoch within 
the CP seemed to be a relevant explanation for this process. 
Additionally, the strife was not perceived as conflict by the 
party elite. The fact that Jo Benkow resigned without any 
(leadership) election having taken place examplifies this 
point. To sum up, whereas the SP and the KrF elites faced 
intra-elite conflict following the 1983 formal alliance, the 
CP elites faced internal difficulties which were resolved 
internally. We now turn to the strategy adopted by the SP 
and KrF elites in order to neutralize the internal 
dissatisfaction of their respective parliamentary groups.
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However mutable the parliamentary groups' strength may 
have been during 1985-1986, it prompted determined action 
from the SP and KrF cabinet members aimed at neutralizing the 
internal dissatisfaction. Basically, the government had to 
accept a pattern of two-stage compromise of governmental 
decision. Firstly, a compromise was reached at the 
government level. Secondly, the compromise that was reached 
in the first stage was re-negotiated and amended within the 
SP and the KrF parliamentary groups. As the Prime Minister, 
Kare Willoch, noted.
In reality, members of government would consult with 
members of parliament when government was discussing 
controversial issues and sometimes the government 
postponed decisions in order that members [of 
government] might consult with their members in 
parliament. What should have been respected to a 
greater degree was that membersof government should have 
authority to negotiate compromise which members of 
parliament should accept. Their signs should be given 
in advance so that there might be negotiations leading 
to a result. But what gradually developed was a system 
through which compromises should be adjusted and always 
in the same direction, that means always in the 
direction of greaterexpenditure. Because the two 
smallest parties are, whatl called, 'Expenditure 
Parties'. Their basis is an ability to get more 
government revenue for the [...] particular interests of 
their voters.
The SP and KrF parliamentary groups, therefore, have 
established themselves as necessary, not merely relevant 
actors, in the governmental decision-making process. This, 
in turn, undermined the effectiveness of the decision-making 
process and content. Much more time had to be spent on 
discussions between the government and both the SP and KrF 
parliamentary groups producing results which meant
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increasing government expenditure.
The internal opposition within the SP and the KrF did
not undermine the solidarity amongst the cabinet members. In
spite of the intra-elite conflicts within these parties, an
59atmosphere of solidarity continued within the government.
As part of the government, SP and KrF cabinet members could 
not, of course, militantly oppose legislation without being 
excluded from the coalition. Yet, the very nature of their 
skills enabled them to keep their cabinet positions whilst 
maintaining the two-stage compromise of governmental 
decisions. It should be remembered that their strategy to 
cope with the internal dissatisfaction should be evaluated 
not so much according to the 'how' governmental decision were 
actually taken, as to the extent of the pressures that were 
exerted on the government. This was, of course, a function 
of the intensity of the conflict within the SP and the KrF.
From the beginning of the formal alliance, Willoch 
formed his governmemnt in a way which significantly 
neutralized the impact of potential opposition within his two 
partners. Clearly, Willoch was aware of the potential risks 
of a formal alliance with two heterogeneous parties. 
'Particularly the SP', Willoch claims, 'has always been known 
for its lack of internal loyalty'.Consequently, 
Willoch's strategy to cope with potential internal problems 
within his chosen partners focused on the informal structure 
of the government and the careful allocation of portfolios. 
Minor adjustments in the government's informal structure had 
to be made in order to establish methods and practices to
reconcile differences of opinions between the three parties. 
Firstly, an informal inner-cabinet was formed, including the 
Prime Minister, the Finance Minister and the leaders of the 
two coalition partners. These informal mechanisms were 
additional to the meetings between members of government and 
their own parliamentary group, and between Ministers and the 
coalition MPs from the relevant parliamentary committee. 
Secondly, the leaders of the parliamentary groups were 
invited to informal meetings of the government such as, 
lunches.
With regard to the composition of the cabinet, Willoch 
noted that he had a clear reasoning in the allocation of the 
portfolios. The reasoning was as follows:
I wanted their leading personalities in the government. 
It was my demand that their party leaders should be in 
government because I did not want to strengthen the 
other centers which would be in Parliament [...]. That 
was my absolute condition for having three parties in 
government.
Indirectly, therefore, the SP and the KrF's parliamentary 
groups were to some extent neutralized, although not totally
pacified, by the allocation of their prominent leaders in
governmental positions, and, at the same time, the
incorporation of their less prominant parliamentary leaders 
into the informal structure of the government.
Of primary importance here are the consequences of the 
intra-elite conflicts within the SP and KrF. At the outset, 
it should be clear from the above discussion that the
compromises made by the government following the pressures
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from the SP and KrF parliamentary groups did not undermine
the CP's bargaining power. The dominant position of the CP
in the government, having controlled 11 portfolios out of 18
in the 1983 government, and 10 out of 18 in 1985, and
retaining the four major posts of Prime Minister, Foreign
62Affairs, Finance and Defence, exemplifies this argument.
Perhaps most important was the solidarity within the 
government which indirectly enabled the CP to take advantage 
of its dominant position within the government. Compromises 
were easily reached at the first stage of decision making in 
government. As the various parliamentary groups lacked 
dominant leaders due to the incorporation of their most 
prominent members into the government, modifications of 
governmental decisions at the second stage were incremental 
rather than substantial. The main consequence of the 
parliamentary groups' activity was the frequent delays in the 
governmental decision-making process which meant increasing 
government expenditure.
However, as a result of the continuation of the 
dissatisfaction within the SP parliamentary group, the SP 
cabinet members were forced to modify their coalitional 
behaviour in order to maintain party stability. This change 
occured in April 1986 following the defeat of the government 
by 79 votes to 78 in the Storting. A l t h o u g h  the SP voted 
with the government, the DNA, the SV and two FrP members were 
able to secure a majority for the opposition. Immediately 
after Willoch's resignation, however, both the SP and the KrF 
elites modified their coalitional behaviour, forming an
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informal minority government with the DNA. It seems 
reasonable to argue, therefore, that the internal conflicts 
within the SP contributed significantly to its elites' 
decision to break-up the co-operation (i.e. in government or 
in opposition) with the Conservative Party.
To sum up, an informal minority government amongst the 
CP, SP and the KrF during 1981-1983, which was based on the 
decisive preference of 'fighting inflation', was not further 
extended as the two latter partners realised they provided 
external support whilst the CP enjoyed dominant policy 
influence. However, a formal minority government which was 
maintained by these parties during 1985-1986 resulted in 
intra-elite conflicts within the SP and the KrF. By taking 
the prominent members of the SP and the KrF to his Cabinet 
together with accepting minor constraints over the 
government day-to-day operation, Willoch had neutralized, to 
some extent, the internal dissatisfaction within the two 
partners. Yet, as a result of the continuation of the 
dissatisfaction within the SP parliamentary group, the SP 
cabinet members were forced to modify their coalitional 
behaviour in order to maintain party stability. It was 
concluded that that the internal conflicts within the SP 
contributed significantly to its elites' decision to break-up 
the co-operation (i.e. in government or in opposition) with 
the Conservative Party.
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4.4 SP CABINET MEMBERS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT SOLIDARITY AND 
PARLIAMENTARY GROUP HOSTILITY, 1989-1990.
Turning to the changes within the SP elites during the 
late 1980s, our first concern is to demonstrate just what 
Hirschman claims, that, '[...] for voice to function properly 
it is necessary that individuals possess reserves of 
political influence which they can bring into play when they 
are sufficiently a r o u s e d ' . T h i s  involves a discussion 
not only of 'attitudes', as disembodied sets of ideas and 
values, but also of the varying organizational contexts in 
which party politics take place.
In the previous section it was shown that intra-elite 
conflicts, which evolved within the SP especially during 
1985-1986, were successfuUy neutralized by Kare Willoch 
mainly through the allocation of SP and KrF's prominant 
leaders in governmental positions and the incorporation of 
their parliamentary leaders in the informal structure of the 
government. As time passed, however, the leaders of the SP 
parliamentary group established their position within the 
party. Most notably, Anne Enger Lahnstein, who served as 
deputy leader of the SP parliamentary group during 1983-1989, 
was elected the group leader in 1989. Her views on alliance 
strategy effectively represented these of the parliamentary 
group:
We are a little bit special party [...]. We are now only 
11 [members] in Parliament but we are always seeding 
power, and, we are always taking responsibility.
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Following the ineffectiveness of the parliamentary
group, evident during the 1985-86 formal alliance with the CP
and the KrF, the need to strengthen its power emerged. It
is therefore hardly surprising that Lahnstein incorporated
her 'reserves of political influence' into the SP bargaining
plane by collaborating with the party secretary, John Dale.
This is not to say that the parliamentary group and the party
secretary established a united front against the cabinet
members. It is rather to stress that a cooperative channels
of communications were established between the two.
The political influence of John Dale grew out of two
sources: (i) the control over party members, and, (ii) the
divergence between the cabinet members and the party
organization. Dale controlled and managed political
activities which involved 49000 members in 1989.^^
Although a gradual decline in the SP membership was evident
throughout the 1970s and the 1980s (for example, 63000
members in 1969, 52000 members in 1981, and 49000 members in
1989),^^ one could not blame the party secretary. Almost
all Norwegian parties faced similar trends throughout this 
68period. According to Hirschman,
[...] When a uniform decline hits simultaneously all 
firms of an industry, each firm would garner in some of 
the disgruntled customers to its competitors. In these 
circumstances the exit option is ineffective in alerting 
management to its failings [...].
The decline in the SP membership, therefore, did not 
undermine Dale's position within the party. Recent research, 
furthermore, suggests that the political influence of the SP
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secretary is considered 'strong' by 47 per cent of both top
and middle-level party elites.
The divergence between the cabinet members and the party
organization, which was evident throughout the 1989-90 formal
alliance with the CP and the KrF, was both organizational and
ideological. Being in the government, cabinet members were
exposed to a different set of political interactions which
made solidarity at the governmental level inevitable. A
widening ideological difference between SP cabinet members
and SP activists further enhanced the co-operation of the
latter with the parliamentary group.
Consequently, the SP cabinet members faced a trade-off
between government solidarity and parliamentary group
hostility during 1989-1990. According to John Dale,
This is a classical conflict because you have 
negotiations in the government and you have negotiation 
here [...].[Yet] the question you posed is surprising. 
You asked what is the parliamentary group allowed to do. 
This is not the question. The question is what are the 
cabinet ministers allowed to do, because, in our system 
the parliamentary group has got a 'say'. They are the 
people that must take responsibility here in the 
Storting by their voting [...]. They [cabinet members] 
cannot come to the parliamentary group and say 'listjn, 
we demand from you', its more the other way around.
Because of the intensity of the intra-elite conflict,
therefore, the SP cabinet members were unable to embrace 
policy fully without offending the leader of the 
parliamentary group and the party secretary.
A classic example is the inter-party negotiation over 
the 1990 budget. Probably following the intra-elite 
conflicts, the SP acted inconsistently during these
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negotiations; breaking-up the negotiations following the FrP
participation, but, in the end, signing the agreement.
Given the FrP's strategy shift in 1989, seeking co-operation
72with the non-socialist government, it is hardly
surprising that the party was considered a relevant partner
for an informal alliance over the Budget. However, whilst
the KrF and the CP agreed to form such an alliance with the
FrP, the SP parliamentary group bitterly opposed.
Two days after the pre-negotiations over the 1990 budget
had started, that is, the negotiations whether to negotiate,
the SP parliamentary group refused to co-operate with the FrP
and broke-up the discussions. According to FrP member in
the Finance Committee, Tor Mikkel Wara,
For two days, nights and days, we negotiated with the 
three parties whether we are going to negotiate about 
the Budget. The result was that we were going to do it. 
The Centre Party did not like to have this budget co­
operation with us [...]. So, when we were going to [...] 
get it through, to have a balance, they said that they 
would like to negotiate both with the Labour Party and 
the Progress Party. We said 'no chance, you have to 
make a decision, either the Labour Party or the Progress 
Party' [..]• The result was that all the media and press 
wrote that the Progress Party won these negotiations 
because the Centre Party had to chose the Progress Party 
as their-co-operation partner to get the budget 
through.
An additional cause of the dissatisfaction of the SP
parliamentary group were the direct negotiations between the
Prime Minister, Jan P. Syse, and the FrP leader, Carl Hagen.
According to the latter.
The Prime Minister and me settled the 1990 budget in a 
meeting in his office. It was following the 
negotiations we already had and we made some minor 
adjustments to bridge the gap from the meetings between 
the parliamentary leaders. [...] We made a binding
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agreement that we will cut expenditure during the 
revised-Budget in May [1990], 450 million Krones 
[...].
Following the governmental co-operation with the FrP, the
conflict between the SP parliamentary group and Cabinet
members intensified to an overt hostility.
The interesting question that the analysis now turns to
is: How did the SP cabinet ministers resolve the conflict?
Basically, a two-fold strategy was implemented by Johan J.
Jakobsen (the SP leader and Minister of Local Government and
Labour). Firstly, a decision-making 'troika', responsible
for shaping party strategy, was established. Not
surprisingly, it comprised of Johan Jakobsen, Anne Enger
Lahnstein and John Dale. Secondly, the SP alliance strategy
was modified, that is, the SP-CP-KrF formal alliance had
collapsed following the refusal of the former to support the
Government policy over the issue of 'European Economic Area'.
To understand how the modification of the SP alliance
strategy was an inevitable consequence of the establishment
of the 'troika' requires a more detailed examination. The
discussion, concerning the evolution of the SP strategy over
the 'European Economic Area', begins with the fall of Gro
Harlem Brundtland's minority government in 1989.
A partial explanation for the fall of Gro Harlem
Brundtland's government in 1989, is provided by a newspaper
interview with John Dale. In the newapaper interview. Dale
expressed the view that Labour's EEC policy was one of the
75main reasons why the SP wanted a change in government.
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Whilst the SP tried to start a debate on Norway's and EFTA's
adaptation to the single market of the EEC during the 1989
electoral campaign, Gro Harlem Brundtland did not want to
divulge to the public the government strategy in the EFTA
negotiations on EEC adaptation. Immediately after the
election, Gro Harlem Brundtland drafted a series of memos on
adaptation substantiating the SP arguments that the final
aim of the DNA was to make the question of EEC membership a
76mere formality.
In 1990, the SP's bargaining position over a similar
issue contributed to a governmental collapse. As the SP was
strongly opposed to membership of the EC or even a full
customs union of the EC and the EFTA for all products, a
commitment to a 'broader trade agreement' with the EC was a
77necessary part of the 1989 coalition agreement. The
governmental crisis, however, surfaced over the question of 
forming a free internal market in Western Europe, 'European 
Economic Area', between the EFTA, of which Norway is a 
member, and the EEC. Whilst the SP insisted that Norway 
would refuse to abandon its concessionary laws which impede 
foreign ownership of property, financial institutions and 
industrial enterprises in the country, the CP adopted a more 
conciliatory position. To understand how the SP position 
over the above-mentioned issue was formulated, however, it is 
necessary to appreciate the role of Lahnstein and Dale in the 
'troika'.
From its beginning, the SP strategy over this issue grew 
out of the views held by both Dale and Lahnstein, According
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to Ole Gabriel Ueland, SP member of parliament,
Our tough leaders are represented in the parliament, in 
the government and in the administration. You have a 
'troika' there of Jakobsen, Lahnstein and Dale, they are 
all in the centre of the discussions [...]. But the 
person that without any doubt had used most time and has 
had most interest for this question during the last year 
was John Dale.
As party secretary. Dale could not initiate a governmental 
crisis without the firm backing of party members, nor could 
he and Lahnstien act without the approval of the 
parliamentary group. Their political skill, however, enabled 
them to establish an informal support base within the party 
organization and the group in parliament. Within the party 
organization. Dale met SP leaders at the local level and 
probably won their support. Discussions in the parliamentary 
group had taken place approximately 2-3 weeks before the 
actual crisis. In both cases. Dale and Lahnstien did not 
seek the formal approval of the various party bodies for his 
strategy. To sum up, the 'troika', dominated by Lahnstein 
and Dale, had acted independently with respect to the issue 
in question.
The above-mentioned process and the disapproval of
almost half of the parliamentary group to the 'troika'
strategy were confirmed by Ole Gabriel Ueland:
I think that after we have been discussing it now for 2- 
3 weeks, really every day, there are more differences in 
the group still. But, we had a meeting 2-3 weeks ago 
with the members of the party from all parts of the 
country, such as the leaders of every county, and then,
I guess, our party leaders got the backing they needed 
to go on with the process [...]. It is not possible to 
speak about stable party relations [...]. John Dale has 
been travelling around the whole country and told the 
people about this. And they are only a small part of it
13 /<
[i.e. the party]. But it easy to tell people, who don't 
know too much about the question, what's wrong [...] 
[Besides] we are doing more in directing the policy as a 
member of the government even if we not a part of the 
majority [over the EEA issue] [...] I think more than 
half [share my view]. Normally, perhaps one or two of 
the parliamentary group would prefer to be free and out 
of the government. [Another problem] is to be in the 
parliament and don't always know what's going on at the 
top.
Clearly, the decision taken by the 'troika' to bring down the 
government over the issue of a 'European Economic Area', 
was taken without any approval, in voting terms, of the 
parliamentary group and the party organization. Neither 
was it taken after the parliamentary group had been informed 
about the negotiations with the government.
The discussion up to now has covered the internal 
politics of the SP during 1989-1990. Justifiably, one can 
raise a question concerning the involvement of the Prime 
Minister, J.P. Syse in neutralizing the internal dissatisf­
action within the SP. A substantial reason for the minor 
role Syse had in pacifying the internal opposition lay in 
his weak position within the CP, compared to Willoch's 
position during 1981-1986. At the outset, the latter was 
much more experienced than the former; whereas Willoch served 
eight years as party leader and five years as a Prime 
Minister, Syse was party leader for approximately two years 
and Prime Minister for one year. Additionally, in the 1989 
general elections, the CP, led by Syse, suffered its worst 
result since 1973, losing 8 per cent of the vote and 13 
seats (see Appendix 4.1). Not surprisingly.
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since Mr. Willoch, in a sense, step aside, we had Mr. 
[Rolf] Presthus, Mr. [J.p.j Syse, Mr. [Erling] Norvik in 
the background, and there was never one real obvious 
leader with total authority. We [therefore] tended to 
be a little spread out and the party was gradually 
loosing authority [...].
Contrary to Willoch's strategy to cope with the internal 
situation within the SP, Syse could not initiate CP's 
concessions without risking internal opposition within his 
own party. Thus, politically, the minor involvement of the 
Prime Minister in the resolution of the internal conflicts 
within the SP was a derived consequence of his weak position 
within the CP, as well as the existence of the 'troika'.
The above discussion, concerning the two-fold strategy 
adopted by the SP leader in order to neutralize the internal 
opposition and the uninvolvement of the Prime Minister in the 
matter, brings the analysis to the stage of evaluating the 
relative bargaining power possessed by the parties involved 
during 1989-1990. A substantial reason for the relatively 
high level of bargaining power possessed by the CP lay in 
the failure of Johan Jakobsen to pacify the parliamentary 
group's dissatisfaction by the formation of the 'troika'. 
The failure was later manifested by Jakobsen's acceptance of 
Lahnstein and Dale's attitude in the 1990 governmental 
crisis.
The relatively minor concessions made by the 
Conservatives during the period under examination were a 
major source of irritation to other party elites. For the 
KrF, during the negotiations over the 1990 budget it was 
decided that 10000 Krones would be given to every child under
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five years old, together with a governmental commitment to
formulate a plan aimed at reducing the number of abortions.
Additionally, the CP had promised the KrF that the issues of
Gene Technology and opening hours of shops during religious
81holidays would not be dealt with by the government.
Concessions to the SP were made during the negotiation over
the 1990 budget when it was decided to lower value added tax
for milk, and to increase the amount of money towards
82environmental protection. The relatively low level of
the SP bargaining power was confirmed by John Dale in an
interview which was conducted two hours before the CP-led
government collapsed:
The Conservatives do not respect our attitudes. They 
have thought that this is a small party and,[therefore], 
they could be the bosses. And we, as a small party, we 
should only obey them. It was wrong. Their mistake was 
that they thought they could more or less force us to 
obey them instead of respecting us and respecting our 
programme, our own right to decide our policy [...[. 
[They] try to use all kind of force, threats, 
year by year; [for example, they said] 'if you do not 
obey us we shall crush you'. This is their big 
mistake.
Based on the SP experience during 1989-1990, it is indeed 
hardly surprising that in the crisis over the 'European 
Economic Area' the SP militantly opposed Syse's position, 
forcing the resignation of his government.
To sum up, the emergence of the SP parliamentary group's 
leader, Anne Enger Lahnstein, as the prominant figure in the 
party, and her close co-operation with the party secretary, 
John Dale, were critical factors in the worsening intra­
elite conflicts within the SP during 1989-1990. In order
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to neutralize the internal opposition, the SP leader, Johan 
J. Jakobsen, established a decision-making 'troika', 
comprised of Lahnstein, Dale and himself, which was 
responsibe for the formulation of the party strategy. 
However, after failing to pacify the internal opposition, 
Jakobsen modified the SP alliance strategy, that is, broke up 
the CP-SP-KrF formal alliance, in order to maintain party 
stability. It can be concluded that the CP enjoyed 
relatively a high level of bargaining power following the 
failure of Johan Jakobsen to pacify the internal opposition 
by the formation of the 'troika'. The failure was later 
manifested by Jakobsen's acceptance of Lahnstein and Dale's 
attitude in the 1990 governmental crisis.
4.5 CONCLUSIONS
The Norwegian case seems to support the argument that 
the formation of informal minority governments is the most 
attractive strategy for highly institutionalized parties. It 
also supports the contention that weakly institutionalized 
parties do not necessarily have to face internal conflicts 
when they shift alliance strategy. The experience of the 
highly institutionalized DNA during 1976-1981 and 1986-1989 
indicates that as long as the party avoided formal alliances, 
no intra-party conflicts evolved. Such a strategy was 
especially profitable when its leader, Odvar Nordli, was 
facing internal difficulties which undermined his position 
within the party. For the weakly institutionalized party.
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the experience of the CP indicates that a shift from an 
informal minority government to a formal one does not 
necessarily cause internal conflicts.
With regard to highly institutionalized parties which 
form formal minority governments, this chapter reveals that 
such parties tend to impose structural constraints on the 
day-to-day operation of the government, and modify their 
alliance strategy in order to maintain their stability. The 
SP's experience during 1989-1990 immediately springs to mind.
As clearly demonstrated in this chapter, the elites' 
ability to control internal dissatisfaction affect the 
relative bargaining power of the party. It was shown that as 
long as the highly institutionalized parties pursue informal 
minority governments, they possessed a relatively high level 
of bargaining power. Once a formal alliance between weakly 
and highly institutionalized parties was formed, such as the 
SP-CP-KrF case in 1985-1986 and 1989-1990, the disadvantage 
of the former in mobilizing internal dissatisfaction was 
translated into a relatively inferior position in the 
bargaining arena, forcing the party elites to modify their 
alliance strategy on both occasions.
Consequently, by formally coalescing with the highly 
institutionalized party, the weakly institutionalized party 
risks the stability of co-operation. Once internal
conflicts evolve within the highly institutionalized partner, 
it probably would have to modify its alliance strategy in 
order to maintain stability as it lacks heterogeneous and 
diffused mechanisms for internal dissent.
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5. THE HISTORIC COMPROMISE, ITALY, 1976-1979
This chapter has three major goals. First, and most 
broadly, it shows that elite-follower conflicts are most 
likely to evolve within a highly institutionalized party as 
it moves aggressively to break out of long period in the 
political wilderness. In the Italian case, the formation of 
an informal minority government, as well as a formal one 
later on, exacerbated the strains within party organization. 
At the same time, the elites within the weakly 
institutionalized partner, which were deeply affected by the 
inter-party alliances, underwent excessive strains.
Secondly, it demonstrates how each aspect of the 
alliance strategy formulated by the highly institutionalized 
party was grounded not simply, in the party's response to 
external forces and stimuli, which were numerous and 
powerful, to be sure, but in the organizational limits of the 
party. Violent demonstrations of militants and activists 
erupted outside the framework of the party due to the lack of 
diffused mechanisms for internal dissent. On the other hand, 
intra-elite dissatisfaction within the weakly 
institutionalized party was manifested and resolved within 
the party.
Finally, this chapter is required as a national context 
against which the relative bargaining power of the main 
actors need to be assessed. It intends to demonstrate that 
the failure of the highly institutionalized party to 
mobilize, and thus, control its followers' dissatisfaction
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forced its elites to modify their alliance strategy. Those 
modifications significantly contributed to the inferior 
position of the party in the parliamentary bargaining plane. 
In contrast, the success of the weakly institutionalized 
party to pacify its internal opposition was translated into a 
superior position in the bargaining plane.
To support hypotheses 1 and 3, this chapter analyses the 
formation, maintenance and collapse of the 'historic 
compromise' during 1976-1979. The chapter examines the 
informal minority government amongst the DC, PCI, PSI, PRI, 
and the PLI which was formulated in July 1976. It thereafter 
investigates the formal minority government amongst the 
above-mentioned parties (except the PLI) which was formulated 
in July 1977, and was maintained by the Communists abstention 
and external support until January 1978 and January 1979, 
respectively. The first section is an introduction which 
provides the data concerning trends in Italian politics prior 
to the period under study.
The intent of the second section is to establish the 
decisive preferences of the DC and the PCI which led to the 
formation of the historic compromise. Its purpose thereafter 
is to describe the parties' tactics during the actual 
bargaining over the alliance formation. With regard to the 
former aim, it will be shown that the historic compromise 
grew out of Enrico Berlinguer's decisive preference for 'the 
defence of democracy' and 'obtaining PCI's full legitimation 
as a governing partner', combined with Aldo Moro's decisive 
preferences for 'economic and institutional recovery' and
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'the continuation in power of the DC and the wearing out of 
the PCI'. Obviously, both leaders adopted 'economic and 
institutional recovery' as their visible decisive preferernce 
in order to minimize party disunity and establish some 
visible convergence of opinion.
The third section analyses the evolution of elite- 
follower and intra-elite conflicts within the PCI and the DC, 
respectively. Its aim, thereafter, is to investigate the 
strategies adopted by the PCI and the DC elites in order to 
cope with the internal opposition. It will be demonstrated 
that whereas the PCI elites initiated an 'articulation of 
ends' and was later on forced to modify its alliance strategy 
in order to cope with militants' actions, the DC elites 
accepted the formation of new factions, petitions and appeals 
with the intention of changing the party's alliance strategy.
A substantial part of the fourth section is devoted to 
an analysis of Lange's claim that 'the DC seemed increasingly 
ready to risk confrontation rather than to make any more 
concessions to the PCI'.^ This section examines the 
inter-party relationships in the parliamentary bargaining 
arena, in light of the PCI failure and the DC success in 
neutralizing the internal opposition. It will be shown how 
the DC elites took advantage of the PCI's relatively low 
bargaining power, due to the failure of the latter elites to 
control internal dissatisfaction, and converted the PCI 
fragility into a superior position in the parliamentary 
bargaining plane.
142
5.1 ELECTORAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Multi-party representation, based on the almost complete
proportionality achieved by the electoral system of
2
preferential vote, together with the strong heterogeneity 
of Italian coalitions,^ has characterized Italian post-war 
politics. Until the mid-1970s, furthermore, two unique
political actors distinguished the Italian party system from 
the others; on the one hand, the uninterrupted dominance of 
the DC which has not been out of power since 1945, and, on 
the other hand, the role played by the PCI as the main 
opposition party. The PCI has been operated within the 
system but has not shared control of the national government 
since May 1947.* During 1958 and 1972, where electoral 
stability and partisan continuity characterized the Italian 
political system, DC's strength in the Italian Parliament 
ranged between 42 per cent and 38 per cent, respectively, 
while the PCI received between 22 and 27 per cent of the 
total votes, respectively (see Appendix 5.1).
The dominance of the DC, however, did not preclude the 
possibilities of changes in the composition of the Italian 
government coalitions. Since the end of the war, these 
government coalitions followed in succession; 'centre' 
coalitions, during the fifties, in which the partners of the 
DC were the small centre parties, the Republican, the 
Liberals and Social-Democrats; and centre-left coalitions, 
during the sixties and seventies in which the Socialists 
became part of the DC dominated government. While 'over-
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sized' cabinets have predominated, there have also been 
intermittent minority governments, such as, the DC minority 
governments during 1957-1963 and Aldo Moro's minority
governments during 1974-1976. A partial explanation for the
formation of minority governments in Italy focuses on the 
absence of an established coalition formula, that is, when 
parties have not been over-constrained by any specific 
coalition formula. The eight and two minority governments 
which were formed during 1953-1962 and 1972-1976,
respectively, exemplify this tendency (see Appendix 5.2).
By the early 1970s, however, the DC's share of the vote 
declined whilst the PCI's electoral strength became 
increasingly evident. The PCI's potential for sharing power 
arose from the declining dominance of the DC. Electorally,
it was first demonstrated by the letter's defeat in the 1974 
'divorce referendum' (40 per cent in favour of repealing the 
law, 59 per cent against).^ Politically, it was evident 
following the DC's declining ability to retain the allegiance 
of alliance partners.
Three reasons are usually given for the evidence of such 
processes. Firstly, there was the establishment of the 
regions in 1970, that is, the intermediate level between the 
central state and local government. Secondly, the electoral 
victory of the PCI in the regional and administrative 
elections of 1975 in which it gained an outstanding 32.5 per 
cent of the total vote and which provided it with the control 
of many local and regional administrations.^ And, thirdly, 
the electoral growth of the PCI at the general election of
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1976 in which it received 34 per cent of the vote (see 
Appendix 5.1).
At the electoral level, moreover, the PCI's vote became 
more evenly distributed in the different geographic zones of 
the country than at any time previously.^ At the level of 
party system on a left-right dimension, the DC constituted 76 
per cent and 74 per cent of the total strength of the 
centrist forces in 194 6 and 1976, respectively. But the PCI, 
which constituted only 45 per cent of the combined left 
percentage in 1946, had by 1976 climbed to an impressive 73
o
per cent. This, in turn, suggests that a process of 
polarization had occured. Beyond the PCI's gain of control 
in several regions and municipalities where it had been 
absent earlier, it was the involvement in broader coalitions 
which emphasized the PCI's position as a political force, 
compact and disciplined enough to assume the responsibility 
of governing.
The success of the PCI in the 1975 and 1976 elections is 
attributed mainly to the votes of the young with the
9
lowering of the voting age in 1975. Other studies
suggest that the electoral shifts among large sections of 
young voters had already began in 1968 producing their first 
effect in the elections of 1972.^^ A more comprehensive 
study, however, argues that two distinct factors attributed 
to the PCI electoral victories in 1975 and 1976: social
movements of the previous years and the policy of the 
historic compromise which was launched by the PCI in 1973. 
The former accounts for the increase in the percentage of
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young people and workers who voted PCI in 1975-76, while the
latter accounts for sections of the middle-class, mainly
clerks and craftsmen, moving towards the PCI.^^
As one might question the conclusiveness of the
electoral trends during the 1970's, attention should be also
focused on the cleavage structures of Italian polity.
Basically, it is the left-right dimension in the Italian
society along which one finds a few strong cleavages, namely,
capitalisn versus socialism, democracy versus fascism,
proletariat versus bourgeoisie, reform or revolution versus
12reaction and church versus state. Consequently, the
dynamics of formal and tacit inter-party alliances have been 
influenced by the fact that a number of the important socio­
economic cleavages - such as, developed versus underdeveloped 
areas, city versus periphery, agriculture versus industry and 
workers versus owners - run through the DC rather than 
separating it from the other parties in the political 
s p e c t r u m . B o t h  the PCI and PSI also represent mass 
parties through which such socio-economic cleavages run. The 
national stances that DC, PCI and PSI assumed in the post-war 
period, their multi-class recruitment and their common legacy 
of anti-facism have been advanced as explanations of their 
diverse composition.^*
However, even though all the mass parties are to a great 
extent inter-class in nature, the leftist parties differ 
significantly from the DC. Notably there are distinct 
patterns of associations that are part of the subcultures 
which support the PCI and PSI. Whereas, to a great extent.
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the Communist and Socialists grew out of the same Marxist
subculture or community, the DC partook of the Catholic
s u b c u l t u r e . N o t  surprisingly, 'Italian Communist
politicians are radical, programmatic and ideologically
committed Marxists', but at the same time, '[...] they are
sensitive to the need to bargain and compromise
These restraints did not damage the DC advantage over
other parties since the party is also rooted in the
international arena. Beyond the DC's electoral strength
lies the unqualified support of the U.S.A. which identified
in the DC the party that could guarantee political stability
and, thus, favoured the eventual success of the DC. However,
among the most cited factors which predict the DC's eventual
decline are the centrifugal drives which dominated the
17Italian multi-party system.
The DC's occupation of the centre of the party system
makes the centrifugal drive towards the extreme ends of the
political spectrum predominant over the centripetal drive;
In other terms, the very existence of a center party (or 
parties) discourages 'centrality', i.e., the centripetal 
drives of the political system. And the centripetal 
drives are precisely the moderating drives. This is why 
this type is center-fleeing, or centrifugal, anggthereby 
conductive to immoderate or extremist politics.
According to Sartori, the long term consequence for the DC of
the centrifugal drive is the erosion of its voting base, as
voters move away from the centre towards the extremes.
However, major factors which could minimize the effect of the
centrifugal drives are the movement forwards 'clientelistic 
19politics', and the colonisation of the state apparatus.
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public economic and social agencies by the p a r t y . T h e s e
trends, together with the intensive competition derived from
the nature of the party system, opened the way to what is
called the partitocrazia.
Specifically, partitocrazia is distinguished by two
different, but related factors. First, the 'penetration' of
political parties to state organs, bureaucracy, judiciary
system, public firms, and other crucial sectors of social
life, such as, mass media. Second, the absence of clear
lines of separation between majority and opposition, namely,
the invisible and visible levels of co-operation, which is
called in Italy trasformismo for historical reasons. No
traditional party, of course, could deal with the
partitocrazia issues because all the traditional actors were
involved in this system. As a result, the governmental
parties, especially the DC, expanded their own sphere of
influence within the state, contributing to the
'degeneration' of a party-based democratic regime where
parties no longer becoming responsible for their actions
21before the citizens.
Of utmost relevance is the classification of Italian
parties according to degrees of institutionalization.
During the 1970s, the DC and the PSI could be classified as
weakly institutionalized parties whereas the PCI could be
22considered a highly institutionalized party. This
classification is most visible especially with regard to the
23existence of factions within the 'weak' parties. Their
existence was enhanced mainly by the 'preference vote' (i.e.
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the mechanism by which voters are able to cast preferences
for particular candidates on their party list thus
determining which are actually elected). Consequently,
coalition stability was affected since factional alliances
24act as 'extra' parties in parliament.
Since fluidity is still the predominant characteristic
of factional alignment, in structural terms, the DC remains
unwilling and incapable of formulating a long-term strategy.
However, a classic example of the PCI's ability to
establish a long term strategy was the formulation of the
Historic Compromise. In simple terms, it was a long-term
strategy put forward by the PCI which argued that profound
changes in Italian society would only be possible if serious
political polarization were avoided. And the only way to
guarantee against such polarization was an alliance between
the major political forces in the country, that is, the DC,
PCI and the PSI.
From the very beginning, however, this proposal was
framed with reference to very pressing short-term problems.
The extent of political terrorism, scandals and adverse
economic conditions challenged the traditional patterns of
25inter-party co-operation during the mid-1970s. What was
the effect of the PCI's initiative on the internal arena of 
the main parties? How did it influence patterns of 
coalitional behaviour? The following section, therefore, 
examines the formation of the 'programmatic agreement'.
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5.2 A COMPROMISE AT ANY PRICE: TOWARDS THE BREAKING UP OF 
PCI'S 'CONVENTIO AD EXCLUDENDUM'
To understand the logic behind the development of the DC
and the PCI alliance strategies it is necessary to appreciate
the organizational trends during the 1970s and the elite
structure within both parties. At the organizational level,
the PCI elites faced a new phase in relation to the Italian 
2 6community. Firstly, a 2 0 per cent increase in party
membership was recorded during 1968-1976. Additionally, the
adherence rate (i.e. the percentage of party members as a
ratio of the total electorate) rose from 4 per cent to 6 per
cent during 1968-1977 (see Appendix 5.3). Secondly, after
1968, the territorial differences in membership distribution
diminished across voters categories, i.e. men, women and
young people. Thirdly, the percentage of new recruits has
increased, attaining in 1972, 1975 and 1976 higher level than
before, whilst a decline in the percentage of non-renewals
was recorded (see Appendix 5.3). Fourthly, the number of
sections increased, suggesting there was an improvement in
the stability of the organizational base. Fifthly, the
tendency amongst communists members to support their party
financially was distinctly strengthened between 1974 and
1977. Finally, a decline in the age of the party leadership
was recorded from the beginning of the 1970s. Consequently,
the links between the PCI and the community were strengthened
and the general instability of the party organization was
27reduced considerably.
Perhaps the most important trend that evolved within the
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DC was a decline in party membership. DC membership dropped
during 1973-77, with the decline totalling nearly 580,000;
the bulk of this fall occured in 1976 (see Appendix 5.4).
Given the very limited number of the DC sections' activities,
the low level of both participation in party life and the
28influence of mass membership on party policy, it is
hardly surprising that the D C s  image deteriorated
significantly. Consequently, the major issue within the DC,
prior to the historic compromise, was the revitalization
(rifondazione) of the party. The saliency of the
rifondazione lies, naturally, on the view that DC could no
longer base its political fortunes on the anti-communism
issues or the links to the Catholic church. Additionally,
the decline in membership during 1975-1976 raised a call for
ending the regime of the correnti which had resulted by the
defenestration of Fanfani from the DC Secretaryship and his
29replacement by the 'reformer', Zaccagnini. The latter
approach, consequently, was to mobilize a strong movement
within the DC for the reorganization process against an 
opposition of the party's centre and right.
At the elite level, the highly cohesive PCI elites 
included seven-member secretariat under the leadership of 
Berlinguer, whereas the DC elites included seven factions 
under the leadership of Moro, namely, Forze Nuove (13%), Base 
(10%), Morotei (10%), Rumor-Gullotti (9%), Colombo (7%), 
Dorotei (23%) and Fanfani (12%).^® Note, however, that 
the distribution of posts within the DC - mentioned above in 
brackets - did not accurately reflect the internal balance
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of power. At the outset, whereas Moro was elected as DC's
President by a 165 majority of the 183 votes cast in the
party's national council, the more powerful post of party
secretary was held by Zaccagnini, who had been re-elected, in
the 1976 party congress, by 51 per cent against 48 per
cent.^^ Further limitations to Zaccagnini role, beyond the
narrow majority he won in the Congress, was the election of
Senator Fanfani as the chairman of the party's national
council and 21 of his supporters as the executive committee
members. Additionally, the prime ministership was given to
the most right-wing leader with governmental experience,
32namely, Giulio Andreotti.
Yet, however mutable Zaccagnini and Fanfani strengths
may have been, it was Moro who possessed the major influence
within DC. According to the leader of the D C s  parliamentary
group, Flaminio Piccoli:
Moro was the leader of the Left within the DC after 
being the leader of the Center in the DC, and in that 
moment, the position between Mr. Moro and Fanfani 
began to diversified. Even if Mr. Zaccagnini was 
the Secretary General of the party, at that moment, the 
real leader was Moro. Thus, from this reason I saw 
Moro and Fanfani and not Zaccagnini and Fanfani [as 
opponents] even if Zaccagnini was a real cultural and 
sensitive man. But the real leader of the party was 
Moro. So, if we can speak about discussions between two 
persons we should speak about those between Moro and 
Fanfani. Zaccagnini interpreted Moro, and I say this 
not as to be offensive against Zaccagnini. Moro was 
intelectually superior and he had a really high prestige 
among all parties.
Thus, it was Moro who enjoyed a dominant position within the 
DC in the mid-1970s.
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Table 5.1 List of Events in Italy, 1972-1979
17\2\72 Formation of Andreotti's I government.
26\2\72 Government collapse after a vote of no-confidence.
24\6\72 Formation of Andreotti's II government.
28\9\72- Publication of three articles by Berlinguer in
12\10\72 RinascitarThe emergence of the Historic Compromise
12\6\73 Resignation of Andreotti's II government.
7\7\73 Formation of Rumor IV government.
2\3\74 Resignation of Rumor IV government.
15\3\74 Formation of Rumor V government.
3\10\74 Resignation of Rumor V government.
11\11\74 Formation of Moro IV government.
15-16\6\75 Regional, Provincial and Municipal Elections.
B. Zaccagnini elected as DC's party secretary. 
Right and left wing incidents, kidnappings. 
Resignation of Moro IV government.
Formation of Moro V government.
PSI's 14th Congress-the endorsment of 'the
16\7\75 
10\75 
7\1\76 
2\2\76 
3-7\3\76
alternative of the left'.
17-18\3\76 D C s  13th Congress- B. Zaccagnini reelected as 
party secretary.
14\4\76 A. Fanfani elected chairman of the D C s  National
Council.
20-21\6\76 General Election
13\7\76 F. De Martino, PSI's party secretary, resigned.
16\7\76 B. Craxi becomes PSI's party secretary.
30\7\76 Formation of Andreotti's III government.
1\10\76 Moro elected as D C s  President.
8\10\76 First austerity package.
10-12\ll\76Second austerity package.
02\77 Student disturbance.
04\77 Political terrorism, kidnappings.
6\4\77 Third austerity package.
25\4\77 Aprroved of IMF loan.
13-15\7\77 Formal policy agreement between the DC, PCI, PSI, 
PRI, PLI, PSDI.
16\1\78 Collapse of Andreotti's III government.
13\3\78 Formation of Andreotti IV government.
16\3\78 Moro's kidnapping by the Red Brigades.
9\5\78 Moro's death.
14-15\5\78 Partial Municipal and Provincial elections. 
31\1\79 Resignation of Andreotti IV government.
1\4\79 President Pertini disolved Parliament and called
an election for June 3-4.
Source; Keesina's Contemporarv Archives, 1972-1979.
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Undoubtedly, the main issue on the PCI's agenda from
September 1972 was the 'historic compromise'. According to
Chiaromonte, the reasoning of the secretary of the PCI
moved within the ambits of the great political ideas of
34Palmiro Togliatti'. Thus, the 'historic compromise' was
presented as a continuation of the immediate postwar 
strategy of broad co-operation between political forces 
including those representing the middle strata. Clearly, 
such a presentation throughout the exploration of the 
Compromise was aimed at preparing the party's base for the 
actual co-operation.
Added to this pattern of presentation was the step-by- 
step evolution of the PCI's strategy through the course of 
events. Clarification of the PCI's strategy occured after 
the following events: (1) the disturbing swing to the Right 
following the MSI gains in 1970, 1971 and 1972, (2) the Chile 
1973's experience, (3) the erosion of the Catholic subculture 
as evident in the 1974 referendum, (4) the movement to the 
left of important sectors of the middle strata in the 
administrative election of 1975, and (5) the impressive PCI's 
gains in the 1976 general election. During these events, to 
mention only one example, the PCI position concerning NATO 
and its existing bases on Italian territory was modified.
However conclusive the above-mentioned trends may have 
been, it was the PCI decisive preferences of 'obtaining full 
legitimation as a governing partner' and 'the defence of 
democracy' which shadowed any short-term aims. As Berlinguer 
explained:
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The struggle to democratize the State is an essential 
condition in order to fulfil a revolutionary policy, 
which, to be revolutionary, must always aim at 
destroying the class limits which are so strong in our 
country, in spite of the importance of the struggles and 
strength of the popular and worker's movement. Without 
this struggle it is impossible to get closer to our 
historical target, which is to fulfil a complete 
democracy and the coming of the working class and of its 
allies to the direction of the State.
The decisive preference of overcoming the PCI's legitimacy 
barrier meant that patterns of government formation were to 
be considered as intermediate targets, during a process 
aiming at deeply changing the Italian's political spectrum. 
Such a strategy should take place by bringing the PCI inside 
a 'government of democratic change', and, consequently, 
preventing a shift of the middle strata towards the 
Right.
Perhaps most important of all was the economic and
institutional crisis which provided the issue upon which a
visible convergence between the DC, PCI, PRI, PLI, PSDI, and
37PSI was reached. For the PCI, the crisis, which
worsened dramatically in the mid-1970s, was considered an 
element aiding the historic compromise. The fact that major 
economic decisions of national necessity were agreed upon by 
large part of the bourgeoisie, could justify co-operation 
amongst the working class and the socialist movement in order 
to widen their action to a national level. For the DC, on 
the other hand, the economic and institutional crisis was a 
matter of government and party survival. Pridham's finding, 
that 'the DC emerges as [...] a power-motivated party 
prepared at almost all costs to preserve its role in the
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38state', emphasizes choosing a consensus-based aim as DC's
39decisive preference.
This observation is undeniably appropriate to the cases
of DC, PSI,PRI,PLI, and PSDI. Yet, it cannot capture the
whole complexity of the PCI elites' efforts to cope with the
increasing dissatisfaction of party base during inter-party
negotiations. The fact that the PCI's decision in 1976 to
enter into bargaining with the DC was taken by the elite
collectively and unanimously significantly reduced potential
dissatisfaction at the elite l e v e l . A c c o r d i n g  to the
chairman of the PCI's parliamentary group, Alessandro Natta:
I have spoken about doubts in the body of the party.
The choices [that] were made in that period were
accepted by all the leadership of the party, by all the
Central Committee of the party. There was no contrast, 
no division within the leadership at the top of the 
party [... ] I can add that comrade Longo expressed 
some riserva about the idea of historic compromise. 
Sometimes he said; I don't like this term 'historic 
compromise'. I would prefer that people will use the 
term which was used by Gramsci 'new social political 
bloc' which means that he had some doubts not only about 
this strategy but also about the solution like the 
government of abstention.
However, at the organizational level, the PCI elites
faced potential opposition to their strategy. At the outset,
the PCI elites had to implement their strategy in light of
two sources of instability; (1) the 20 per cent rise in the
42party membership which was recorded during 1968-1976, 
and (2 ) the fact that the most important decision-making 
bodies within the party were only afterwards informed of the 
decision to launch the p o l i c y . F o r  a time it appeared 
that the internal conflicts aggravated by heterogeneity and
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the negative aspect of 'democratic centralism' were costs the 
leadership was willing to pay. Surprisingly, moreover, the 
'doubts' in the body of the party were perceived by PCI 
elites as only concerned with the economic and institutional 
crisis. As the PCI economic spokesman, Giorgio Napolitano, 
put it:
[...] I want to emphasize the awareness which was 
represented in our rank-and-file people of the 
seriousness of the national situation from two 
fundamental aspects; inflation and terrorism. So, the 
idea that it was necessary to put together all 
democratic forces in our country to fight these two 
threats was accepted [. .. ] at that moment we had to 
decide without delay. We could not engage our party and 
other parties in months of discussion in a possible 
common programme. A government had to be formeg.also 
because those two threats were really pressing.
In order to cope with the potential followers' 
opposition, the PCI elites decided to initiate 'explanatory 
pedagogy' through public meetings. They also decided to 
abstain over no-confidence motions during August 1976 to July 
1977. Behind the former tactic lay the assumption that the
party strategy was meaningful only insofar as it could be 
implemented at the grass roots. This required the 
establishment of certain norms, that is, the belief that the 
strategy chosen by the party elites is good for the followers 
and the application of sanctions against deviations from the 
norms. Through public meetings and the lengthening of the 
process of forming a formal alliance, the PCI elites 
translated the strategy into action at the grass-roots level. 
Further elements which served to minimize potential disunity 
were the fairly general government programme over the
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decisive preference of 'economic recovery' and the absence of 
joint consultation amongst the parties.
According to Luebbert,^^ it is wrong to assume that 
because inter-party negotiations take a long time very much 
is being negotiated among the parties. Rather, most 
negotiations actually take place between leaders and their 
followers and among rival factions within parties. The 
transitional period, thus, created an image of long, 
difficult and complex PCI-DC negotiations. This, in turn, 
was intended to satisfy elites' members and party followers 
whose orientations were still largely attuned to the 
ideological aspect of the co-operation.
The above-mentioned pattern of bilateral discussions, 
informal inter-party meetings, telephone calls and private 
conversations is crucial to explaining both the November 
proposals concerning the government economic strategy and the 
formation of a formal alliance later in the early 1977. 
Clearly, it was during the transitional period (i.e. from 
August 1976 to July 1977) that the PCI had produced, and 
brought up to date, alternative policies to those followed by 
successive governments throughout its period in opposition. 
Furthermore, in the months following the informal alliance, 
Napolitano, who led the PCI's economic team, co-operated both 
with Stammati, who was a DC technical expert brought in to 
strengthen the quality of economic advice, and the Prime 
Minister.
The PCI's strategic line was also dependent on a more or 
less contemporaneous convergence between the strategies of
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several different parties. since no formal agreement was
signed, during the transitional period, one could not expect
to find strong internal disagreement within the different
parties. Within the DC, for example, it was mainly
Fanfanians who argued against deepening the co-operation with
the PCI. They stated that although the DC was open to
'dialogue' with the PCI there must be no confusion of roles
between government and opposition. For the small parties,
whereas the vast majority of the PRI favoured the 'no no-
47confidence' formula, the PSI elites seemed to have no 
option out to support it.
It is important to note that the PSI, at that time, 
faced a period of transition, from the dominance of the 
centre faction led by De Martino towards the succession of 
the Craxi-Signorile group to win a majority in the Central 
Committee.*^ The resignation of the PSI's secretary, 
following the 1976 election results, furthermore, reflected 
the uncertainty within the PSI. As Silvano Labriola, a PSI 
member of Parliament, put it:
I'll be very honest. After the general election in 1976 
there was a sort of shock in the PSI because at that 
time we reached our historical minimum, the lowest level 
of the party. Hence, in the leadership of the party 
came out the wish to found out new ways, new paths, so 
as to enhance g-little bit the people's feeling vis-a- 
vis our party.
Not surprisingly, Craxi was left with no choice other than 
to participate in the six-party alliance.
The nuances of Andreotti's tactics are of equal
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relevance. A classic example was the decision that the PCI's 
member Pietro Ingrao, considered a potential rival to 
Berlinguer, would be elected President of the Chamber while 
Amitore Fanfani, considered an opponent to any DC's co­
operation with the Communists, would be re-elected President 
of the Senate. Beyond the fact that this decision had been 
taken at a joint session of the six parties lies a clear 
indication that Andreotti aimed at minimizing the DC's 
disunity as well as the PC's disunity. Moreover, in order to 
minimize DC's disunity, a total of 47 under-secretaries, 
adherents of the main correnti. were appointed. This was 
an increase of eight on the number in the outgoing 
Government.
Added to these tactics was Andreotti's attempt to cover 
his exposed right flank following the PCI's hope to shift 
the balance within the DC to a degree sufficient to permit 
the formation of a coalition.Perhaps following external 
pressures from the right-wing factions within the DC, a 
break-up within the MSI-DN parliamentary group occurred in 
December 1976. According to MSI's member, Raffaele Valensise:
In 1976, there were those who left the MSI who thought 
it was possible to cover the manouevre of Signor 
Andreotti, who had already obtained the abstention of 
the Communist Party, by getting also the abstention of 
at least some members of the MSI [...]. I think this 
was the main cause of the break, a sort of temptation 
into which some of our members fell to cover the 
manouevre of Andggotti with the assistence of the 
Communist Party.
Given that almost half the deputies in the MSI-DN
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parliamentary group left the party over the issue of 
abstention in parliament, it is hardly surprising that the DC 
obtained a 'sleeping partner'. The DN-DC informal co­
operation, aimed at voting out the Abortion Bill in the early 
1977 in the Senate, suffices to underline this point.
The formal minority government, formed in July 1977, 
signalled a new stage of inter-party co-operation in the 
Italian party system. Marradi claims that '[...] the DC is 
aware that it can accede to many of its partners' requests in 
the program drafting stage, since it retains an almost 
absolute control upon which policy measures to take, to 
block, and which to subvert'.^* Consequently, a 
substantial reason for the formation of the formal alliance 
was due to the DC acceptance of some PCI's elements of 
planning in the agreement. According to Giorgio Napolitano, 
the head of the PCI's economic team.
We tried to agree on some elements of planning in order 
to correct some traditional imbalances in our economy 
and our society. Particularly, we focused on some 
Bills to be adopted in Parliament. First, for 
industrial policy, industrial planning. The idea, 
approved by other parties, including the DC, was that 
all incentives should be given on the basis of sector 
plans [...][according to] some goals, such as, the 
reduction of the imbalances between north and south or 
as the reduction of structural weaknesses in our 
industrial system. Second,a similar mould for 
agriculture. Third, a plan for public housing. These 
three Bills put together could represent a new framework 
for public intervention in economic development.
Clearly, these three conditions did not embarrass the 
Government because its monocolore position implied no real 
possibility for the PCI to control the implementation of 
these reforms. The fact that one finds almost exactly the
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same items in the official programme of past DC's
governments,^^ reveals Andreotti's tactic of forming a
formal alliance whilst conceding much less in return.
The agreement was, in that case, presented in the
Chamber of Deputies as a motion signed by the six parties and
approved section by section by a large m a j o r i t y . T h e
vote on the final motion was 442 in favour, 87 against, 16
abstaining and 85 absent. Although the total strength of the
parties officially opposing the programmatic accord was only
45, possibly more than 100 out of 2 63 DC's deputies either
voted against it, abstained or were intentionally absent as a
5 8sign of their disapproval of the new commitment. The
evolution of intra-elite conflicts within the DC, which were
first evident in the above-mentioed vote, and the followers'
dissatisfaction within the PCI, which was worsened following
the formation of the formal alliance, are our next concern.
5.3 PCI ELITES BETWEEN FOLLOWERS' HOSTILITY AND DC'S ELITES 
ADAPTATION
To explain the way in which the internal dissatisfaction
within the PCI and the DC was manifested following the
formation of the formal minority government, requires
specification of the parties' strategic model designed to
mediate between their internal life and their political 
59behaviour. For the PCI, the internal difficulties faced 
by the party elites during the implementation of the historic 
compromise had two mutually reinforcing dimensions. The 
first was the lack of members and militants' support for the 
party line. The second dimension was the absence of
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mediator role in the PCI structure.
From its beginning, the PCI's strategy revealed open
hostility in the grass-roots level. Those hostile attitudes
were recorded, during the 'explanatory pedagogy' involving
over 11000 public meetings in the first three month of
1977.^® Even within the highly institutional context of
the PCI one finds striking cross-party variation over the
issue of supporting the party line. According to Barbagli
and Corbetta's research, dissent from the party line was
greater among the members than among the section secretaries,
at least during the period 1976-78. According to data from
members of the Bologna federation at the beginning of 1978
and from section secretaries collected in the second half of
the same year, 20 per cent of PCI members were explicitly
against the party policy and almost all the section
secretaries were in favour of collaboration with the DC in
the political circumstances at that time.^^ During this
period, it could be said that the positions of the elites and
that of the followers moved steadily apart after the
62formation of each government.
Perhaps most important feature was the 1.3 per cent loss 
of party membership which was evident during 1977-1978 (see 
Appendix 5.3). A 2 per cent decrease in the membership 
figure, a 21 per cent decrease in the new recruits, and a 3 
per cent decline in the non-renewals, were also recorded 
during the same period (see Appendix 5.3). These trends 
implied that the PCI elites were not able to embrace its 
strategy fully without offending the members' ideological
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heritage. The limitations of the PCI's strategy are well
described in the draft theses for the Fifteenth PCI Congress,
in December 1978:
[...] there has been a disparity between the efforts 
devoted to work in the institutions and relations among 
the political forces, on the one hand, and initiative to 
promote united movements involving broad masses around 
concrete goals and problems, on the other hand. This 
has led to difficulties in maintaining and strengthening 
the party's relations with various strata of the working 
population at all times and in all phases of the 
struggle, in organically linking our presence and action 
in society with our activity in the institutions and in 
exercising our government functions in the most 
effective manner.
A clear change in the position of the section 
secretaries was recorded following the experience of the 
Andreotti governments from 1978 onwards. Almost all those 
interviewed in Barbagli and Corbetta's research still 
thought that 'the most possible, most realistic government' 
would be based on an alliance between their party and the DC. 
However, the preference of the relative majority of those 
interviewed was in favour of a government of the left.^*
An additional factor which contributed to the worsening 
of the follower's dissatisfaction was the absence of formal 
groups within the party who could serve as mediators. At a 
time when the elite-follower conflicts emerged, the PCI 
structure, in which a strong apparatus confronted the party's 
intermediate and peripherial associations, risks losing the 
control over the intermediate position between the members 
and the apparatus (i.e. the militants). The rank-and- 
file hostility, on the one side, and the apparatus' efforts 
to get them to accept the party line, on the other, resulted
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in the increasing tension and political fatigue within the 
militants.
The PCI followers militantly opposed the official
party's line. The climax of the militants's activities was
reached late in 1977, when the militant metalworkers' union
(FLM) precipitated a governmental crisis against the PCI's
wishes. As Napolitano noted:
There was an alarm with some partial election already in
spring 1978. [...] But, another very dramatic
moment was a general strike of metal workers at the end 
of 1977. I think that this was the reason for the 
Cabinet crisis of January 1978 because we felt that 
there was dissatisfaction among the workers from the 
economic policy of the government we were 
supporting.
The presence of approximately 200.000 workers in the streets 
forced the PCI to modify its alliance strategy.
Additionally, the party elites were forced to initiate an
'articulation of ends' in order to pacify the followers'
dissatisfaction, which was increased by the government
economic policy of 'austerity'.
Debate as to whether to accept the government austerity 
policy, which called for sacrifices by the workers, continued 
within the PCI and between the PCI and the union throughout 
the period of formal co-operation with the DC. Clearly, both 
the PCI elites and the followers recognized that increasing 
conflict over the austerity issue would result in a 
disastrous outcome. At the same time, the pragmatic co­
operation with the DC and the support of the austerity policy 
did not coincide with the PCI's ideology. Thus, the
collective identity of the PCI followers was put at risk as
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the official goal of revolution was constantly evoked.
In order to cope with the above-mentioned gap, the CGIL
leader, Luciano Lama, suggested the immediate target of
reducing unemployment as a justification for the workers' 
68sacrifices. The PCI elites, however, decided to
demonstrate that the party's long-range goals had not been
abandoned. In a speech to the PCI Conference of
Intellectuals, on January 1977, Berlinguer specified that:
A policy of austerity is not a policy that tends to 
level everyone towards indigence, nor can it be pursued 
with the aim of enabling an economic and social system 
now in crisis to survive. A policy of austerity must 
instead have as its aim the establishment of justice, 
efficiency, order and, I would add, a new morality; and 
it is precisely for this reason that it can and must be 
adopted by the workers' movement. Seen in this way, 
while it does involve giving up certain things and 
making certain sacrifices, a policy of austerity 
acquires meaning as renewal and becomes, in effect, a 
liberating act for broad masses long kept in position of 
subjection and pushed to the sidelines of society: it 
creates new forms of solidarity and, thus, rallying 
growing consensus becomes a broad democratic movement, 
at the service of social transformation [...].
In Theodore Lowi's t e r m s , a  process of 'articulation of 
ends' was initiated by the PCI elites. Thus, the party's 
official aim of 'social transformation' was not abandoned, 
nor did it become a mere 'facade'. Rather, the party's 
official aim was adapted to the organizational need.
Not surprisingly, a substantial part of the section 
secretaries in 1978 accepted the position of the party elites 
on wage restriction and argued for it in line with the 
elites' view. After 1978, when the section secretaries 
abandoned the line of the historic compromise, they 
inevitably concluded by also rejecting the 'austerity'
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policy. This was shown by the 51 per cent rise in the share
of section secretaries opposed to the limitation on wage
demands between 1978 and 1980.^^ We can therefore
conclude that the PCI elites failed to safeguard the section
secretaries' sense of identity by constant and ritual
references to the ideological goals, and by caution in their
choice of alliances.
The inside story of the conflicts within the DC is
completely different. It was from the PCI's call for 'a
72government of unity and national solidarity', following 
the FLM activities, that intra-elite conflict evolved within 
the DC. Debate as to whether to include Communist support 
for the new government on the vote of confidence was evident 
along ideological and factional lines. A classic example was 
the 'group of 100', consisted especially of the Dorotei and 
Fanfanian's deputies, which opposed any new steps in the co­
operation with the PCI. Moreover, survey results indicated
that 64 per cent of 205 D C s  deputies asked were against the
73entrance of the PCI into the majority. Yet, it is
misleading to contend that the party's decision-making bodies
shared the approach of the 'group of 100'. On the contrary,
the DC National Executive Committee, for example, had
accepted a policy statement which favoured the inclusion of
all the six parties in a 'parliamentary convergence'. This
would involve a government programme, worked out in detail
with the opposition, which would enjoy the active support of
74the Communists in Parliament.
However mutable the intra-elite opposition may have
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been during 1978, it prompted determined action from
Piccoli, the president of the DC's parliamentary group, and
Aldo Moro. As the former indicated:
Moro proposed to introduce the PCI into the majority 
[...] There were a lot of problems [and] questions on 
the Centre and Right of the party, a lot of perplexities 
[...] I was leading the parliamentary group of the DC, 
at that moment I decided to stop that and to support 
what the party was doing [...] Because Moro himself 
explained to us in a very famous speech his position and 
raised a lot of questions. First, he said the positive 
things, but, telling immediately after, all the risks 
that were and asking for the unity of the parliamentary 
group and the party, because, he said, only being 
together we could always go on. This was the feeling, 
the tone, of what really happened. The step he did was 
very hard. First, we were all waiting to see what was 
happening and then we all supported everything that he 
said. So that, if his aim could be reached we would 
have been_all characters of the history of this 
country.
Thus, the DC elites mobilized the dissatisfaction through the
diffused mechanisms whilst relying on Moro's dominant
position within the party as a 'buffer'. Intra-elite
conflicts, which evolved during the inclusion of the PCI into
the majority, were thus neutralized without undermining the
party's alliance strategy.
The assassination of Moro by the Red Brigades opened a
new era in the relationship between the DC and the PCI
elites. Actually, the intra-elite conflicts within the DC,
following the inclusion of the PCI into the majority,
evolved before the kidnapping. Gerardo Bianco, a member of
the DC elite, recalled that.
Tensions had already appeared during the formation of 
[the new] Andreotti government. As it is known, 
difficulties were overcome only after the speech of Aldo 
Moro to the parliamentary group. But the speech did not 
give immediate results as some historians have written
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[...] Some signatures were gathered with which he was 
asked not to accept the vote of the Communists. There 
were long negotiation during the whole night, then, a 
document was drafted and presented to the Communist 
Party which approved it. This was the passage with many 
many resistance ranged from the center to the so called 
Sinistra Sociale by Donat Cattin who were against this 
kind of alliance.
It was during the long crisis of January-March 1978 (i.e.
following the entry of the PCI into the majority) that a new
dividing line emerged. This cleavage cut across various
factions, especially Forze Nuove, Base and Dorotei. It
separated those who were apparently inclined to work in the
long-term direction of an agreement with the PCI and those
who worked in the direction of re-establishing a privileged
relationship with the PSI while isolating the Communists.
Zaccagnini, Andreotti's supporters and Piccoli represented
the former tendency. A less homogeneous group including
Mario Segni, Mazzotta, De Carolis, the Dorotei led by
Bisaglia and his supporters together with Donat Cattin,
77represented the latter direction.
As noted earlier, at the heart of DC's strategy lay 
Moro's position within his party and, thus, his ability to 
win the support of the party's parliamentary group. However, 
it was after he was murdered that factional activities 
reached a new climax. In spite of Zaccagnini's effort 
towards the revitalization of the party, new forces were 
institutionalized within the DC during 1978-9. Whereas two 
new factions, namely, Iniziativa Democratica and Proposta. 
grew out of the anti-communist subculture, a technocratically 
oriented group associated with Umberto Agnelli emerged.
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Furthermore, a student movement of approximately 100,000
members, namely. Communion and Liberation, grew out of the
Catholic subculture and concentrated its activities in that 
78direction. Although Zaccagnini had been given new
legitimacy by his direct election as Secretary by the 1976
Congress, the absence of both a firm power base and strong
environmental pressure contributed to his inability to
implement a significant organizational change within the DC.
'It is necessary to deepen the internal crisis of the
Christian Democratic party', writes Berlinguer, 'in order to
79determine a change in its position [...]'. At face value 
this statement is not incorrect. However, in its concern to 
choose between factions with respect to their attitude 
towards DC-PCI co-operation rather that to consider seriously 
the interaction between the factions, it is misleading. 
Beyond Berlinguer's attitude towards a deep change in the 
internal equilibrium within the DC lies the assumption that 
the DC's internal inequalities tend to be at least in part 
exogenous, i.e. externally imposed. Alliance with the PCI 
could, therefore, destabilize the DC by putting additional 
de-institutionalizing pressures on it, thus increasing its 
internal tension. Yet, when intra-elite conflicts occured 
within the DC they were contained within the party. Since 
the DC elites accepted the formation of new factions, it 
became clear that as long as dissatisfaction could be 
expressed through the diffused mechanisms no change in the 
elites' strategy would be required. Not surprisingly, the 
successful resolution of the conflicts within the DC
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positively affected the party's position in the bargaining 
plane.
If, as Lange claims, 'the DC seemed increasingly ready
to risk confrontation rather than to make any more
80concessions to the PCI', a substantial reason for this 
lies in the D C s  control over its internal opposition. The 
following section, thus, assesses Lange's argument and 
examines the relative bargaining power of the main alliance 
partners. Attention is focused on the nature of the inter­
party relationships in the parliamentary bargaining plane.
5.4 THE WAGES OF BARGAINING POWER: D C S  STRATEGY OF 
CONFRONTATION DURING 1976-1979
The successful resolution of the intra-elite conflicts 
within the DC was translated immediately into a superior 
position in the parliamentary bargaining arena. In
contrast, the inability of the PCI elites to control their 
followers' dissatisfaction was translated into a relatively 
low level of bargaining power. This observation is 
undeniably appropriate in respect of the periods of the 
informal alliance, from August 1976 to July 1977, and the 
formal alliance, from July 1977 to January 1979. 
Consequently, the DC elites implemented a strategy of 
confrontation towards the PCI in the bargaining arena, which 
was sometimes diffused to the electoral arena.
For a time it appeared that the PCI had gained extensive 
policy influence due to the formal consultation with the 
government over major issues following the 'programmatic
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agreement' (accordo proarammatico). Furthermore, the
'institutional agreement' faccordo istituzionale) in 1976
provided the PCI with the Presidency of the Chamber and also
four committee chairmanships. It is somewhat misleading to
insinuate, as Heilman does, that in the period of 'National
Unity' during 1976 and 1979, the Communists were granted
extensive influence and eventually everything short of
81cabinet positions in the government. There is on the
contrary conclusive evidence that the DC's government
controlled the inter-party relationships within the alliance.
Firstly, the DC dominance during the historic compromise
was demonstrated by its control of all ministerial portfolios
compared with its 38.7 per cent strength in the Chamber of 
82Deputies. A single-party (monocolore) cabinet provided
the DC with a total influence over policy implementation.
Thus, consultations with the other parties appeared to be a
'visible price' that was not translated to actual policy
concessions. This direction was confirmed by the PCI
economic spokesman, Giorgio Napolitano:
The main difficulty was not to be inside the Cabinet, to 
have an all-DC government without the possibility to 
control day by day the implementation of the common 
programme and the Bills which had been adopted by 
Parliament.
The DC elites, for example, did not take into consideration 
the views of the PCI and the trade unions in drafting their 
three years economic plan, nor did they initiate changes in
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the agrarian policy, pension policy and university 
84reform. Furthermore, Andreotti's refusal, in September
1977, to dismiss Signor Vito Lattanzio, the Minister of
Defence, together with the Prime Minister's ignoring of
Communist views on the nomination of new chairmen to various 
8 5state bodies, exemplify this argument.
This does not mean that the PCI had no impact on the
86policy process and its outcomes. Lindblom's observation, 
that all affected interests can have at least some influence 
in the policy-making process, is valid. However, the PCI's 
bargaining power did not lie in the ability to affect the 
outcome. But rather some outcomes were designed with
consideration of the position or objection of the Communists. 
The delegation of powers and functions to the new regional 
governments, the implementation of a major reform in the tax 
system, and the complicated eouo cenone (fair rent) law which 
was passed by Parliament in 1977, suffice to underline this 
point.
Not surprisingly, the inclusion of the PCI into the
majority fnella maaaioranza) did not constitute a change in
the party's position. According to the leader of the PCI's
parliamentary group, Alessandro Natta:
[...] The most relevant political concession was the 
fact that in 1978, following the reproposal of the 
Andreotti's government, we moved from an ambiguious and 
even equivocal formula [...] towards a constitution of a 
true and proper parliamentary majority in which the PCI 
took part. I don't know if you can call this a 
concession, but certainly, it was the acknowledgement 
that thegPCI was a legitimate governing force in our 
country.
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The distinction which was drawn between 'political majority',
i.e. formal coalition majority, and 'parliamentary
8 8(programme) majority', created a bridge between the
different ideologies. But, at the same time, it committed 
the Communist to the discipline of the majority. This 
raises an inevitable question concerning the PCI's insistence 
on maintaining the formal alliance.
As a partial explanation for the PCI's position, 
reference to the visible decisive preference of 'economic and 
institutional recovery' provides a starting point. The PCI's 
room for manoeuvre was heavily restricted when its elites 
decided to form an informal alliance in 1976 over the time- 
consuming preference of 'recovery'. According to Gerardo 
Chiaromonte:
We did not have other choices besides those which we had 
to actually choose. Once we had started a certain party 
with the abstention in August 1976, we were in a certain 
sense obliged to continue towards that unitary 
government of emergency that we thought was necessary 
for the country and for the democratic regime.
Following the DC-PCI agreement concerning the need to promote 
economic recovery, ordinary voters would naturally expect the 
alliance to last at least until some improvement in the 
Italian economy and institutions became evident.
For the PCI, furthermore, the time-consuming preference 
of economic recovery coincided with the period of time 
sufficient to obtain full legitimacy as a governing partner. 
However, although both preferences were crucial to the 
formation of the formal alliance, the visible preference of 
'recovery' was the only issue over which the alliance could
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be broken up. A break-up of the alliance, over issues other
than economic recovery, could 'promote confusion in the
90conduct of the election campaign'.
Given that the PCI was subordinated to the DC and
clearly received an unfair rate of exchange, one would
ordinarily expect inter-party conflict to be endemic, or at
least that the dominant patterns would require the repeated
resort to naked power. However, the assertion of the leader
of the DC parliamentary group that until Moro was kidnapped
91'there were no dramatic problems and questions'
suggested a much more relaxed inter-party atmosphere. A
substantial reason for this evaluation lies in the PCI's
search for legitimacy which served to maintain the formal
alliance. Actually, this preference made the commitment
enforceable because it provided the PCI with the recognition
of future opportunities for governmental co-operation that
92will be eliminated if the commitment is not maintained.
We can thus conclude that whereas the decisive 
preferences of 'legitimacy' and 'recovery' took priority over 
demands to break the commitment, the elite-follower conflicts 
(and especially the militants) dictated the evolution of the 
PCI-DC co-operation. In other words, the organizational 
inadequacies, which forced the PCI's elite to create 
governmental crisis in 1977 and 1978, emphasized the loss 
of the PCI elites' initiative.
The nuances of the intra-alliance politics which 
involved other partners, besides the DC and the PCI, are of 
equal relevance. For the PSI, the disappointing 1976
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electoral results undermined its position as a third party.
The fact the the PSI elites felt squeezed following the DC-
PCI co-operation is often used to account for the
93inconsistent tactics during the historic compromise.
The PSI's surprising break with the inter-party solidarity
during the Moro kidnapping and its reluctance in 1977 to sign
the 'programmatic agreement' are relevant examples. Added
to the PSI's marginal strategic position during 1976-1979 was
the reluctance of the new leadership to implement incisive
changes. This direction is confirmed by Hine, who argues
that Craxi needed a period in which the main centre of power
in the party would remain the party organization and not the
94ministries and para state agencies. This was mainly
because the ministers and the para state agencies offered a
reservoir of patronage through which individual leaders could
obtain members' support independently of the apparatus.
Given the PCI's orientation towards co-operation with
the DC and the PSI's weak position, it is hardly surprising
that difficulties in the PSI-PCI relationships developed.
As Labriola put it:
There were very bad relations because in that framework 
we have always blamed the PCI for a couple of things. 
First, there was a certain trend to establish a kind of 
regime together with the DC, and second, they [the PCI] 
had also the attitude to act as a fireman, a saver, in 
solving existing social tension [... ] The Communists 
had always prefered the DC rather than the Socialist 
side and I think this was a sort of an historical 
mistake by Mr. Berlinguer. They had not developed, 
during the period of the National Unity, any real 
contacts. Communists and Socialists. Berlinguer had 
rather prefered to establish a sort of direct-link 
between Botteahe Oscure and Piazza del Gesu.
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Consequently, the PSI ran a campaign in 1979 that was evasive 
and disturbing to the PCI. The PSI edged back toward direct 
co-operation with the DC, emphasizing the political isolation 
of the PCI.
If, as Napolitano claims, '[...] we had good relations
in almost all fields with the Republican Party and with Ugo
96La Malfa', a substantial reason for this lies in the
'bad/ relationships between the PCI and PSI during the period
of the historic compromise. It was mainly at the Congress
of Turin in 1978, where the Socialist Plan for a Left
Alternative was accepted (thus, consecrating Craxi's
leadership), that the Socialists became engaged in bitter
controversy with the PCI. The reason was that the former
opposed the historic compromise and tried to create a left-
wing alliance. The PRI, therefore, could act effectively as
a third party while taking advantage of its past experience
of co-operation with the DC.
Beyond its 3.1 per cent parliamentary strength (see
Appendix 5.1), the PRI took advantage of few factors which
mostly characterized the party. As Giorgio La Maifa argues:
The Republican Party is considered to be, firstly, an 
extremely steady organization in terms of the stability 
of views [...] Second, it is considered to be extremely 
loyal, [i.e.] people know that we keep the agreements. 
And thirdly, the quality of the people is considered to 
be higher than generally speaking [...] If we suggest a 
solution to a problem they tend to think that we are 
right and they are wrong [...] [Furthermore] my father 
was the leader of the party and he commanded a great 
respect.
Probably, the PRI acted as a mediator between the PCI and the 
DC, limiting the use of extreme bargaining tactics and
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regulating the nature and intensity of the bargaining. Of
course, other parties, such as the PSI, PSDI and the PLI (in
the earlier period), with interests somewhat different from
those of the main alliance parties may have been drawn into
the bargaining frays at varying points in time. Still, there
were three parties whose strategic considerations mainly
formed the relevant bargaining arena during the historic
compromise, namely, the DC, PCI and the PRI.
Beyond the PCI's loss of the initiative following the
party's elite-follower conflicts and its inability to control
policy implementation, was the negative DC attitude towards
the PCI in the electoral arena. According to Napolitano:
There were some Ministers who had a negative attitude to 
us, for example, Donat Cattin who was in charge of 
Industry and who was supposed to implement that 
important Bill on industrial policy. According to us, 
he was more or less openly sabotaging it. But 
independently from some ministers, the question was the 
attitude of the DC as a whole. For instance, while we 
were so much committed to the struggle against terrorism 
during the period of Moro imprisonment, there was a 
partial local election campaign in Spring 1978 [...] and 
we were really struck by the behaviour of so many DC 
candidates, national leaders who were campaigning 
against us. So, we thought that there was a heavy 
ambivalence in the DC, particularly, after Moro death 
because Moro had been able to put in evidence the. 
necessity of loyal relationships with our party.
Whether the DC's attitude towards the PCI were disembodied 
sets of hostile ideas and values or the consequences of 
intra-party conflicts within the DC, Napolitano's perception 
of the DC's negative attitude provides us with a convenient 
point of departure in discussing the collapse of the historic 
compromise.
It was after the alliance successfuly re-established
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the international stability of the Italian currency, reduced
99inflation and induced employment-creating investment, 
that the break up of the commitment was initiated over the 
issue of Italy membership in the EMS. Following the PRI's 
threat that it would withdraw its support unless Italy joined 
the EMS, a resolution in favour of membership was carried in 
the Chamber, with the Communists voting against and the 
Socialists abstaining. A further reason for the government's 
victory over this issue, was the crucial MSI vote in favour 
of membership. This is not to say that tacit co-operation 
developed between the DC and the MSI elites. According to 
members of the MSI elite, namely, Raffaele Valensise and 
Francesco Baghino, the party's approach towards supporting 
Andreotti's government was not a result of formal or tacit 
request from the DC.^^^ Valensise, furthermore, adds
that:
I did the speech explaining why we were going to vote in 
favour of Italy joining into the EMS because there were 
some national reasons for us. And I remember Signor 
Andreotti turning toyajds me and really gazing at me 
with very open eyes.
It was, rather, the voting of DC, PRI and the MSI in favour
of membership which provided the PCI with an argument
salient enough to be labelled as decisive to the break up of 
the historic compromise. Besides, the timing of the
alliance break up coincided with the PCI's both decisive
preferences of 'economic and institutional recovery' and 
'obtaining full legitimacy as a governing partner'.
If, as Strom claims, 'everything else being equal.
179
minority governments would prefer purely ad hoc 
102coalitions', a substantial reason which restricts his
conclusion to highly institutionalized parties lies in the
DC experience during 1976-1979. Although a formal alliance
was formed, the successful resolution of the intra-elite
conflicts within the DC was translated into a superior
position in the parliamenary bargaining arena. The failure
of the PCI elites to pacify their followers, in contrast,
undermined significantly the bargaining power of the party.
Moreover, the PCI elites was far more concerned with breaking
up the conventio ad excludendum than they were in respect of
any policies which the alliance might implement. Since the
inter-party relations were limited to joint consultation, no
major concessions were achieved by the PCI by means of
substansive bargaining. Chiaromonte's evaluation that the
historic compromise was a 'losing experience', together
with Paggi and D'Angelillo's assertion that it '[...] opened
a crisis in the political programmatic identity of the PCI 
104[...]', summarized the PCI's experience.
5.5 CONCLUSIONS
If we recall the weakly institutionalized features of 
the DC as a source of strength, it will come as no surprise 
to learn that the party's alliance strategy was not 
undermined following the evolution of intra-elite conflicts 
during the historic compromise. On the contrary, intra-elite 
dissatisfaction was manifested and resolved internally.
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The strongest indication of the relative weak position 
of the PCI during the historic compromise, came, naturally 
enough, with regard to its highly institutionalized features 
and the general dissatisfaction of its followers following 
the formal alliance with the DC. As it moved aggressively 
to break out of nearly thirty years in the political 
wilderness, strains within party organization were 
exacerbated. Not surprisingly, each aspect of the alliance 
strategy formulated by the PCI elites was grounded not 
simply in the party's response to external forces and 
stimuli, which were numerous and powerful, to be sure, but in 
the inherent limits of the party. Violent demonstrations of 
militants and activists erupted outside the party due to the 
lack of diffused mechanisms for internal dissent.
Regarding the strategy of the highly institutionalized 
PCI to neutralize the internal opposition, it was 
demonstrated that the party elites insisted on a transitional 
period in which the party's policies were updated and party 
members were approached by the members of the parliamentary 
group who explained the reasoning for the party's coalitional 
behaviour. Additionally, the party elites initiated an 
'articulation of ends' in order to cope with the followers' 
hostility. Finally, the failure of the highly institution­
alized party to control its followers' dissatisfaction forced 
its elites to modify the party's alliance strategy.
These modifications, in turn, reflect the inferior 
position of the party in the parliamentary bargaining arena. 
It was shown that the DC dominance during the historic
compromise was demonstrated by its control of all ministerial 
portfolios. The DC did not take into account the views of 
the PCI in drafting its three-year economic plan, nor did it 
initiate changes in agrarian policy, pension policy and 
university reform. It was furthermore evident that Andreotti 
ignored the PCI's views on the nomination of new chairmen to 
various state bodies. In contrast, the success of the 
weakly institutionalized party to pacify its internal 
opposition, was translated to a superior position in the 
bargaining plane. The fact that the DC implemented a 
strategy of confrontation in both the parliamentary and 
electoral arenas exemplifies this point.
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6. THE LIB-LAB PACT, U.K., 1977-1978
The previous chapters have dealt with parliamentary 
alliances in minority situations which involved highly and 
weakly institutionalized parties. This chapter examines the 
intra-party consequences of formal minority government 
amongst weakly institutionalized parties. Its aim is to 
demonstrate that this type of alliance is likely to be 
relatively stable. It will be shown that a substantial 
reason for this lies in the decisive preferences which were 
chosen by the parties involved and their ability to 
neutralize internal dissent without modifying alliance 
strategy.
Regarding the former aspect, it will be shown that the 
rationale behind the formation of a formal minority 
government between a party which lacks governmental 
experience and a party which regularly controls ministerial 
portfolios may lie in the former's decisive preference of 
'obtaining governmental experience' (reaierunasfahia). As
the visible decisive preference should reflect a convergence 
of opinion between the alliance partners, 'economic recovery' 
seems an appropriate preference. The unexperienced party, 
thus, might be willing to support the governmental party 
without having ministerial portfolios, as well as, conceding 
over the visible decisive preference, in order to gain its 
invisible decisive preference.
Regarding the partners' ability to pacify internal 
dissatisfaction, it will be demonstrated that intra-elite and
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elite-follower conflicts which emerged within both partners 
were successfully neutralized. Thus, instead of being 
enforced to modify alliance strategy, both partners maintain 
the formal minority government. Finally, with respect to the 
consequences of the successful resolution of the conflicts 
within both partners, it will be shown that each partner 
possessed a relatively high level of bargaining power over 
its basic decisive preference.
To support hypothesis 1, this chapter examines the 
formation, maintenance and collapse of the Lib-Lab pact 
during March 1977 - July 1978. Not only is the pact a
rare example of a parliamentary alliance in the British 
polity, its formal aspect is sufficient for designating it as 
a relevant case for our research. The objective is to 
explain majority building by weakly institutionalized parties 
and its intra-party consequences. The chapter begins with an 
introductory section which provides contextual data 
concerning trends in British politics.
The intent of the second section is to demonstrate that 
the Lib-Lab Pact was the product of bargaining between David 
Steel, the Liberal Party's leader, and James Callaghan, the 
Labour Party's leader. Whereas, for Steel, 'obtaining 
governmental experience' was a decisive preference to the 
formation of the pact, for Callaghan, 'economic recovery' was 
the decisive preference. Obviously, both leaders adopted 
'economic recovery' as their decisive preference in order to 
minimize party disunity and establish some visible 
convergence of opinion.
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The third section examines the worsening of the intra­
elite conflicts within the Labour Party and the evolution of 
elite-follower conflicts within the Liberal Party. Whereas 
the former were manifest by massive dissensions in 
parliamentary divisions, the latter were evident after the 
Liberal executive called a special assembly of the party in 
order to discuss the pact's renewal. It will be shown that 
the intra-elite conflicts within the Labour Party were 
pacified mainly by the government's acceptance of numerous 
defeats in parliament. On the other hand, the elite-follower 
conflicts within the Liberal Party were neutralized by 
Steel's resignation threats.
The fourth section reveals that the Labour Party enjoyed 
dominant policy influence over economic issues, whereas the 
Liberal Party obtained governmental experience. The former 
superior position was mainly due to the structure of the 
formal alliance, which did not provide the Liberals with 
ministerial portfolios. The latter position, on the other 
hand, was enhanced by the extensive consultation with Labour 
ministers and the successful mobilization of follower's 
dissatisfaction.
6.1 PARTY STRENGTH AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
For much of the post-war period, Britain has been 
described as having a two party system.^ Britain's party 
system exibited a two party 'format' since the existence of 
third parties 'did not prevent the two major parties from
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governing alone', and it satisfied the conditions for 
'twopartism'. Electorally, the Conservatives and the
Labour party gained 87 percent of the vote in 1945, and 96 
percent in 1951. In the 1960s, the two parties' shares 
fluctuated and tended to fall. But, at the three elections 
between 1964 and 1970 the two parties received between seven- 
eighths and nine-tenths of the total vote.^ Between 1945 
and 1970, the decline in one party's share was matched in the 
main part by an increase in the vote for the other, for 
example, where the Labour share of the vote fell by 4
4
percent, whilst the Conservative share rose by 6 percent.
It was in this context of two-party dominance that four 
minority governments were formed. Whereas from 1910 to 1915 
a minority Liberal government was dependent upon the support 
of the Labour and the Irish Nationalist for its parliamentary 
majority, two Labour governments were in a minority position 
in 1924 and 1929. A partial explanation for the prevalence 
of these minority governments rather than coalition in 
Britain lies in the conventions associated with the processes 
of government formation and dissolution. Regarding the 
former stage, after a general election in which no party has 
been able to gain an overall majority, the Sovereign is not 
required to nominate a Prime Minister who can secure a 
majority in the Commons, but rather one who can survive as 
leader of the largest (or in 1924 the second largest) 
minority party. For the dissolution, if defeated on the 
Address, the prevailing assumption is that the Prime Minister 
of the minority government can secure a dissolution of
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Parliament. Both conventions, therefore, make it likely that 
minority government rather than coalition will be the result 
of a hung parliament.^
By the 1970s, however, both the Conservative and Labour 
parties' share of the vote declined. The decline in 
dominance by both parties may be evidenced by their falling 
combined share of the total vote: from 80 percent in 1951, 
through 74 percent in 1959, to 56 percent in October 1974.^ 
Yet, this decline in the two-parties combined vote was hardly 
reflected in their parliamentary representation - the total 
seats of Liberals at Westminster during the period from 1951 
to 1975 ranged from six, during the three elections in the 
1950's, to fourteen in February 1974 (see Appendix 6.1). It 
was, however, the total parliamentary representation for all 
parties other than the major two that rose from the range of 
zero to six during 1951-1970, to twenty-three and twenty-six 
in the elections of February and October 1974, respectively 
(see Appendix 6.1). Looking more closely at this 
development, it becomes apparent that the two-party system 
strictly existed if at all only at the parliamentary level, 
with the electoral system as the remaining key determinant, 
and even the parliamentary two-party system has come under 
great challenge.^
To understand the context in which the Lib-Lab pact was 
formulated it is necessary to appreciate the parliamentary 
situation prior to March 1977. In October 1974 Labour 
succeeded in gaining a small overall majority, but this was
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Figure 6.1 List of Events in the U.K., 1974-1979
10\10\74 General Election (Lab. 319, Con. 277, Lib. 13). 
11\2\75 Margaret Thatcher elected as Con, leader.
26\6\75 Labour lose Woolwich West by-election.
18\1\76 Formation of the Scottish Labour Party (2 MPs)
16\3\76 Wilson announced resignation.
5\4\76 Callaghan becomes Prime Minister.
10\5\76 Jeremy Thorpe resigns as Liberal leader.
7\7\78 Steel elected Liberal Leader.
9\9\76 Unemployment reaches 1588000.
28\9\76 Callaghan speech demanding financial prudence. 
21\10\76 M. Foot elected Deputy leader of the Labour Party. 
27\10\76. Pound reaches its lowest level ($1.56).
4\11\76 Labour lose Workington and Walsall North by- 
elections
15\12\76 Healey announced letter of intent for IMF loan 
and drastic cuts.
21\2\77 David Owen becomes Foreign Secretary.
22\2\77 Government defeated on devolution guillotine. 
17\3\77 Aircraft and Shipbuiding Act finally passed.
23\3\77 Lib-Lab Pact saved government in confidence motion. 
31\3\77 Labour lose Stechford by-election.
28\4\77 Labour lose Ashfield by-election and hold Grimsby. 
5\5\77 Labour lose Greater London Council and other local 
election contests.
15\7\77 Healey outlines Phase III of incomes policy.
08\77 Unemployment peaks at 163 6000.
13\12\77 PR for European Elections rejected by Commons. 
26\1\78 Special Liberal Assembly conditionally endorsed 
Pact.
23\1\78 Government defeat on Green Pound devaluation.
2\3\78 Labour lose Ilford by-election.
25\5\78 Announcement of forthcoming termination of the
Pact.
31\5\78 Labour wins Hamilton by-election.
7\9\78 Prime Minister announced 'No election'.
21\9\78 Ford Strike against 5% offer begins.
2\10\78 Labour conference rejects 5% wage limit.
26\10\78 Swing to Labour in Berwick and East Lothian by- 
elections
13\12\78 Commons vote 285-283 against government sanctions 
on employers breaking the 5% pay policy.
1\3\79 Devolution referendum in Scotland and Wales.
28\3\79 Government loses confidence vote 311-310.
29\3\79 Election announced for May 3.
Source ; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1974-1979.
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gradually eroded through by-election defeats and defections, 
so that by April 197 6 the party found itself in a minority 
again. The immediate consequences were twenty nine 
governmental defeats in the House of Commons during June 1974 
to March 1977, during which time the Lib-Lab Pact was
p
formulated. Moreover, the Parliament witnessed the first 
'mass' use of the Guillotine which has been described as 
'the most drastic method of curtailing debate known to 
procedure' and 'the extreme limit to which procedure goes in 
affirming the rights of the majority at the expense of the
Q
minorities of the House'. On July 20, 1976, for example, 
the government carried three guillotine motions on five 
Bills; one motion for the Aircraft and Shipbilding Industries 
Bill, a second for the Rent (Agriculture) Bill and the 
Education Bill, and a third for the Health Services Bill and 
the Dock Regulation Bill.^^ Clearly, from the view point 
of the government, it achieved the orderly dispatch of their 
business, but this was not without cost. To be forced to 
rely on the naked force of the guillotine gave an advantage 
to the opposition in terms of their prestige.
Adding to the difficulties of the minority Labour 
administration was the internal situation within the party. 
In February 1977, the Labour government achieved the 
distinction of being the first government to be defeated on a 
guillotine motion, mainly due to dissent by vote or 
abstention, of the government backbenchers. The government 
struggled with the Scotland and Wales Bill through ten 
Committee days but it finally decided that the question could
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not be postponed. As the Guardian reported:
[..] what Mr. Foot and his more timid colleagues in the 
Cabinet have decided to take a gamble on is that enough 
of the rebels will back down on the night when they are 
brought face to face with the disastrous consequences of 
an effective backbench rebellion [...] The Cabinet 
decision follows weeks of intense activity by the Labour 
whips as they sought to assess the scale of any possible 
backbench revolt and to identify the possible weak links 
among the rebels. They appear to have confirmed Mr. 
Foot's view that the earlier the motion was tabled the 
better in terms of the number of rebels. For ministers 
recognise that the longer the timetable is delayed the 
more stringent it will have to be, and there|jre, the 
greater the indignation among its opponents.
When the decision was made, the government was defeated by
twenty-nine votes; twenty-two Labour MPs voted against the
12government and fifteen abstained. Such governmental
defeats due to Labour's rebels, occured over eight divisions 
during January 1975 to March 1977, emphasized the weak 
position of the Labour government.
The above-mentioned situation within the Labour Party is 
indicative of its weakly institutionalized character. 
According to Panebianco, whereas the Labour Party can be 
classified as a weakly institutionalized party, the 
Conservative Party can be classified as a; highly 
institutionalized.^* With regard to the Liberal Party, 
the evidence and arguments presented by a large number of 
scholars suggest that it can be classified as a weakly 
institutionalized party. Since the 1930s, the Liberal Party 
organization had been small, weak and poorly financed. It 
was dependent significantly on its main financial backer, the 
Joseph Rowntree Social Service Trust Ltd.^^ Besides, the 
party was created by a federation of existing groups, namely.
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the Whigs, Radicals and Peelites, through a process of 
d i f f u s i o n . I t  is therefore hardly surprising that the 
organization institutionalized in a weak manner.
Added to the minority situation in which the Labour 
Party found itself in April 1976 and its weak parliamentary 
position, were the influences of the economic crisis. By 
1976, the financial and economic crisis was such that the IMF 
could dictate terms to the Labour Government in return for 
international support for B r i t a i n . T h e  starting point of 
the analysis, however, is March 1977, when the Lib-Lab Pact 
was formed. How did it influence tactical considerations
of party elites? What were the new patterns of alliance 
formation, maintenance and collapse which evolved during 
1977-1978? These questions will be investigated in light of 
the rich material which was furnished by the British case.
6.2 THE PRODUCT OF BARGAINING BETWEEN TWO PARTY LEADERS
To understand the tactics which were implemented by
David Steel and James Callaghan, i.e. the Liberal and the
Labour leaders, respectively, it is first necessary to
appreciate both positions within their parties. Prior to the
Pact, both the Labour and the Liberal parties had elected
new party leaders. Under the multi-ballot system in which
the successful candidate would have to obtain an overall
majority of the total electorate of 317 Labour MPs, Callaghan
was elected leader of the PLP on the third ballot by a
18majority of 3 9 MPs. David Steel, on the other hand.
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contested his election under new rules which provided for an
electoral college composed of constituency representatives,
and was elected by a majority of 5509 out of 19573 
19voters.
These results eliminated any further challenges to
leadership within those parties. Whereas, in the Labour
Party, 'Michael Foot accepted the result without any
difficulty and worked as deputy leader with James Callaghan
20and gave him one-hundred and fifty per cent support', in
the Liberal Party, John Pardoe told Steel that 'the party
21could have only one leader and one strategy'. Both
leaders, therefore, enjoyed a dominant position within their
respective parties.
Since the leader is at a centre of a range of internal
forces which he must seek to pacify or neutralise, the style
of leadership becomes of particular importance. Style of
leadership, which common sense suggests is influenced heavily
by past experience, provides us with the nuances of leader-
elite communications within the parties. According to Tom
MacNally, the private secretary of the Prime Minister, James
Callaghan was considered to be:
Very relaxed, very much as chairman of the board, head 
of a team. I think he brought to the prime-ministership 
a lot of his experience of his early youth as a trade- 
union negotiator and also by the time he became PM 
almost a decade as a senior colleague of Harold Wilson, 
so, he had seen the advantages and the disadvantages of 
Harold Wilson's Style. I think he consciously tried to 
have a more open relationship with his colleagues and 
because he was at the autumn of his political career, I 
think, he had a more relaxed and philosophical attitude 
about Cabinet government. He saw it as an opportunity 
to allow individual Ministers to develop their ideas 
rather than trying to be the head of every initiative
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and the final arbitrator of every decision. 22
That David Steel had a completely different leadership style
and political background is undoubted, as described by John
Pardoe, his competitor in the leadership election and the
informal deputy leader during the Pact;
David Steel [... ] is passionately interested [. . . ] in 
the mechanics of politics. It is politics that 
interested him, not political ideas [...] And the game 
of politics was not communication with people, it wasn't 
even creating power, it was just being there. He loved 
every minute of it, he loved manipulating politicians, 
he loved manipulating beyond the scene. And he had 
never done anything else; he gone out of University's 
student union, student's politics, straight from that 
into what was a research or organization job with the 
Liberal Party in Scotland and then he joined the 
Parliament in an early by-election.
At face value these statements are not incorrect. However, 
in our concern to explain the main variables operating during 
the formation of the Pact, it is more relevant to consider 
the interaction of these two party leaders during the actual 
bargaining rather than limit our discussion to their position 
within the confines of their respective parties. Both 
factors will provide a starting point to the following 
discussion concerning the decisive preferences for the 
formation of the Lib-Lab pact.
The preferences that embody contested principles of 
policy or program direction (i.e. the decisive preferences in 
government formation), Luebbert argues, were due to their 
impact in minimizing party d i s u n i t y . T h e  logic behind 
this argument lay in the principles' nature of deriving from 
the most widely shared values within a party and because they
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directly engage the party's most basic sense of purpose. 
Undoubtedly, it was the preference of 'economic recovery' 
which serves as a visible point of departure in the 
bargaining between Callaghan and Steel (see Appendix 6.2).
The idea of using an economic umbrella as the central 
energiser of the Pact was sufficiently focused that it 
generated the widest possible support within both parties. 
Furthermore, since no policy concessions over this issue were 
explicitly mentioned in the Pact, it was sufficiently vague 
and opaque that it did not initiate intra-party disagreement. 
It was seen as a decisive point that the Liberals, by forming 
the Pact, supported a broad target, namely, 'work with the 
government in the pursuit of economic recovery' (Appendix 
6.2), that is convergent with their respective preference.
As potential coalitional partners, both parties could 
limit themselves to one visible decisive preference as a 
basis for all government activity. This was especially 
relevant to the Liberal MPs who insisted on PR to the
European Election as a precondition to any formal alliance 
with the Labour Party. In order to capture the actual
bargaining between Steel and Callaghan over this issue we 
must examine the bargaining position of both actors.
The Labour cabinet had, prior to the loss of the
government's majority and any discussion of a pact, already
accepted a version of the Finnish regional system of PR,
which the Foreign Secretary, David Owen, had suggested for
25the election to the European Parliament. As David Owen
recalled;
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It was a cabinet decision. It was discussed twice in 
Cabinet. The first time I raised it as a possibility 
and then we took it away and came back with a paper on 
it, so, that it was a formal majority decision [...] It 
was a clear majority in the Cabinet, I mean, we didn't 
vote. Callaghan summed up and said that we agree [...] 
When I knew that these discussions [over the Pact] were 
going on [...] Jeremy Thorpe was then shadowing the 
Foreign Affairs, [...] I did actually tell him that the 
Cabinet had decided that there would be PR [gg.] The 
attempt was to stiffen his arm on the issue.
Given that there was a cabinet decision over PR to the
European Election which was known to a key Liberal MP, it was
very surprising that Steel did not insist that the Liberals'
support could not possibly continue if the Cabinet's advocacy
of this issue was not carried on to the statute book.
During the final inter-party negotiations, the issue which
worried the Liberal MPs most was the European Elections and
PR for those elections; 'they insisted that the Government
should be bound to legislate for the election in the present
session of Parliament, and that they should be pledged to
introduce PR'.^^
Debate in the Labour Party as to whether PR for the
European Election should be introduced was due mainly to the
fear that it might be the harbinger of a similar system for
the British elections. The observation of Lord Donoughue
that 'It was not an issue that Mr. Callaghan ever wished to
raise to a high profile because it would have divided the
2 8party just as the EEC divided the party', gave rise to 
Callaghan's proposal in which he agreed to offer a choice of 
electoral systems, between the regional list system of PR and 
the 'first past the post' system and promised to take account
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of the Liberals' views on the subject while giving a private
29assurance that he himself would vote for PR. By forming
the Pact, therefore, Callaghan's party was not obligated to 
support a policy that was at variance with its respective 
preference. In other words, the Liberal's preference for PR 
to the European Election might have been a basis for a 
divergent relationship. However, since both leaders 
preferred a formal alliance, they formulated the Pact in such 
way that no party commitment was formalised over an issue 
which was at variance with each parties' respective 
preferences.
There is, nevertheless, general agreement that for David 
Steel, 'obtaining governmental experience' was a decisive 
preference. According to his political adviser, Richard 
Holme,
For Steel, the main price was not the condition of 
the arrangement but the arrangement itself. For Steel, 
the price, the victory [...] was the arrangement that a 
marginal party had become part of the process of public 
policy determination, become more governmental [...]
[For him], it seemed almost the ideal compromise that 
he could both get involved in government but not commit 
his party g^ich [would] not have been willing to formal 
coalition.
Given such view, it is hardly surprising that the major part 
of the Pact dealt with the institutionalization of Labour- 
Liberal regular contacts. A joint consultive committee which 
met regularly under the chairmanship of Michael Foot, the 
leader of the House of Commons, was set up. Yet, in order to 
minimize disunity within both parties it was stated that 'the 
existence of this committee will not commit the Government to
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accepting views of the Liberal Party, or the Liberal Party to 
supporting the Government on any issue' (Appendix 6.2).
Additionally, there would have to be an immediate 
meeting between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the 
Liberal Party's economic spokesman before the Pact was 
finalised, to confirm that there was agreement upon an 
economic strategy based on a prices and income policy and 
reductions in personal taxation. Furthermore, a regular 
consultation was suppose to take place between Labour's 
minister and the appropriate Liberal's spokesmen along with 
meetings between the Prime Minister and the Liberal leader as 
necessary. Finally, the terms of the agreement were to be 
published as a formal exchange of letters (Appendix 6.2).
Attention now turns to the immediate response of the 
Liberal party to the pact. At the outset, the major part of 
the negotiations over the Pact took place between Callaghan 
and Steel. However, whereas Liberal MPs were aware of the 
nature of the discussions, most people within the PLP were 
not informed about the negotiation. In other words, the 
latter were not aware what concessions were being made by 
James C a l l a g h a n . N o t  surprisingly, whilst no conflicts 
within the Liberal Party were recorded immediately after the 
formation of the pact, intra-elite conflicts were evident 
within the Labour Party. The very few Liberals MPs who 
argued against the Pact (namely, Jo Grimond and David
Penhaligon) have agreed to act upon the majority
. . 32decision.
A basic question still remains unanswered; How did Steel
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manage to sign a Pact which had no commitment by Labour to
legislate the issue of PR to the European Election ?. In
other words, how did Steel act contrary to his MPs
overwhelming concern ?. The answer lies in Steel's idea of
'realignment of the left' which was demonstrated by him on at
least three public occasions; at the end of June 1974 as a
chief Whip, in May 1975 as a candidate to the Party
leadership, and finally, in September 1975 as party 
33leader. In the latter occasion, televised live. Steel
argued:
We must be bold enough to deploy the coalition case 
positively. We must go all out to attack the other 
parties for wanting power exlusively to themselves no 
matter on how small a percentage of public support. If 
people want a more broadly based government they must 
vote Liberal to get it. And if they vote Liberal we 
must be ready to help provide it.
Logically, the fact that the leadership election took 
place under a more representative system then the previous 
election (the new rules included an electoral college 
composed of constituency representatives), provided Steel 
with wider support for his ideas of 'realignment of the 
left'. The long process of preparing the Liberal party to 
the idea of 'realignment of the left' clearly served to 
minimize disunity within the party. Consequently, the issue 
of PR for the European elections and the views of the 
opponents to the 'realignment of the left' were altogether 
subordinated to Steel's decisive preference of 'obtaining 
governmental experience'. It must be conceded that however 
influencial were the opponents to the Pact, it was the
preference of 'économie recovery' which generated the widest 
support of Liberal MPs, rank-and-file and voters.
Attention now turns to the immediate response of the
Labour Party to the Pact. At the outset, '[...] the mood of
the majority of the PLP was to accept it because it would at
least make certain that we would remain in command of the
Commons for another year'.^^ Yet, it is somewhat
misleading to contend that harmony existed within the Cabinet
and the PLP. A motion by 48 left-wing Labour backbenchers
suggested that they did not regard themselves as bound to
implement the Pact.^^ Moreover, in the Cabinet, four
members - namely, Stanley Orme, Albert Booth, Tony Benn and
37Bruce Millan - argued against the Pact. Not
surprisingly, most of the members, both in Cabinet and in the 
PLP, who expressed their objection to the Pact were organized 
in the left-wing faction, namely, the Tribune group. It was 
only after the Prime Minister reaffirmed that neither he nor 
Michael Foot would have recommended the Pact if it in any way 
damaged the integrity of the Labour Party that the left-wing 
cabinet members, who objected to the idea of the Pact, agreed 
to continue in office.
However mutable the left-wing strength may have been in 
the mid-1970s, it did not prompt determined action from 
Callaghan because he assumed that Labour MPs would support 
the party over no-confidence motions and, perhaps, over other 
critical divisions in the House. Moreover, Callaghan assumed 
that the TUC leaders would prefer to keep Labour in power 
despite the Pact with the Liberal Party rather than having an
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3 8anti-TUC Conservative government. Finally, based on
these assumptions, the Pact was presented to Parliament on 23
March 1977 and helped Labour overcome a no-confidence motion
by 322 votes to 298, the government being supported by the 13
Liberals and assisted by three Ulster Unionist 
39abstentions.
To sum up, the Lib-Lab Pact was the product of 
bargaining between David Steel and James Callaghan,. 
Whereas, for Steel, 'obtaining governmental experience' was 
a decisive preference to the formation of the pact, for James 
Callaghan, 'economic recovery' was the decisive preference. 
Obviously, both leaders adopted 'economic recovery' as their 
decisive preference in order to minimize party disunity and 
establish some visible convergence of opinion which enabled 
the formation of the formal alliance. Additionally, it was 
demonstrated that intra-elite conflicts which evolved within 
the Labour Party, were neutralized mainly through the elite's 
acceptance of appeals, petition and dissension in the Cabinet 
which challenged the party's alliance strategy.
6.3 COPING WITH INTRA-ELITE AND ELITE-FOLLOWER CONFLICTS: 
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE WEAKLY INSTITUTIONALIZED LABOUR 
AND LIBERAL PARTIES
To describe the extent of the internal dissatisfaction 
within the Labour and the Liberal parties, requires 
specification of the 'voices' which were recorded throughout 
the pact. Rather than support for the Lib-Lab pact, the 
orientation of large sectors of the Labour elite and the
2Ü0
Liberal base was most expressed by dissenting voices, 
challenging the alliance strategy of the respective party 
elites. These developments were stimulated and reinforced 
by the ability of the opposition within both parties to 
demonstrate their attitudes in the party arena as well as the 
parliamentary one.
For the Labour Party, a significant increase of intra­
party dissent was demonstrated by votes in the House of
40Commons' division lobbies during the Pact. Whereas, 14.5
and 16.5 per cent of divisions (expressed as a proportion of 
non-free divisions in each session) witnessed one or more 
dissenting votes by Labour members during 1974-5 and 1975-6 
respectively, dissent by Labour backbenchers during 1976-7, 
1977-8 and 1978-9 were 30, 36 and 45 per cent
respectively.*^ Not only did Labour members vote against 
their own party in more divisions than before, there was also 
greater willingness to enter the Conservative lobby, thus, 
government backbenchers were prepared to vote in the 
Opposition lobby on some occasions in which the government 
had no overall majority.
The result was 22 government defeats in the lobbies
42during the Pact, most of which it accepted. Of the 22, 9 
were attributable to opposition parties combining against a 
minority government (or to confusion in the lobbies or 
miscalculation by the whips), and 13 to Labour members
combining with Opposition members to defeat their own
43side. However, whereas several of the defeats took place
on important items of government legislation or policy it was
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not until defeated on a vote of confidence that Callaghan 
requested a dissolution.
Perhaps most important of all was the activity of the 
Tribune Group within the Labour Party. As the source of the 
separation within the Labour Party was both ideological and 
organizational, cross-voting or abstention by members of the 
Group resulted in numerous governmental defeats. The defeat 
of the government on the Expenditure White Paper in March 
1976, the loss of clause 40 of the Scotland Bill, the defeat 
on an amendment to the Nurses, Midwives and Health Visitors 
Bill in February 1979, and finally, a number of the defeats 
suffered by the government in Standing Committee, suffice to 
underline this point.**
Undoubtedly, the issue which caused the most serious 
intra-elite conflict within the Labour Party was the 
devolution of certain powers to elected assemblies in 
Scotland and Wales. The assertion of one author that 'The 
issue of devolution was one which could not be seen in terms 
of left or right wing attitude, at least not solely so',*^ 
represents the difficulties faced by Labour elites. 
According to the Liberal chief whip, Alan Beith,
People had talked about the devolution debate as a 
revolving door; as soon as you [Labour government] 
improved the Bill someway so that we [the Liberals] were 
happier and the SNP were happier, more of Labour own 
supporters are going out at tgg same door because they 
were opponents of devolution.
The existence of a 'revolving door' combined with 
incremental improvements in the Bills are crucial in
explaining the tactics of the Conservatives. At the outset, 
it is worth mentioning that whereas cross-voting and 
abstention by the Tribune members caused the loss of clause 
40 of the Scotland Bill, votes by other political wings and 
groupings within the PLP caused various defeats on the 
Scotland Bill, three of the four defeats on the Wales Bill 
and the loss of the guillotine motion for the original 
Scotland and Wales Bill.^^
The intra-elite conflicts over the devolution issue did 
not evolve only at the visible sphere of Labour's party 
politics. Given that various political wings and groupings 
within the PLP were divided, it is hardly surprising that co­
operation between Labour and Conservatives MPs evolved. 
George Gardiner, the organizing secretary of a Conservative 
group, namely the Union Flag, confirmed this direction:
I had a regular liaison with Tam Dalyell and George 
Cunningham [. . . ] and also with Enoch Powell and the 
Ulster Unionists because we often needed them to help us 
with some philibustering. And there was coordination 
too in the drafting of certain amendments [...] and 
there was a lot of consultation, of course, over the 
amendment, that in the end, on the first Bill, enforced 
a referendum anyway, and certainly discussions and 
contacts over the second Bill beyond George Cunningham's 
amendment which brought the 4 0 per cent threshold.
Additionally, at the level of the Conservative's shadow
cabinet, Mr. Teddy Taylor, the Scottish spokesman, had '[...]
49total and complete cooperation' with Tam Dalyell, George 
Cunningham, Betty Harvie Anderson and Tom Galbraith.
The above tendencies emphasize that a strife over the 
devolution issue evolved within the Conservative Party. This 
rift was extremely visible because the pro-devolutionists
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were an important minority, and included Edward Heath and the 
Shadow Scottish Secretary, Alec Buchanan-Smith.^^ In the 
division on the Second Reading of the Scotland and Wales 
Bill, for example, five Conservatives cross-voted to support 
the measure and an additional 29, including Mr. Heath, 
abstained from voting.Furthermore, the standing within 
the party of some of the Conservative dissidents, the 
resignation of Mr. Buchanan-Smith, and the refusal of the 
Conservative Front Bench speakers to offer any alternatives 
to the Government proposals in the debate reflected the
serious division within the Conservative ranks. To sum up, 
it was the fact that the issue of devolution was generally 
one which did not split into clear cut left or right wing 
that enhanced internal conflicts within the major British 
parties.
The nuances of the elite-follower conflicts within the
Liberal Party are of equal relevance. If, as Healey claims
'it was never easy working with the Liberals, since David
52Steel was unable to control his tiny flock', one should
expect to see numerous Liberal dissents. Surprisingly, the 
Liberal parliamentary group did not succeed in concerted
opposition to the Pact although there was a gap between Steel 
and most of the group as the latter wanted tangible 
achievement whereas Steel was more interested in the 
agreement itself.
A substantial reason for the lack of intra-elite
conflicts within the Liberal Party lies in the inability of 
Liberal MPs to organize their opposition to the Pact.
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According to John Pardoe, a substantial reason for this lay
in the fact that,
We did not agree on the reasons why we didn't like the 
Pact. And, frankly, it was some doubt in Penhaligon's 
phrase about 'turkeys voting for Christmas' because, 
basically, most of my parliamentary colleagues were 
scared stiff of fighting an election at that time..
They thought they were going to loss their seats.
The arguments presented by a large number of Liberal MPs
suggest another reason. As Lord Hooson put it:
I also took the view that for one member to resign would 
undermine the whole object of it [the Pact]. The 
Liberals have always been accused on never being able to 
agree on anything, and if one individual, which I did 
consider doing, resigned half way through the Pact,
[he will] probably, be followed by two or three more.
If I would have resigned, Cyril Smith would have 
resigned and David Penhaligon wouldghave done, and 
Richard Wainwright would have done.
Given that the Liberals were so concerned with electoral 
performance, it is hardly surprising that Steel's view of 
the Pact as an opportunity to bring the Liberals into 
association with government for the first time, served to 
eliminate internal dissatisfaction within the parliamentary 
group.
At the opposing extreme, however, were the party 
followers who called a Special Assembly to discuss the 
renewal of the Pact. Despite the Liberal MPs insistence on 
the importance of PR to the European Parliament, Steel
refused to make it a point at which he was prepared to bring
down the government. A party council which met in mid-
November 1977 passed a resolution demanding a special 
assembly if Labour failed to deliver PR to the European
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55Elections. The assembly was suppose to consider the
future of the pact and to discuss questions of electoral 
strategy.
Additionally, in a meeting of the standing committee
prior to the gathering of the assembly, a direct challenge to
Steel's alliance strategy was recorded. According to the
latter, it was his worst meeting with the Party Executive
ever. He wrote in his diary:
An appalling meeting with the Executive which at one 
point is a shouting match. Several say the party is 
disintegrated, and I listen to worthy verbal essays 
about 'participating democracy' etc. Towards the end 
one member actually mentioned inflation. I leave angry 
and depressed [...].
Note, however, that the elite-follower conflicts were not 
evident in the Scottish Liberal Party or in the Welsh Party 
Council. A substantial reason for this lies, of course, in 
the favourable position of the party over the devolution 
issue.
Given that internal conflicts have evolved within the 
pact's partners, it is hardly surprising that the respective 
elites had to respond in order to maintain stability and 
cohesion. At the outset, the intra-elite conflicts within 
the Labour Party and the elite-follower conflicts within the 
Liberal Party were resolved internally. Yet, even within the 
weakly institutionalized context one confronts striking 
variation in the strategy adopted to cope with the conflicts.
Elected as a leader while Labour was in power, Callaghan 
faced two alternatives; whether to follow the guiding 
principle of the PLP's organization, namely, intra-party
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democracy, or to modify this line of behaviour in
response to other principles. Undoubtedly, the former 
alternative was choosen by Callaghan, and was implemented 
both in the level of Cabinet and the PLP. Within the 
Cabinet, dissidents over the Pact's agreement were Tony Benn, 
Peter Shore, Albert Booth, Stanley Orme and Bruce Millan. 
The reason for the modest political significance of this 
intra-cabinet opposition had two dimensions. The first lay
C Q
in the 'The harmlessness of the Pact'. According to Tom
MacNally,
The individual MPs and Peers designated to deal with 
ministers on particular areas were no more than lobbies 
with good access because they didn't have the back up. 
[...] So, it was a most unequal relationship, anyway, 
and on the top, as I said, there was no sign that the 
Liberal Party has thought its way through, it had no 
shopping list, it had no clear objectives, and this 
meant that as far as Callaghan was concerned it was a 
relatively confortable one because, on the one hand, it 
cusioned him from the pressure of his left [...] because 
he could say I can't do this because the Liberals won't 
let me, and on the other hand, there was no great 
shopping list of Liberal demands that he had to sell to 
his own party.
Yet, even within the 'harmlessness' context of the Pact, 
Callaghan confronted some variation within the members of his 
Cabinet; most notably, Tony Benn. David Owen summarized this 
problem:
Even with Benn, he [Callaghan] clearly had a very 
difficult relationship. He tried to lean over 
backwards to give him a hearing in Cabinet, to let him 
feel he had an opportunity to express his views and to 
isolate Benn by being seen effectively to have let him 
display the fact that he was in minority, so, not to 
shut him up. [...] He wanted to give people like Albert 
Booth, Stanley Orme [...] Michael Foot, [...] a forum 
[...] And again, he would give Michael his hand, let 
him listen, let him feel he had a case to argue, but he 
was always able to mobilize a majority of the Cabinet to
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his point of view.^^
Added to these intra-cabinet difficulties which were 
sucessfully managed by Callaghan, was the factional nature of 
much of the PLP dissent. As previously stressed, what 
constituted significant difficulties were the large number 
of divisions witnessing dissenting votes, the size of the 
dissenting lobbies, and finally, the willingness of MPs to 
enter a whipped opposition lobby and deprive the government 
of a majority. For the government, it was both politically 
and managerially a difficult parliament. Assuming in each 
case that the views of the dissenters coincided roughly with 
those of the opposition or sufficient opposition members to 
mould a majority in the lobby, there was always the danger of 
a motion or legislative provision being defeated if it ran 
into opposition from left wing MPs, on its right wing, or 
from a cross-section of the parliamentary party. 
Furthermore, there was always the danger of a defeat by a 
combination of the official opposition and the minor parties 
in the House.
A substantial part of Callaghan's and the Whip's
strategy lay in their perception of the nature of the
internal conflicts and its derived consequences. According
to William Rodgers, the Transport Minister,
The question [is] what do they do at a crucial time; do 
they bring down the government? Now, the assumption 
which Mr. Callaghan would have made was that in the end 
my people are not going to bring down the government.
But equally, the rebels have to consider how far can we 
get this change or amendment without bringing dgyn the 
government. It's a very delicate relationship.
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Indirectly, dissentions by Labour MPs resulted in the
government's final defeat. On 28 March 1979, the House
debated a motion of no-confidence which had been tabled in
the wake of the March referendum in Scotland and Wales in
neither of which was the forty per cent threshold requirement
achieved. This requirement existed because Labour
backbenchers had voted with opposition members to impose it
upon an unwilling government. Indeed, had it not been for
the threat of dissent, there would not have been the decision
to hold a referendum. Consequently, the government was
defeated by 311 votes to 310, after which Callaghan had
62requested a dissolution.
At the opposing extreme was Steel's strategy to cope 
with the follower's dissatisfaction which evolved in late 
1977. By threatening his own resignation, he had managed to 
pursuade the Party Executive to hold the assembly as late as 
possible after the PR vote in the Commons, so that tempers 
had cooled. But most important of all, according to Michie 
and Hoggart, was the fact that the Liberal activists were 
still a minority in the p a r t y . H e n c e ,  when the assembly 
met, the silent majority wanted to reaffirm their loyalty by 
voting for Steel. In the end, Steel won by 1727 votes to 
520, and the pact had been renewed again.
To sum up, we examined the worsening of the intra-elite 
conflicts within the Labour Party and the evolution of elite- 
follower conflicts within the Liberal Party. Whereas the 
former were mainly manifested by a massive dissensions in 
parliament, the latter were evident after the Liberal
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executive called a special assembly of the party in order to 
discuss the pact's renewal. It was shown that the intra­
elite conflicts within the Labour Party were pacified mainly 
by the government's acceptence of numerous defeats in 
parliament. On the other hand, the elite-follower conflicts 
within the Liberal Party were neutralized by Steel's 
resignation's threat.
6.4 THE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF INTERNAL CONFLICTS: ONE WAY 
TO GAIN A BARGAINING POWER
As a partial explanation for the modest Liberals' 
influence over policy, on the one hand, and their achievement 
in obtaining 'governmental experience', on the other hand, 
reference to an essay by Alan Beith, provides a convenient 
point of departure. 'Many of the most valuable policy 
achievements of the agreement', the Liberal's chief whip 
claims, 'were [...] gained through the process of 
negotiation'.^^ The attitude, notes the author, had a 
number of dimensions but these basically added up to an 
extensive consultation on legislative priorities, access to 
privileged Whitehall documents, and after the Pact's renewal 
in July 1977, the ability to discuss government legislation 
with ministers prior to the Cabinet taking a final decision 
on its commitments for the coming year.
The above-mentioned observation is undeniably 
appropriate to the case of Liberal's Economic Spokesman, 
John Pardoe, who helped re-write that part of the 
legislation dealing with tax incentives for worker co­
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ownership schemes. This observation, however, cannot be 
applied to his Liberal colleagues. Basically, all the 
Liberal MPs shared the same background in terms of policy 
preparation during bargaining with Labour ministers. 
According to the Liberal's economic spokesmen, John Pardoe,
Very few of our policies had been worked out, probably, 
because after all the party hadn't been in power for so 
long and it never looked like being in power, so, it 
hadn't actually had to prepare its policies for power.
It didn't think about writing its manifesto as though it 
was a programs for power. It was a programme for 
opposition [...] Our policies were underresearched, we 
had too small a research department, we never had the 
resources to do the job properly and we came into the 
Pact franklygWith policies that were hopelessly 
underworked.
This preliminary situation, shared by most Liberal MPs during 
the consultation with Labour ministers, did not preclude the 
possiblity of some Liberal influence over policies, nor did 
it prevent Liberals acting against Labour policies. Its 
importance concerns not so much the question 'how' bargaining 
took place but 'what' was the nature of the government's 
concessions.
Given that the preference of 'economic recovery' was
decisive to the Pact's formation, together with the unequal
position of both parties in terms of office control and
policy preparation, it is hardly surprising to discover that
frequent difficulties existed in the Pardoe-Healey
relationship - as described by the former:
I think, [...] my negotiations were probably much more 
detailed, and if you like, much tougher and rougher than 
my colleagues, because economics was the centre ground 
of the whole thing [...][thus] Healey and I had to 
fight. The only way which the respectibility of the
Liberal Party could be maintained was if Healey and I 
had a fight and would be seen to be fighting all the 
time. The trouble was that the only way in which the 
Labour Party could maintain that Liberals weren't having 
too much influence was for Healey also to be seen 
fighting. So, whether we would have fought because we 
were that kind of people or not, we were more or less 
set upfto fight. It was a battle ground from the 
start.
At the time when the budget of 1977 came it was only six days 
after the Pact had been finalized, therefore, Pardoe had to 
commit the Liberal Party to support the government in return 
for only a modification over petrol tax.
However, as previously stressed, the Liberals could not
bring down the government over the economic issue until some
improvements had occured. As the government's negotiations
with the TUC for the third stage of the policy of income
restraint broke down, for example, the Liberals supported
Healey's pay policy while arguing that 'We will stay with it
for as long as the Government resolve in the battle against
inflation holds, but we remain with it for one purpose only -
6 8to bolster that resolve'. Moreover, the nomination of
Harold Lever to investigate the problems of small businesses 
without any credit given to the Liberals who were pressing 
for special attention to the subject, together with Healey's 
refusal to accept the Liberal's principal demand over the 
Spring 1978 budget, namely, income tax cuts, demonstrated 
that the Liberal Party was clearly subordinated to the Labour 
Party over the economic issue and was obviously receiving 
an unequal rate of exchange.
This is not to say that Pardoe did not achieve important
^12
concessions. The new low tax-rate band of 25 per cent on the
first 750 pounds of taxable income exemplifies this point.
However, the government concessions on economic issues were
not of critical importance to the Labour's economic policy.
Indeed, the government had lost a budget resolution on income
tax due to the Liberals voting with the Conservatives, and
the surcharge on employers national insurance contributions
69was passed by the House only by the Liberals abstention. 
So, the extensive consultation with the Labour minister
provided Pardoe, to some extent, with governmental 
experience.
From the Labour Party point of view, the above 
concessions cannot be over emphasized. The 'harmless'
nature of the bargaining was confirmed by the Liberal shadow 
spokeswoman for Employment, Prices and Consumer Protection, 
Baroness Seear, who co-operated with Roy Hattersley and 
Albert Booth:
We were never really very well supplied with information 
except the information we got from our opposite numbers 
[...] The thing I remember very vividly was that we were 
very opposed to the Dock Work Regulation Act and we 
managed to hold up the laying of the regulation which 
brought them into force. That was the kind of way we 
could operate. We could modify certain things they did
[...] We could get individual things [...] and that was
really but all we could do. If we pushed much further 
than that the Pact would just have been broken.
For a time it appeared that the Liberal's refusal to support 
the Labour government over the Dock Labour Scheme, levels of
13
income tax, National Insurance contributions and the
devaluation of the green pound, might damage the co-operation
between the two parties, but after the Liberals had accepted
minor modifications to legislation as the upper limit of
government concessions, their loyalty could be assumed.
A classic example of the 'weak' position of the Liberals
is provided by the negotiations over the devolution issue.
The fact that the Liberals had opposed the guillotine on the
Scotland and Wales Bill in order to secure two improvements
of the Bill, namely, proportional representation and revenue-
71raising powers, did not preclude the possibility of
Liberal support to the guillotine motion for the Second
Reading of the Bill. Furthermore, whereas the Pact's
negotiations between Steel and Callaghan revealed that there
was no commitment from the PLP to support PR to the European
Elections, on revenue-raising powers, the government was
72adamant in refusing to make any concessions.
As for the importance of these improvements for the
Liberals, a question should be asked; Did the Liberals have a
point at which they were prepared to bring down the
government? According to Russell Johnston, the answer was
No. That made the whole negotiations very weak. I 
participated in the negotiation over the devolution 
issue. We had 17 meetings, John Smith and I. In the 
end, the problem was that although [the issue] was very 
important, nevertheless, there was nothing so important,
[...] that we would have been prepared to pull the plug 
because that would effect the main political reason 
for entering the Pact [...] [namely] inflation. And 
therefore-^e were in a very weak negotiating 
position.
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The weak 'negotiating position' of the Liberals resulted in a
significant concession on revenue-raising powers by Steel as
evidenced in a speech made to the annual conference of the
74Scottish Liberal Party on 19 June 1977. Moreover, since 
the Liberals lacked a researched policy paper on the issue 
they used a paper entitled 'Scotland and Wales Bill: 
Conditions for the Resurrection' written by the Outer Circle 
Policy Unit. The author of the paper, Prof. James Cornford, 
confirmed the weak position of the Liberals during the 
negotiation:
Russell Johnston and I [. .. ] went into negotiation 
[with] Joel Barnett, John Smith and 20 officials [...]
At the end, Joel Barnett said; I cannot get this Bill 
through my backbenchers, my backbenchers will not 
support this Bill [concerning revenue-raising powers]. 
And Russell Johnston said; well, if they won't they 
won't, and he didn't even go outside and said what are 
we going to do about it. He just gave way.
Given the Liberals weak 'negotiation position', it is hardly 
surprising that they were handicapped throughout the 
negotiations. At the end, '[...] the only thing that was in 
the Bill that wouldn't be in the Bill otherwise [...] was the 
provision for judicial review on the issue of the competence 
of the Assemblies'.^^
Up to now it was shown that the Labour Party possessed a 
relatively high level of bargaining power with respect to the 
major issues in the bargaining plane. Yet, it is somewhat 
misleading to contend that the Liberal Party possessed a 
relatively low level of bargaining power in all the aspects 
of the pact. On the contrary, Steel's decisive preference of 
'obtaining governmental experience', combined with the fact
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that the party was not forced to modify its alliance strategy 
following the elite-follower conflicts, call into question 
any total under-estimation of the Liberal's bargaining power.
To understand the way in which David Steel gained a 
relatively high level of bargaining power over the decisive 
preference of 'obtaining governmental experience', it is 
necessary to appreciate the importance of the extensive 
consultation with Labour Ministers and the successful 
mobilization of the followers' dissatisfaction. At the heart 
of Steel's strategy were the electoral considerations of the 
'realignment of the left'. In order to enhance this idea, he 
had to obtain governmental experience. Not surprisingly, the 
major part of the pact dealt with the institutionalization of 
Labour-Liberal regular contacts. The formation of a joint 
consultive committee, combined with the regular consultation 
between Labour ministers and Liberals MPs created an image of 
Liberal's involvement in the day-to-day operation of the
government. The fact that the terms of the agreement were
published furthermore contributed to this aim.
Perhaps one of the factors which enhanced Steel's aim 
was the fact that the alliance strategy of the Labour 
government was continuously challenged by Labour backbenchers 
through massive dissension in parliament, whereas opposition 
to the renewal of the pact within the Liberal Party was
immediately neutralized. In other words, the Liberal leader 
could renew the pact without offence to any incumbent 
ideological heritage. The government defeats, caused by
members of the left-wing faction, furthermore, gave a basic
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tactical advantage to the government's partner. Because of 
the left-wing rebels, Callaghan's Cabinet was not able to 
embrace economic issues fully without offending the left- 
wing faction. This strengthened the Liberal's image within 
the alliance:
Steel regarded that as an advantage. Steel did not want 
to be associated with the left-wing of the Labour Party. 
Politically, the fact that the Labour left-wing voted 
against it [Lib-Lab matters] was an advantage because it 
positioned Steel as making a Labour Government respond 
to him rather than respond to its own left-wing.
Hence, the Liberal's image and the intra-elite conflicts
within the Labour Party associated with the left-wing faction
were mutually reinforcing. The greater the extent of the
internal conflict within the Labour Party, the stronger was
Steel's motivation to support the government in order to
improve his Party's positioning in the political map.
Additionally, Bogdanor's argument that the Pact was not an
agreement between the PLP and the Liberal Party but between
78the parliamentary Liberal Party and the Cabinet, proved 
to be of some advantage to the Liberals since it prepared the 
ground for left-wing dissensions.
It is at this stage of the analysis that a question 
concerning the collapse of the Pact should be asked. Given 
that both party leaders successfully neutralized the 
dissatisfaction of large sections within their parties, why, 
eventually, did the Pact collapse?. The answer to this 
question lies within the context of the principles which 
directed the formation of the Pact. After all, the decisive 
preference of 'economic recovery' was the only convergent
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principle between the two partners which was formalized in
the Pact, thus, naturally, it should have been the potential
issue at which one of the partners might bring down the
government. Other preferences could not have been as
significant as the economic preference to cause the collapse
of the Pact. This logic is well explained by the Employment
Minister, Albert Booth,
Whether or not legislation runs, even complex measures 
does depend, quite a bit, on what will be the electoral 
consequences. And that's why I think it was possible 
for the Labour government to carry a lot of very 
difficult legislation because being brought down on it 
in circumstances where you haven't governmental majority 
means you can go to the country on that measure. So, 
suppose we had been defeated on important Employment 
Protection Act, it would become an election issue, 
wouldn't it?
Debate within the Liberal Party as to whether they 
should make the distinction between Labour proposals which 
had an electorate mandate and those which did not have, was 
intensified due to their inability to impose upon the PLP a 
commitment for PR to the European Elections. However, since 
Labour governments tended to implement the major and/or 
controversial issues at the begining of their life-span, it 
was obvious that the Liberals did not have any of those 
controversial issues over which they could bring down the 
government. As Russell Johnston put it:
We weren't entering a new period of government, and 
saying this is how the government should run. We were 
propping up a dying government and we were taking over 
policies [...] which were already engrained and trying 
to do something about things which were already 
established.
216
Indeed, prior to the Pact, substantial elements of the
Social Contract (which were a range of policies formulated
between the Labour Party and the TUG in 1972 and 1973), were
already implemented. The Industrial Relations Act, for
example, was repealed, the Employment Protection Act was
introduced, improvements in pensions and other assistence
were given to the retired and the disabled, child benefits
were brought in, control of food prices and rents was
established and steps were taken to nationalize the
81shipbuilding and aircraft industries. The observation of
Coats, that the pact was not the cause of the Labour Party's
inability to pursue the more radical elements in its policy
but was one important extra factor for Labour ministers to 
82bear in mind, clearly confirms our view regarding the 
minor Liberal influence. Moreover, it seemed that Callaghan 
did not want to pursue the more radical aspects of Labour 
policies and, as previously stressed, the Pact had provided a 
convenient excuse.
Following the successful resolution of the internal 
conflicts within both partners they were not enforced to 
modify their alliance strategies. In this context, it is 
important to demonstrate how the personal relationships 
between Callaghan and Steel influenced the subsequent 
political experience of each party during the termination of 
the agreement. This involves, first of all, the observation 
that both leaders coordinated their tactical moves concerning 
the election to come. Although the final date of the 
election was determined basically by the Government's defeat
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in the House of Commons in March 1979, it was in August 1978
that Callaghan decided he should not call a general election
8 3in the following autumn. As Lord Donoughue recalled,
Of course, the most important discussion was the one in 
1978 when they agreed to break-off the negotiation [...] 
In summer 1978, Callaghan advised them to break the Pact 
because we probably will have a general election in the 
Autumn and he said again, in fatherly way, to Steel, you 
must not come in to an election with us, you must have 
an independent electoral position, therefore you.must 
get out of the Pact in advance of the election.
For Steel, the end of the Pact over the preference of
'economic recovery' was in line with his decisive preference
of 'obtaining governmental experience'. Whereas Liberals MPs
were interested in policy gains. Steel wanted 'to be able to
argue the case for a better way of running Britain and
illustrate it as we've never been able to before by pointing
85to a successful period of political co-operation'. Thus,
for Steel, the pact's collapse coincided with the period
considered sufficient to establish his decisive preferences, 
namely, 'economic recovery' and the invaluable experience of 
cooperation with the government. For the decisive preference 
of 'economic recovery', the period from March 1977 to the
end of May 1978 was crucial to achieving it. Hence, one
could expect the collapse of the Pact once the visible 
(formalized) decisive preferences had been achieved. In 
other words, the end of the Pact can be seen as a 'natural 
collapse' considering one can identify the visible decisive 
preferences which led to its formation.
To sum up, section it was revealed that the Labour 
Party enjoyed dominant policy influence over economic issues.
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whereas the Liberal Party obtained governmental experience. 
The former superior position was mainly due to the structure 
of the formal alliance, which did not provide the Liberals 
with ministerial portfolios. The latter position, on the 
other hand, was enhanced by the extensive consultation with 
Labour ministers and the successful mobilization of 
follower's dissatisfaction.
6.5 CONCLUSIONS
Throughout this chapter it was demonstrated that the 
Lib-Lab Pact was the product of bargaining between David 
Steel and James Callaghan. Whereas, for Steel, 'obtaining 
governmental experience' was a decisive preference to the 
formation of the pact, for Callaghan, 'economic recovery' was 
the decisive preference. Both leaders adopted 'economic 
recovery' as their decisive preference in order to minimize 
party disunity and establish some visible convergence of 
opinion.
Regarding the evolution of internal conflicts, it was 
shown that intra-elite and elite-follower conflicts evolved 
within the Labour Party and the Liberal Party, respectively. 
Whereas the former were manifest by massive dissensions in 
parliamentary divisions, the latter were evident after the 
Liberal executive called a special assembly of the party in 
order to discuss the pact's renewal. It was shown that the 
intra-elite conflicts within the Labour Party were pacified 
mainly by the government's acceptance of numerous defeats in
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parliament. On the other hand, the elite-follower conflicts 
within the Liberal Party were neutralized by Steel's 
resignation threats.
Consequently, it was shown that a successful resolution 
of internal conflicts is a critical factor in obtaining a 
relatively high level of bargaining power. In the case 
examined, each partner possessed a relatively high level of 
bargaining power over its basic decisive preference. 
It was demonstrated that the Labour Party enjoyed dominant 
policy influence over economic issues, whereas the Liberal 
Party obtained governmental experience. The former superior 
position was mainly due to the structure of the formal 
alliance, which did not provide the Liberals with ministerial 
portfolios. The latter position, on the other hand, was 
enhanced by the extensive consultation with Labour ministers 
and the successful mobilization of follower's dissatisf­
action.
Finally, this chapter demonstrated that a formal 
minority government amongst weakly institutionalized parties 
is most likely to be relatively stable. A substantial 
reason for this lies in the partners' ability to pacify 
internal dissatisfaction. Instead of being forced to modify 
alliance strategy, both partners can maintain the 
parliamentary co-operation without a threat to their 
stability or cohesion.
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8. ROCARD'S MINORITY GOVERNMENT, FRANCE, 1988-1990
Ail the previous chapters were confined to parliamentary 
governments, the predominant form of government among the 
democracies of Western Europe and the Commonwealth. 
Additionally, the study covered formal and informal minority 
governments which involved highly institutionalized parties 
occuping governmental and external support positions. It 
now turns to examine the research question in semi- 
presidential systems, i.e. where the President has the de 
facto ability to intervene in the formation and the day-to- 
day operation of the government. It also assesses the intra­
party consequences of an informal alliance involving a highly 
institutionalized party which occupies the external support 
position.
This chapter demonstrates the advantage of the weakly 
institutionalized party in terms of its ability to control 
internal conflicts as a result of a formation of an informal 
minority government. Such control is immediately translated 
into a dominant position in the bargaining arena. It also 
illustrates the disadvantage of the highly institutionalized 
party in terms of its inability to control followers' 
hostility which is manifested outside the party (i.e. violent 
demonstrations). Such difficulties are immediately
translated into an inferior position in the parliamentary 
bargaining arena.
To support hypotheses 1 and 4, the chapter analyses the 
formation and the maintenance of the Rocard's 1988 minority
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government. Its objective is to explain majority building by 
highly and weakly institutionalized parties and its intra­
party consequences. To gain insight into the impact of 
intra-party politics on the alliance strategies of the French 
parties, during the first minority situation in the Fifth
Republic, elite interviews were conducted in May 1990. The 
analysis, therefore, covers mainly the period May 1988-May 
1990. The chapter begins with an introductory section which 
provides contextual data concerning trends in French politics 
during the period under examination.
The second section analyses the position of Rocard
within the PS. Its purpose thereafter is to examine the 
presidential factor in minority government formation. With 
regard to the former aim, it will be shown that Rocard 
possessed a relatively weak position within the PS although 
he enjoyed the President's endorsement, as well as popular 
support. With regard to the presidential determinant, it
will be demonstrated that the informal minority government 
amongst the PS, the PCF, and the UDC parliamentary group was 
the product of Mitterrand's strategy during the May 1988 
Presidential election. It will be furthermore shown that it 
was Mitterrand's theme of ouverture which determined Rocard's 
decisive preference of 'unity'.
The third section presents the evolution of intra-elite 
conflicts within the PS and the UDC parliamentary group, and 
the development of elite-follower conflicts within the PCF, 
as a result of the informal minority government. Its aim, 
thereafter, is to investigate the strategies adopted by the
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PS, the UDC parliamentary group and the PCF elites in order 
to cope with the internal opposition. It will be 
demonstrated that whereas the PS elites allowed dissenting 
voices to be raised within the PS parliamentary group, as 
well as the formation of new factions, the PCF elites were 
enforced to modify their alliance strategy in order to cope 
with militants' protest outside the party. Additionally, 
the UDC parliamentary group was forced to modify its alliance 
strategy and to reaffirm its position with the opposition in 
order to maintain its stability.
A sustantial part of the fourth section is devoted to an 
analysis of the inter-party relationships in the bargaining 
plane in light of the PCF failure and the PS success in 
neutralizing the internal opposition. It will be shown that 
the successful resolution of the intra-elite conflicts within 
the PS was translated into a superior position in the 
parliamentary bargaining plane. On the other hand, the 
failure of the PCF to resolve the elite-follower conflicts 
internally was translated into an inferior position in the 
bargaining plane. Special attention is given to the use of 
Article 49-3 which shapes the bargaining between the 
government and the National Assembly.
7.1 PARTY STRENGTH AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The most significant changes in the French party system 
from 1981 to 1988 were the transformation of the Socialist 
Party into a main stream social-democratic government party.
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the continuing and accelerating decline of the Communist 
Party, the weakening of the Socialist-Communist alliance, and 
finally, the emergence as an important force of the National 
Front.
The major constraint on the Socialist Party during the
1970s was the need for an alliance with the Communist Party.
Moreover, the existence of a large pro-Moscow Communist Party
loyal to the dogmas of Marxism and Leninism served to hinder
the Socialist Party from developing into a 'catch-all' party
able to rally the centre and middle class vote which is
essential to any election victory and successful
government.^ Since 1981, however, the French Communist
Party has been subjected to a process of degradation in all
aspects: a series of electoral failures, loss of positions of
local power, fall in membership and drop in militant
activity, and unfavourable development of its image in public 
2
opinion. Regarding national legislative elections, in 
1978 the Communists won 20.7 per cent of the poll, 16.1 per 
cent in 1981 and 9.8 per cent in 1986 (see Appendix 7.1)
Clearly, the main beneficiaries of the Communist
collapse were the Socialists since the steady decline of the 
Communist vote eliminated the Communist Party as a major 
force on the left. In 1978, this process contributed to the 
actual break up of the alliance with the Socialists. 
Strategically, the political game changed from being one of 
trying to maintain an alliance with the Communists to that of 
wooing voters away from the Right with an appeal to the 
traditional virtues of patriotism, administrative efficiency
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and change within continuity, packaged as 'modernizing' 
socialism.
It was from the larger structural changes taking place 
within the French party system, particularly the slow but 
steady decline of the Cummunist Party, that the National 
Front emerged as a political force.* Based on domestic 
issues such as immigration and security, the National Front 
had attracted between 8-11 per cent support during the period 
1983-1986 in four very different elections: local elections 
in 1983, European elections in 1984, departmental elections 
in 1985 and legislative elections in March 1986.^
The electoral breakthrough of the extreme Right in 
France since 1983 was enhanced by the political situation of 
a left which has proved disappointing in power, the political 
exploitation of the immigration issue and the capacity for 
turning the hostility of the media to its advantage.^ 
Logically, the political weaknesses of the National Front 
were related to its strength, namely issue voting. Following 
the gap between Le Pen's commitments to traditional values of 
the past and the basically non-traditional commitments of the 
largest group of its supporters, the leadership of the
7
National Front failed to augment the latter group, as was
p
manifested by the poor 1988s election results.
To explain the context in which Rocard's 1988 minority 
government operated, it is also necessary to appreciate how a 
particular French legislative institution, called the 
Article 49-3, shapes bargaining between the Government and 
the National Assembly. This Article is perhaps the most
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potent of many Fifth Republic legislative institutions 
designed to restrict the legislative role of the
9
parliament. According to the Article, when the government 
engages its own responsibility on a text, the Bill in 
question is considered to be passed unless a motion of 
censure is lodged and voted by an overall majority. In other 
words, in the vote of censure, both votes in favour and 
abstentions are considered favourable to the government. If 
the government fails to reach an absolute majority of the 577 
deputies, under Article 49-3 the government is brought down. 
The Article, then, forces the National Assembly to choose 
between accepting the government's version of a bill and 
throwing the government out of office.
Of relevance here is the classification of French
parties according to degrees of institutionalization.
According to Panebianco, whereas the PS can be classified as
a weakly institutionalized party, the PCF can be considered a
highly institutionalized one.^® This classification is
most visible with regard to the existence of factions within
the PS. According to Cole, throughout the 1970s, there have
been four major factions: Mitterrand, Mauroy, CERES, and
after October 1974 R o c a r d . The first two represent
intra-party groups whose main strength lies within some
aspect of the party organization. The latter two, in
contrast, refer to those groups which maintain a high level
of independent factional organization, in parallel to the
12party's official structure.
The rivalries between potential PS presidential
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candidates is often considered the cause of the intra-party
conflicts within the p a r t y . Y e t ,  factionalism within the
PS was not only subordinated by presidentialization. During
the 1980s it was further mitigated by the ideological and
sociological heterogeneity of the currents themselves, the
factions lacking clear enough boundaries to pose a threat to
14the leadership.
In the June 1988 legislative elections no party obtained 
a majority in the National Assembly. The PS, who obtained 
275 of the 577 seats, formed the first minority government in 
the history of the Fifth Republic. Theoretically, potential 
partners were the Gaullists (RPR, 13 0 seats), the UDF (90 
seats), and the Centre (UDC, 41 seats) - as well as the 
Communists with 25 seats (see Appendix 7.1). This
parliamentary situation provides a starting point to the 
analysis. How did it influence tactical consideration of 
party elites operating in a presidential system ? What were 
the new patterns of government formation and maintenance 
which evolved during May 1988-May 1990 ? These questions 
will be investigated throughout the following sections.
7.2 THE PRESIDENTIAL FACTOR IN MINORITY GOVERNMENT FORMATION
To understand Rocard's alliance strategy during 1988- 
1990, it is necessary to appreciate his position within the 
PS, as well as Mitterrand's strategy in the 1988 Presidential 
elections. For the former, Rocard was clearly Mitterrand's 
choice as Prime Minister, rather than that of the PS.
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Although Rocard enjoyed a relatively high level of popular
support, he lacked the immediate support of his own party.
His relatively small faction suffices to underline this
argument. The Economist, furthermore, concludes that:
As a rebel of the most irritating sort (one whom time, 
in certain respects, has proved right), Mr. Rocard was 
never going to become a party darling just by becoming 
prime minister. Though popular with the public, 
his following among Socialists is small. His harping on 
politicians' failure to represent 'civil society', his 
insistence on giving opposition parties their due, his 
courtship of centre-right politicians - none of this is 
calculated to win the hearts of party workhorses.
Since Rocard was at the centre of a range of internal
forces which had to be pacified or neutralised, his style of
leadership becomes of particular importance. According to
Machin, a shared leadership pattern had evolved between
Rocard and Mitterrand, replacing the previous pattern of
'imperial p r e s i d e n c y T h e  solution of the crisis in
the New Caledonia, for example, was clearly Rocard's work and
most domestic policy choices appeared to have been worked out
with little presidential intervention. The President did
not publicly weigh in on the dispute between the Prime
Minister and the Finance Minister about the rates for a
reimposed wealth tax. Additionally, Mitterrand did not
intervene when Rocard over-ruled his Justice Minister over a
proposal to house those convicted of political violence with
17other prisoners.
Undoubtedly, Rocard's style of leadership was a critical 
factor which contributed to the shift towards a shared- 
leadership. According to Dominique Strauss-Kahn, PS member
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of the National Assembly and the President of the Finance 
Committee,
Rocard tries to manage a form of consensus. I am not 
quite sure this is linked to the minority situation of 
the government. I think even if the Socialists had a 
huge majority, Rocard, for personal reasons, would have 
this kind of leadership. He is more a man of consensus 
than a man of a conflict. Of course, in the situation 
today, when the Socialists have no majority in the 
parliament, it is not only a ggestion of taste, it is 
also a question of necessity.
Given Rocard's relatively weak position within the PS, it is 
hardly surprising that a consensus-oriented strategy was 
implemented in the party arena. Yet, in order to have a 
complete picture of PS politics in late 1990 it is also 
necessary to appreciate Mitterrand's strategy in the 1988 
presidential elections.
La France Unie was the essential spirit of Mitterrand's 
campaign strategy in the May 1988 Presidential election. He 
called for an opening of the new presidential majority to the 
centre and centre-right politicians, implicitly refusing the 
old Fifth Republic pattern of bipolarization between the Left 
and the Right. Additionally, he had rejected any 
parliamentary pact which might reduce his image as a 
candidate who could offer a synthesis of the various policies 
that had been adopted, under Left and Right, during his first 
seven-year presidency.
Additionally, throughout the campaign Mitterrand was 
careful not to call for a formal alliance. He promised 
implicitly that his election would be followed by a political 
realignment, and that a new presidential majority backing
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Table 7.1 List of Events in France, 1988-1990
24\4\88-
08\5\88
12\5\88
14\5\88
14\5\88
05\6\88-
12\6\88
15\6\88
23\6\88
28\6\88
20\8\88
10\ 88-
11\88
06\11\88
09\12\88
22\12\88
12\88
12\3\89-
19\3\89
4\89
15\6\89-
18\6\89
25\9\89
11\2\90
3\90
F. Mitterrand elected as France's President.
M. Rocard announced his minority Cabinet list.
F. Mitterrand dissolved the National Assembly and 
announced the first round of legislative election. 
P. Mauroy elected as PS secretary by 63 votes to 
54 votes for M. Fabius, who was supported by 
Mitterrand, 
legislative election
P. Mehaignerie announced the formation of the UDC. 
M. Fabius elected as President of the Parliament. 
M. Rocard announced his enlarged Cabinet list. 
Signing of the New Caledonian Agreement.
Public sector strikes.
National referendum on New Caledonian.
A motion of censure against the government failed 
to win the necessary support.
The 1989 budget aimed to reduce the budgetary 
deficit was adopted.
First attempt by senior PCF members to circulate a 
dissident publication inside the party.
Local elections, the PS won control over an 
increased number of large towns.
Threat to opposition leadership led by P.
Seguin and M. Noir.
Election to the European Parliament with separate 
UDC list.
C. Millon elected as parliamentary UDF leader.
RPR National Congress in which J. Chirac was re­
elected unanimously as the RPR leader while 
leadership challenge continues.
PS party congress at Rennes.
Source ; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1988-1990.
Mitterrand would have to be comprised of those centre and 
centre-right politicians who were willing to support the new 
President. Mitterrand's view, however, did not preclude an 
alliance with the PCF. The PS gesture of reducing the number 
of seats required to form a parliamentary group, from 30 to 
25, in order to institutionalize the PCF's position within 
parliament as a potential partner, exemplifies this point.
As a partial explanation for the above strategy,
reference to Mitterrand's Letter to all the French People.
19provides a starting point. National unity was needed,
Mitterrand claimed, due to the importance of the completion
of the 1992 EC internal market. Special issues concerning
France's preparation for this step, such as educational
training and poverty problems, were needed to be tackled
peacefully by 'a sort of dialogue'. However, a different
explanation to the implementation of Mitterrand's strategy
suggests that the importance of the above-mentioned economic
challenges can hardly be over emphasized. According to Cole,
the 'national unity' slogan can be considered as an attempt
to respond to the large consensus in French society on most
aspects of policy prevailing amongst two-thirds of French
voters after the contrasting experience of the 1981-86
20Socialists and 1986-1988 Conservative governments.
The preferences that embody contested principles of
policy or program direction (i.e. the decisive preference in
alliance formation), Luebbert argues, were due to their
21impact in minimizing party disunity. Given Mitterrand's 
1988 campaign slogan, 'La France Unie'. and the relatively 
weak position of Rocard within the PS, it is hardly 
surprising that 'unity' was adopted as the decisive 
preference in the bargaining towards the formation of the 
1988 alliance. Such a preference implied that the PS would 
not form a formal alliance, as such a commitment opposes the 
essence of 'solidarity'. Clearly, this broad aim would not 
have alienated any group within the PS and was sufficiently
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focused to generate the widest possible support within the 
PS, as well as, within its partners.
To understand why Rocard seriously took into account a 
potential emergence of dissatisfaction within the PS, it is 
necessary to appreciate the attitudes of large sections in 
the party to any co-operation with the PCF or the Centrists. 
The reluctance of these sections resulted from the alliance 
strategy implemented by both the PCF and the Centre 
throughout the 1970s. At the heart of the PCF alliance 
strategy throughout the 1970s lay a certain ideological 
affinity shared with the PS. After all, during this period 
the two parties have, to a greater or lesser extent, co­
operated in the opposition as well as in government (1981-
1984) . Clearly this does not mean that no conflict emerged 
between the two parties. It does mean, however, that
relationships were easily manageable, not only as a result of 
the ideological affinity, but also due to the PCF's
dependence on Socialist support for the election of its 
deputies and municipal councillors. The ideological
affinity, however, gave rise to a fear within the PS elite 
when intra-party implications were examined. As Jean-Pierre 
Worms argues.
From 1988 onward, the fear of a lot of Socialist rank- 
and-file members or leaders is that the Communist Party 
may cultivate a certain amount of discontent within the 
salaried classes and could gain a new strength. This is 
a sort of ideological blackmail or pressure which the 
Communist Party can [exert] on the French Socialist 
Party, especially on the rank-and-file members. So, 
there is a pressure not to go far away from the 
Communist Party. [Yet], the fact that the Communist 
party apparatus now is very much old-style Stalinist 
position makes co-operation with the Communist Party
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very difficult [...] officially, the very strong 
opposition to certain type of Communists thinking is the 
Rocard group, but very deeply I would say that most of 
the leaders of the Socialist Party today are conscious 
of the necessity to separate [the party] clearly from 
the old-style [Communist^gP&rty but most of them do not 
dare to say it publicly.
This is not to say that the PC would unconditionally support
the government nor did it mean that the PS government would
likely to have such type of PCF support. It is rather to
stress that beyond the Presidential constraints upon Rocard's
alliance strategy, there was a reluctance within the PS to
engage in formal co-operation with the PCF.
The UDC, which was led by Pierre Mehaignerie,
represented the other possible partner for the government.
As members of the CDS, the centrists could not dissociate
themselves from the UDF. Yet, the very nature of
✓
Mehaignerie's skill enable them to dissassociate themselves, 
at least temporarily, from their traditional right-wing 
allies. This was done by the establishment of a separate 
centrist group in the National Assembly, namely, the UDC, 
whose stated aim was to form a constructive opposition to the 
government. Not surprisingly, the formation of the UDC was 
strongly opposed by UDF leaders, such as Giscard d'Estaing 
and Francois Leotard. However, in spite of the criticism, 
the group consisted of 34 deputies with seven others allied 
to it, including Raymond Barre. The latter, in turn, stated 
that he would support the Socialist government whenever it 
was necessary in the interests of the country.
The group's position was partly inspired by the presence
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of a small number of centrist and right-wing ministers in 
Rocard's government. These figures included the Labour 
Minister, Jean-Pierre Soisson (ex-UDF), the Minister of 
Overseas Trade, Jean-Marie Rausch (CDS), the Minister for 
Turism, Olivier Stirn (ex-UDF), and the Secretary of State 
responsible for economic planning, Lionel Stoleru (ex-UDF). 
Their presence in the government meant that if the UDC 
censured the government, then it would also be censuring 
members of its own party and former colleagues. Moreover, it 
must also be noted that the centrists possessed a certain 
affinity for Rocard. He, therefore, was the person in the 
PS with whom the centrists felt that they were most able to 
do business.
However conclusive such affinity has been, there were
still attitudes which opposed co-operation with the
Centrists, shared by the majority of the PS elite and the
grass-roots. As Jean-Pierre Worms explains.
There is a strong ideological reticence towards any form 
of agreement with the Centrist group or with politicians 
who come originally from the Centrist group [...] Even a 
man like the present Minister of Work and Employment, 
Jean-Pierre Soisson, who comes from the Barrist - 
Raymond Barre supporters- is still considered by a large 
fraction of the Socialist party members as somebody 
rather suspicious who cannot be trusted inspite of the 
fact that hg^is one of the best ministers in this 
government.
These factors indicated that Rocard's tactical moves, such 
as the 'opening' of his government to the centre-right 
politicians, have cleared the way to PS-UDC co-operation on 
grounds other than the formal one.
Given the internal constraints upon Rocard's strategy.
 ^jb
it is hardly surprising that he 'took great care in not being
25prisoner of any configuration'. An informal alliance,
comprised of the PCF, the UDC and individuals MPs, was 
therefore formed on the basis of 'unity' in light of the 1991 
EC's single economic market. By negotiating each issue 
separately and on an ad-hoc basis, the PS elites could pick 
the least 'expensive' alliance partners available, i.e. the 
one which does not pose a threat to the PS stability. This 
direction was confirmed by Rocard's legislative adviser, Guy 
Carcassone,
Among the 19 independents, 12 have already joined the 
'presidential majority' and will never vote against 
Rocard. Thus, we just need to find 6 or 7 abstentions 
in the opposition if ever the Communists voted the 
dismissal. This may be quite easy as far more than 6 or 
7 deputies would refuse to join their vote with those of 
the Communists, in an artificial majority without any 
future. WggUaturally know who can easily be 
convinced.
In addition to the above-mentioned informal alliance, 
Rocard could rely on Article 49-3. Two advantages of the 
Article were evident: (i) the government's dismissal would
need a common vote of right and left-wing oppositions (129 
RPR + 91 UDF + 41 UDC + 2 6 PCF + at least 2 of the 18
independents) in order to reach the absolute majority (289), 
and (ii) the government does not need a positive majority 
vote, i.e. it just needs 16 of the 305 'non-socialists' 
deputies to refrain from voting against it. Not
surprisingly, thus, the government position in mid-1988 could 
be considered relatively secured.
To sum up, given the relatively weak position of Rocard 
within the PS combined with Mitterrand's theme of ouverture
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in the 1988 presidential elections, it is hardly surprising 
that the former adopted 'unity' as his decisive preference in 
the bargaining over the alliance formation. We argued that 
Rocard seriously took into account a potential emergence of 
dissatisfaction within the PS as he was aware of the 
objection of large sections to any co-operation with the PCF 
or the Centrists. Thus, based on the decisive preference of 
'unity', Rocard decided to form an informal alliance, 
comprised of the PCF, the UDC, and individual MPs, in order 
to minimize party disunity.
7.3 COPING WITH INTRA-ELITE AND ELITE-FOLLOWER CONFLICTS: 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PS'S INTERNAL FLUIDITY AND THE 
PCF'S STRUCTURAL RIGIDITY
To describe the extent of the internal dissatisfaction 
within the PS, the PCF and the UDC parliamentary group, 
requires specification of the voices which were recorded 
during 1989-1990. For the PS, intra-elite conflicts were 
particularly apparent between the parliamentary group and the 
government. The PS group saw itself as being relegated in 
importance behind the PCF and the UDC, with the government 
taking its support for granted. Additionally, there was a 
division between centrist factions, led by Rocard, and more 
leftist factions, due primarily to the negative reaction of 
many Socialist deputies to the government's effort to co­
operate with the UDC in 1988. A partial explanation of this 
division is provided by Jean-Pierre Worms,
In my opinion, within the party, the only organized 
group which publicly opposed any sort of co-operation
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with the Centrist would be the ex-Trotskyist, Julian 
Dray group. I would explain that, very cynically, by 
the fact that it is the only 'tendance' within the PS 
which is not represented in the government. [However], 
this is a very popular angle of attack on the government 
within the Socialist Party which was widely ç^nifested 
during the preparation of the last Congress.
In the months following the passage of the 1989 Budget, 
therefore, the PS parliamentary group featured a militant 
disposition. The vote on the 10th Plan in March 1989, where 
the government had to use Article 49-3 in order to force 
dissident PS deputies into line, exemplifies this argument.
Perhaps most importantly was the effect of the 
preparation for the 1990 Party Congress in Rennes, where 
delegates, elected by the local federations, were supposed to 
debate policy and to elect the Comite Directeur, which 
determines the composition of the Executive Bureau. Whereas 
for much of the 1970s and 1980s the party consensus on 
Mitterrand's leadership enabled the party to escape internal 
divisions, in 1989 the various groups that formerly supported 
Mitterrand began to oppose each other as the party searched 
for a new First Secretary.
Before, as well as during the party Congress at Rennes 
in March 1990, numerous Socialists kept criticizing Rocard's 
government either because they did not accept the nature of 
the PS inter-party strategy or because they wanted to 
enhance their visibility. The division was marked primarily 
by a conflict between three individuals, namely, Lionel 
Jospin (Minister of Education), Laurent Fabious President of 
the National Assembly), and Louis Mermaz (President of the PS
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parliamentary group). According to The Times, the conflict
reached a climax in the Party Congress,
For the first time since President Mitterrand took over 
the leadership of the Socialists in 1971, a party 
congress has ended in disarray. Hundreds of delegates 
at the congress in Rennes hissed and yelled at M. Louis 
Mermaz, a senior official, as he stood on the platform 
yesterday to announce that their leaders had failed to 
reach a consensus [...] Rivalry has consistently been a 
feature of these party congress, but, amid much 
brinkmanship those concerned have previously managed to 
produce a late compromise. This year's failure to do 
the same puts the Socialists in the same boat as the 
deeply divi^gd right-wing opposition and the 
Communists.
Dissatisfaction from Rocard's alliance strategy was
manifested also within the party base. Leftist militants,
for example, called for a repositioning of the party to the
left after the disappointing returns in many districts in the
29May 1989 Municipal elections. However, the dominant mode 
of the conflicts within the PS was, undoubtedly, an intra­
elite one.
Intra-elite conflict emerged also within the UDC 
parliamentary group. Division surfaced between Pierre 
Mehaignerie, who wished the UDC to cooperate with the 
opposition, and Jacques Barrot, who favoured co-operation 
with the government. As a new parliamentary group, the lack 
of institutional mechanisms of conflict resolution together 
with the uninstitutionalised relationships between the group 
and the CDS contributed to the continuation of the internal 
conflict. Added to the negative influences of the above- 
mentioned division, were the June 1989 elections to the 
European Parliament in which the Centre list received only
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8.4 per cent of the vote (see Appendix 7.2). Altogether, 
this led large sections of the parliamentary group to realize 
that they failed to achieve their objective, namely, a 
'constructive oppostion' to the PS minority government.
Contrary to the types of conflict which emerged within 
the PS and the UDC parliamentary group, elite-follower 
conflicts emerged within the PCF. The ex-Ministers, Anicet 
Le Pors and Andre Lajoinie, were notably more favourable to 
co-operation with the government, whilst militants from the 
Communist-led CGT wished the party to oppose the government's
economic policy. This conflict was recorded especially
during the public strikes in October-November 1988. 
According to The Times, the October 20 strike was the first 
since 1968 that saw the leaders of the CGT marching in the 
same protest with those of the moderate Force Ouviere.^^ 
Moreover, violent demonstrations were conducted outside the 
Hotel Matignon, on November 23, by miners from the 
impoverished eastern region of Lorraine.
Whereas all the union federations accepted the
government's offer of two catch-up pay raises, militant 
workers from the CGT, did not want to follow the calls of
the PCF elites for a compromise. Such a compromise was
considered necessary in order to form a pact with the 
reluctant Socialist elites for the local elections which were 
due in the spring of 1989. Unless they did compromise, they 
risked losing some of their few remaining sources of power 
and patronage in France's big towns. Additionally, the PCF 
elites assumed they had some tacit support from left-wing
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Socialists unhappy with Rocard's government. This was
especially significant in light of the letter's fear of
losing touch with the party base in the public sector and
teachers' unions, because, of 275 Socialist deputies, 115
32have a background in teaching.
Dissenting voices were also recorded inside the party.
In the first attempt by senior party members in more than 60
years to circulate a dissident publication inside the PC, a
new magazine - 'Reconstruction Communiste' - published in
December 1988, attacked the secretary-general, George 
33Marchais. This is not to say that those attacks were
simply the result of cooperation with Rocard's government. 
It is rather to stress that the events in Eastern Europe and 
the public sector unrest in France throughout the winter and 
spring of 1988-1989 - a sector where the CGT is particularly 
strong - were equally if not more important.
Perhaps of equal importance is the evolution of intra­
elite conflicts within the right-wing opposition parties. 
Given that numerous right-wing members, most notably, Raymond 
Barre, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Francois Leotard and Jacques 
Chirac, considered themselves candidates for the Presidency, 
it was hardly surprising that a division between the right- 
wing had evolved. The source of this division, 
organizational as well as ideological, manifested itself 
mainly as follows: (1) a break-away group from the centre-
right, namely, the UDC, (2) a split in the UDF between Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing who aimed at leading the centre-right in 
'constructive opposition' to Rocard, and Francois Leotard who
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favoured alliance with the neo-Gaullists Jacque Chirac.
During 1988-1990, therefore, new and existing factions
within the right-wing opposition parties had featured a
militant disposition. Firstly, in April 1989 a group of
young deputies, namely, the Renovateurs. emerged to challenge
the established leadership of the right-wing elites by
calling upon Giscard d'Estaing to relinquish his position at
the head of a joint UDF/RPR list for the June 1989 election
to the European Parliament. The faction failed to achieve
its goal but support for the Renovators had grown to include
3442 deputies and three senators.
Secondly, In February 1990 a faction in the RPR, led by 
Charles Pasqua, and the Renovator faction, led by Philip 
Seguin, challenged the RPR leadership by putting forward 
their own joint motion which obtained 31.4 per cent of the 
national congress vote.^^ This motion advocated a revival 
of nationalist Gaullist tradition to distinguish the RPR 
electorally from other right-wing parties and called for more 
party independence. Additionally, these dissenting RPR 
factions opposed the creation of the so-called Union Pour la 
France in November 1990, which was an umbrella organization 
for the RPR, UDF, and UDC designed to organise the 
opposition's electoral strategy for the regional elections in 
1992 and the legislative elections in 1993.
Attention now turns to the resolution of the above- 
mentioned internal conflicts. At the outset, Rocard's major 
goal was, naturally, to control the legislative's policy 
output. In other words, he was motivated to maximize the PS
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cohesion only to the extent that he could establish and 
maintain control over his party in Parliament. Cohesion at 
the price of control, therefore, defeated his purpose. 
Twofold strategy was, therefore, adopted in order to pacify 
the internal opposition within the PS. Firstly, dissenting 
voices which were raised within the parliamentary group did 
not trigger off a reaction from Rocard. Secondly, new 
factions were formed.
It was during such conflict situations that Rocard's 
style of leadership, negotiated consensus, became of the 
utmost importance in the resolution of the intra-elite 
conflict. Guy Carcassone, Rocard's legislative adviser, 
highlighted the first aspect of Rocard's strategy:
Naturally, some Socialists hardly accepted this new 
situation. But from time to time we let them present 
their own propositions without interfering. Generally 
they discover their inability to obtain a majority 
and call the government in rescue. This is certainly 
the best evidence of the fact that is we deal with other 
groups, it is not by pleasure or strategy but by 
mathematical necessity. However, it is true that Rocard 
has always been suspected of preferring a coalition with 
the Centrists to a coalition with the Communists (in 
fact, he would prefer no coalition at all if the PS were 
strong enough [...]) The reasonably good relations we
have with the first ones feed the suspicious. Yet, the
PS cannot but see that we also have reasonably good 
relations with the Communists and that we keep the 
balance [. . . ] And to any Socialist who would attack us 
on that matter, we would just ask for a better 
solution.
Clearly, Rocard assumed that the different factions would 
prefer to keep the Socialist Party in power despite the
informal alliance with the Communists and the Centrists,
rather than having a right-wing government.
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The second aspect of Rocard's strategy was the 
acceptance of the activities of new factions. As noted 
earlier, no consensus within the elite was reached in the 
party congress at Rennes. The battle was fuelled by Laurent 
Fabius and Lionel Jospin's personal ambition to be the best 
placed to step into President Mitterrand's shoes if and when, 
in the middle distance, he should step down. Division, 
thus, surfaced between the two which resulted in the break­
up of the Mitterrand faction into two clear factions. First, 
Mermaz, Jospin and Mauroy coluded in order to form the M.J.M. 
faction. Second, the Fabius's grouping which enjoyed 
Mitterrand's support throughout the party Congress, and the 
Poperen's grouping, remained within Mitterrand's faction 
but were operating independently. Of course, all the new 
and established factions were still operating alongside the 
other factions, namely, Rocard, Chevenement and Julian Dray's 
factions. Finally, after the factional split, a new list of 
deputies was drawn up in which each grouping had a fair share 
of the jobs.
Contrary to the successful resolution of the intra-elite 
conflicts within the PS, were the failures of both the UDC 
parliamentary group and the PCF to neutralize their internal 
opposition. For the former, the group leader, Pierre 
Mehaignerie, began shifting the UDC gradually back towards 
the RPR and the UDF, though this was not surprising in that 
it was already dependent upon them for the election of most 
of its deputies and councillors. Consequently, the ties
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between the Centrists and their right-wing allies were 
institutionalised by the creation of the RPR/UDF/UDC 
parliamentary intergroup, the Opposition Coordinating 
Committee, the appointment of Shadow Spokesmen on different 
policy areas and the special opposition debates on particular 
issues such as education, immigration and decentralisation.
For the Communists, the strikes at Finance, a strong 
movement at the PTT, the dissatisfaction among the teachers 
and the strike at Peugeot indicated an increasing popular 
discontent. As the party lacked internal channels through 
which it could mobilize the internal dissatisfaction, its 
elites were forced to modify the party's alliance strategy, 
i.e. to break-up the informal alliance with the PS.
To sum up, whereas intra-elite conflicts evolved within 
the PS and the UDC parliamentary group, elite-follower 
conflicts emerged within the PCF. Taking advantage of the 
weakly institutionalized features of his party, Rocard 
adopted a twofold strategy in order to pacify the internal 
opposition within the PS. Firstly, dissenting voices which 
were raised within the parliamentary group did not trigger 
off a reaction from Rocard. Secondly, new factions were 
formed. The UDC and the PCF elites, on the other hand, were 
forced to modify their alliance strategy in order to 
neutralize their internal dissatisfaction. The former, 
furthermore, formally cooperated with the right-wing 
opposition parties, namely, the UDF and the RPR.
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7.4 ROCARD'S PAY-OFF OF A CAUTIOUS TRADE-OFF
To understand the relatively high level of bargaining 
power possessed by the PS during 1988-1990, it is necessary 
to analyse the inter-party relationships in the bargaining 
plane. The passage of the 1989 and the 1990 Budgets provides 
an appropriate example. In France, there is not simply a 
single vote on the budget as a whole. Instead, there is a 
series of votes which determine the expenditure limits of 
each Ministry, ae well as votes on the income component of 
the budget and on the overall equilibrium level.
The passage of the 1989 budget is a classic example of a 
government's reliance on informal alliances. Negotiating 
each issue separately and on an ad hoc basis with the UDC and 
the PCF enabled the PS government to enjoy three advantages. 
Firstly, it could pick the least 'expensive' alliance partner 
available in policy terms. Secondly, it was able to escape 
any threats to its stability which might have followed a 
formal allliance. Thirdly, it avoided the use of Article 49- 
3 because it won the support on each vote of either the PCF 
or the UDC.
The government profited from this situation wherever 
possible by gaining the support of the PCF, or the UDC. As 
long as the Bills were politically moderate, either the PCF 
or the UDC (or even both RPR and the UDF) found themselves 
in situations where a mere refusal would be difficult to 
justify. Then, the government just had to deal with a few 
amendments which enabled the external support parties to
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argue that they have obtained some concessions improving the
Bill. Afterwards, either they voted for the text or they
refrained from voting, which was enough. Communist
abstention, for example, was reached over the education part
of the Budget in which increased expenditures was manifested,
while the UDC support was obtained for the employment part of
the budget as the Minister concerned, Jean-Pierre Soisson,
was an ouverture Minister. The government just had to keep
a constant balance between the two possibilities and was
doubly pleased to cooperate with these groups as it avoided
using Article 49-3. Guy Carcasson, thus, even summarized
this experience as a new sport in France, namely, 'the
37parliamentary slalom!'.
A comprehensive examination of the 1988 budget's
negotiation, conducted by John Huber, reveals four central
features of the bargaining amongst the government and its
informal partners: (i) there was no bargaining before the
bill was presented by the Government to the National
Assembly; (ii) there was no bargaining or compromise in the
Finance Committee; (iii) the Government used the rules of
legislative procedure to limit the importance of formal
amendment activity and debate on the floor, as well as to
shape voter perceptions of who should receive credit for
particular policy outcomes; and (iv) the only forum for
negotiating policy concessions was secret meetings between
the Government and the leaders of the 'pivot' parties after
3 8debate of the bill on the floor had began.
Undoubtedly, features i, ii, and iv were adopted because
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of the intra-party preoccupations of both the PS, the UDC 
parliamentary group and the PCF. The strategy of secrecy in 
the bargaining process, the reduction in the number of 
participants in the negotiation to the level of parliamentary 
group leaders, and the contraction of the bargaining plane 
(i.e. following the elimination of the Finance Committee as a 
bargaining arena), clearly suggest that the relevant elites 
aimed at minimizing internal dissatisfaction.
Such intra-party preoccupations were, of course, 
combined with electoral consideration. The PS, for example, 
could establish a public image of legislative independence 
whilst avoiding the cost of dividing the party by calming the 
fears of its deputies since the budget would not be voted 
strictly with the UDC. The latter, which was unsure how its 
strategy of 'constructive opposition' would play for the 
voters, could escape a deterioration of its image. 
Furthermore, as its deputies were elected through co­
operation with the UDF, the RPR and the UDC, it could avoid
39problems with the latter parties.
In any event, it seems that the definition of the
bargaining plane, as well as, the inter-party relationships
over the 1989 budget, were dominated by the PS. The minor
concessions which were recorded in that period examplifies
the argument. The income side of the 1989 budget, for
example, was passed by the National Assembly by a vote of
274 to 229, with the Centrists grouping and the Communists 
40abstaining. Whereas the support of the Centrists was won 
by an agreement to cut the top rate of value added tax to 28
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per cent from 3 3 per cent and a reduction in the taxe
professionelle. the abstention of the Communists was won by
reducing the housing tax on low-income families.
Any attempt to overemphasize the importance of these
concessions is bound to be undermined. Dominique Strauss-
Kahn, the President of the Finance Committee, explains the
nature of the inter-party relationships in the bargaining
arena as follows;
I don't think the government had to pay something, but 
sometimes it accepted amendments which were not in 
contradiction with what the government wanted. For 
instance, [in 1988] the government decided itself to 
decrease the taxe [professionelle], it was my own
proposal [...] So it's not really a price to pay.
It's just a kind of good manners. With the Communist 
[however] we had more difficult negotiation. Probably, 
you pay less price to the Centrists because they are 
less homogeneous than the Communists.
Clearly, this is not to say that the PCF and the UDC had no 
impact on the policy process and its outcomes. It is rather 
to stress that Lindblom's observation that all affected 
interests can have at least some influence in the policy
making process is v a l i d . T h e r e f o r e ,  the relative 
bargaining power of the PCF and the UDC parliamentary group 
did not lie in the ability to affect the outcome, but rather 
some outcomes were designed with consideration of their 
position or objection.
Attention now turns to the inter-party relationships 
over the 1990 budget. Given the extent of the intra-elite
conflicts within the PS and the UDC parliamentary group, and 
the elite-follower conflicts within the PCF, it was hardly
surprising that the government did not face the same options
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as it did in 1988. Both the PC and UDC groups made it clear
before even the first budgetary vote in September 1989 that
they were unwilling to support the government, thus forcing
the use of Article 49-3. For a time it appeared that the
gap might be bridged by conducting informal negotiation with
43the Communists, but after a short period it was clear 
that the concessions upon which the PCF insisted were
unacceptable and were designed to be so as not be seen to 
support the government on such an important text.
Added to the negative influences of the elite-follower 
conflicts within the PCF, was the UDC strategy of a formal 
alliance with their right-wing allies. Not surprisingly, it 
could also not be seen to support the government on such a 
critical division. Yet, since the UDC lost their impact as a 
single bargaining entity, following the intra-elite 
conflicts, one could expect dissensions over critical 
divisions. Indeed, this was the case on the first two
occasions where Article 49-3 was used to pass the Budget 
because several UDC deputies, notably, Raymond Barre, refused 
to censure the government. Consequently, on the other two 
occasions no censure motion was lodged by the opposition, 
thus avoiding any vote and any further embarrassing 
dissensions.
It is however misleading to contend that the break-up of 
the informal alliance undermined the PS bargaining power. At 
the outset, Rocard continued to use the two sides of his
'majorité stéréo', the PCF and the UDC, but, the use of 
Article 49-3 became more frequent. Whereas in the first year
dol
this article was used only three times, in the parliamentary
session of October-December 1989 it was used to pass four
44different Bills. In order to adopt to the lack of
forthcoming external support, a three fold strategy was 
initiated. Firstly, an attempt to weaken the internal
dissatisfaction during the passage of the 1990 Budget was 
recorded on several important fiscal issues, including an 
increase in the wealth tax where pressure from the PS group 
forced the government to accept amendments which it would not 
otherwise have done. Secondly, new electoral movement was 
launched. Thirdly, the government developed its contact
with the 19 independent deputies in an attenpt to enlarge its 
support base.
With regard to the second aspect, the government had
taken the first steps towards construcing a new alliance.
The launching of La France Unie. an electoral movement
founded by Jean-Pierre Soisson, was an attempt to build upon
ouverture and create a formal alliance with the centreground
of French politics. According to one of its members, Jean-
Marie Daillet,
He [Jean-Pierre Soisson] phoned me and told me; would 
you come along with me and try to organize the left- 
wing of the centre in order to counter balance the 
Socialists ?. The Socialists are in the middle of a 
big crisis [. . . ] they need a partner [...] We started 
with some 3 0 people; we have a list of MPs which are not 
very happy inside the party group which they belong to 
now; they could provide us with parliamentarians who 
could built up a new group right in the middle of the 
Assembly. It would be a very peculiar one. It will be 
very heterodox, almost incoherent. Still, there is a 
common line.for everyone; freedom of speech, freedom of 
vote [...].
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since it was a government initiative one might expect that 
the actual institutionalization of the movement as a 
parliamentary group or a political party would take place to 
ensure the government's survival should the need arise. By 
June 1990, for example, the few Senators and Deputies who 
rallied to this movement were sufficient to keep the 
government alive. Yet, as previously stressed, the stable 
position of the government during the period examined 
suggests that it intended to accelerate the 
institutionalization of the movement in the run up to a 
general election.
Additionally, the government developed its contact with 
the 19 independent deputies in an attempt to enlarge its 
support base. Whereas some of them, such as Bernard Tapie, 
were elected under the banner of the Presidential majority 
and rarely voted against the government, others had to be 
negotiated with and thus concessions had to be made in order 
to ensure the governmental majority over critical divisions.
Beyond the government's strategy to strengthen its 
parliamentary position. Article 49-3 and the political 
situation in which the Article operated also contributed to 
the relatively high level of bargaining power possessed by 
the PS. For the former, the government was able to legislate 
even though it lacke parliamentary majority. For the latter, 
it was clear that both the PCF and the UDC parliamentary 
group were unwilling to fight a general election as they 
sensed a poor performance. Thus, they were unwilling to join 
forces to bring the government down.
Finally, one might argue, of course, that there was also 
a price.to pay for the freguent use of Article 49-3 in terms 
of the weakness of the government and its majority. 
However, The government's electoral cost of invoking this 
Article can hardly be over emphasized since the PCF and the 
UDC refused to enter serious negotiations with the 
government.*^ In fact, this is an understatement. Both 
parties decided to make ideological and non-credible 
proposals in 1989. As the electoral costs of invoking the 
Article were already quite low, following the strategy of 
the opposition parties, the PS decided that the electoral 
benefits of avoiding an appearance of disunity outweighed the 
electoral costs of using the Article.
To sum up, the successful resolution of the intra-elite 
conflicts within the PS, Article 49-3 and the political 
situation in which the Article operated contributed to the 
superior position of the party in the parliamentary 
bargaining plane. On the other hand, the failure of the PCF 
to resolve the elite-follower conflicts internally was 
translated into an inferior position in the bargaining plane. 
During the period under examination, it was furthermore shown 
that the UDC parliamentary group could hardly be considered a 
single bargaining entity. The group was fragmented member by 
member, with very small groupings revolving around the few 
key ones. In light of these circumstances it is hardly
surprising that the failure of the UDC parliamentary group to 
pacify the internal opposition was translated to an inferior 
position in the bargaining plane.
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7.5 CONCLUSIONS
Throughout this chapter it was shown that the informal 
minority government amongst the PS, the PCF, and the UDC 
parliamentary group was the product of Mitterrand's strategy 
during the May 1988 Presidential election. It furthermore 
demonstrated that it was Mitterrand's theme of ouverture 
which determined Rocard's decisive preference of 'unity'. 
Indirectly, the type of the alliance and its participants 
were also a derived conseqence of adopting 'unity' as a 
decisive preference.
Regarding the evolution of internal conflicts, it was 
shown that intra-elite conflicts evolved within the PS and 
the UDC parliamentary group whereas elite-follower conflicts 
developed within the PCF, as a result of the informal 
minority government. It was demonstrated that in order to 
deal with these conflicts, the PS elites allowed dissenting 
voices to be raised within the PS parliamentary group, as 
well as the formation of new factions. The PCF elites, on 
the other hand, were forced to modify their alliance strategy 
in order to cope with militants' protest outside the party. 
Additionally, the UDC parliamentary group was forced to 
modify its alliance strategy and to reaffirm its position 
with the opposition in order to maintain its stability.
Finally, it was demonstrated that the successful 
resolution of the intra-elite conflicts within the weakly 
institutionalized party, Article 49-3 and the political
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situation in which the Article operated, were critical 
factors in obtaining a relatively high level of bargaining 
power. On the other hand, the failue of the highly 
institutionalized party to neutralize followers' hostility 
was translated into an inferior position in the parliamentary 
bargaining plane. It can be concluded, therefore, that an 
informal minority government, involving a highly 
institutionalized party which face internal conflicts, is 
bound to be relatively unstable as its party elites must 
modify their alliance strategy in order to maintain party 
cohesion.
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8. CONCLUSIONS: THE INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANT OF 
COALITIONAL BEHAVIOUR
The comparative study of minority governments in west 
European party systems has attempted to demonstrate that, 
although it is tempting to conclude, as Strom does, that 
minority governments would prefer purely ad hoc 
coalitions,^ the case cannot be made for an equivalent 
comparison when one breaks free from the assumption that a 
party is a unitary actor. It is instead a study of the 
impact of intra-party politics on a party's alliance strategy 
which provides a testable model suggesting that a formation 
of formal minority governments is the most attractive 
strategy for weakly institutionalized parties. The account 
of intra-party politics and minority governments in five west 
European party systems, furthermore, bears out this argument 
in detail. But, an extended view can emphasize the fact that 
our conclusion bore a direct impact on the study of 
coalition stability. Properly, the first priority must be to 
anticipate possible criticisms of the theoretical framework 
and to answer these with a restatement of its logic.
There are two varieties deserving particular attention. 
The first is the objection that the study focuses on intra­
party conflicts which emerge following an alliance. Other 
sources of conflicts, such as personal or opposition of 
principal, thus, are being neglected. A second claim
concerns two assumptions - namely, minimal size and minimal 
number of alliance's members - which are needed to be 
incorporated into the theoretical framework.
I — 7
For the former, intra-party conflict was strictly 
defined in the context of coalitional behaviour mainly 
because the focus of the thesis was on internal conflicts 
which emerge as a result of a party's coalitional behaviour. 
This is not to say that other sources of internal conflicts 
are less important. It is rather to stress that the 
organizational characteristics which significantly effect the 
elites' ability to neutralize internal dissatisfaction do not 
depend on the conflict's source. The arguments developed 
here and summarized in the first section of this chapter, 
thus, are valid whatever the source of the internal conflict 
is.
The second objection should be similarly evaluated in 
light of the thesis's logic. The advantage of loosely 
organized parties in pacifying internal dissatisfaction 
combined with the disadvantage of the rigid parties to 
perform the same task, seem relevant whatever the size of a 
coalition is. The size of an alliance (i.e. whether minority 
or majority status), however, might effect the likelihood of 
such conflicts, as well as their intensity and extent. Yet, 
the analysis does not aim at predicting the evolution of 
internal conflicts. On the contrary, all the hypotheses 
(except of the conclusion concerning a highly 
institutionalized party which occupy a governmental position) 
are conditioned by the evolution of intra-party conflicts. 
Once such conflicts occur, whatever the size of the 
coalition, one can rely on the insight of the thesis in order 
to predict a party's bargaining power.
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A classic example of the applicability of our model to
majority coalitions is the Grand Coalition of the CDU/CSU and
SPD during 1966-1969 in the West German polity. Given the
2
highly institutionalized features of the latter party, it
is hardly surprising that elite-follower conflicts which
emerged were manifested by dissenting voices outside the
party. According to Padgett and Burkett,
A storm of protest followed. The party headquarter was 
deluged by telegrams, street demonstrations abounded as 
disgruntled voters asked Brandt to give them back their 
votes, and Gunter Grass warned that radicals would turn 
elsewhere for their protest. Where they turned was to 
the NPD on the right and to the 'APO' (extraparliamenta 
ry opposition) on the streets. During the next three 
years there were scenes reminiscent of Weimar as the 
young, the radical and the dissident left took to the 
streets [...].
The inability of the SPD to neutralize its followers' 
hostility was translated into an inferior position in the 
parliamentary bargaining arena. The SPD Minister of Economic 
Affairs launched Keynesian pump-priming programme to rescue 
the economy, rather than any socialist program of income
4
distribution or nationalization of industry. The fact
that the Grand Coalition lasted for only three years whereas 
coalitions of one of the big parties with the FDP have 
prevailed, furthermore, emphasizes the uneasy alliance of the 
SPD with the CDU/CSU.
The objection concerning the second assumption (namely, 
minimal number of coalition members), on the other hand, is 
of utmost relevancy in the discussion concerning the 
institutional determinant of coalition stability presented in 
the second section. This assumption provides the basis
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upon which it can be argued that a coalition which involves 
highly and weakly institutionalized partners is most likely 
to be relatively unstable, whereas a formal alliance 
comprised of weakly institutionalized parties or an informal 
alliance which involves a highly institutionalized party 
which occupy a governmental position, are most likely to be 
relatively stable. To begin with a summary of the thesis's 
arguments is the first business.
8.1 THE DYNAMICS OF MINORITY RULE
The concern of the preceding chapters has been to deal 
with political parties as complex organizations and to strike 
a middle course, between non-comparison and overabstraction, 
by applying a theoretical model to a relatively large number 
of cases in different party systems. Political conflicts, 
it was argued, are to be seen essentially as bargaining 
situations. Political parties in multi-party systems face a 
bargaining problem which refers to the need for party elites 
to reach some settlement in parliament, but, at the same 
time, the wish to settle on terms favourable to themselves.
The bargaining problem indicates that the fundamental 
relationships considered here are those between intra-party 
conflict and a party's bargaining power, and their effect on 
the party's alliance strategy. With a practicable political 
context for the formation of alliance strategy, it was 
further argued that party institutionalization is an 
intervening variable, as intra-party relationships are mainly
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matters of manageability, rather than solely a matter of 
democracy. In other words, party institutionalization and 
the nature of intra-party conflict affect the party's 
bargaining power in the parliamentary arena.
Intuitively, it is tempting to accept Groenning and 
Panebianco's argument that the more centralized parties are, 
the stronger they are as coalition actors.^ However, the 
thesis suggested that the value of the institutional 
mechanisms to mobilize internal dissatisfaction have been 
underestimated by both scholars. At the heart of the 
dissertation's strategy lies the notion that it is the weakly 
institutionalized parties that are characterized by diffused 
mechanisms for internal dissent, as well as the ability to 
establish new mechanisms. Therefore, as long as dissenting 
activities take place within those channels, the weakly 
institutionalized parties tend to possess more defences with 
respect to internal challenges than highly institutionalized 
parties.
It is important at this point to reiterate the status of 
those explanatory generalizations about to be made. They 
do not claim, nor are they designed to imply, a general 
theory of European minority governments. They are de facto 
generalizations, to be assumed as relevant mainly to the 
cases examined here within the period chosen. It is 
,furthermore, an addition to the modest stock of systematic 
middle-level observations with appropriate theoretical
formulations.
The central de facto generalization pursued over the
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foregoing pages, 'the dynamics of minority rule', the thesis 
of which now merits a recapitulation: that in multi-party
systems within which minority situations occur, a formation 
of formal minority governments is the most attractive
strategy for a weakly institutionalized party whereas a 
formation of informal minority governments is the most 
attractive strategy for a highly institutionalized party 
which occupies a governmental position. But is, in fact, the 
case made? Is the generalization valid which claims that the 
bargaining power of the party elites in the parliamentary
arena is a function of their ability to neutralize internal 
opposition?
An affirmative answer begins with a return to the 
arguments, presented in the empirical-based sections. Table
8.1 presents four groupings of parties which differ in the 
way intra-party conflicts were manifested and resolved, as 
well as, the derived consequences in terms of bargaining 
power. Whereas intra-elite opposition within the weakly 
institutionalized parties pursued onlv the voice option 
within party bodies and the parliament, such an opposition 
within highly institutionalized parties adopted the exit 
option, as well as the voice mode within party bodies.
Additionally, whereas followers' hostility within weakly 
institutionalized parties adopted the voice option, such an 
opposition within highly institutionalized parties pursued 
the exit option, as well as, the voice alternative outside 
the party.
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Figure 8.l Patterns of Intra-party Conflicts, Party 
Institutionalization and Bargaining Power
Party Institutionalization 
High weak
Type of
Intra-Party
Conflict
intra­
elite
SD (Ten.) 1978-79 
SP (Nor.) 1985-86 
SP (Nor.) 1989-90
VOICE + EXIT 
BP -
Lab(U.K.) 1977-78 
DC (Ita.) 1976-79 
PS (Fra.) 1988-90 
RV (Den.) 1988-90
VOICE 
BP +
elite- PCI (Ita.) 1976-79 Lib.(U.K.) 1977-78
follower PCF (Fra.) 1988-90
VOICE (outside the
party) + EXIT VOICE
BP - - BP 4-
Additionally, the argument that top party elites tend to 
exert greater influence on elite members than on party 
activists was especially visible in the highly 
institutionalized context. In this setting, whereas voices 
were manifested internally in cases of intra-elite conflicts, 
this option was evident outside the party in cases of elite- 
follower conflicts. In other words, the party elites found 
it perhaps impossible to control followers' dissatisfaction 
due to the lack of mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent.
In the weakly institutionalized setting, the above 
argument is not valid because the thesis investigated only 
one case of elite-follower conflict. Still, voices were 
manifested internally whatever the type of the conflict was.
263
It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that within a 
weakly institutionalized context, the control of the party 
elites on their members and followers was dependent to a 
large extent on their ability to mobilize internal 
dissatisfaction through the internal network, rather than 
their control on the distribution of 'selective incentives'. 
Within a highly institutionalized context, an opposite trend 
seems to be the case.
With regard to the elites' ability to neutralize 
internal dissatisfaction it was shown that whereas weakly 
institutionalized parties had resolved the conflict 
internally without having to modify their alliance strategy, 
highly institutionalized parties failed to pacify internal 
opposition without changing their coalitional behaviour. 
The existence of mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent 
seems a critical factor which contributed to the above 
process. Dissenting activities within weakly instituionalized 
parties did not trigger off elites' reaction. Party elites 
could rely on the assumption that the support of their 
members over critical divisions is forthcoming.
A different picture was evident in the case of highly 
institutionalized parties. In order to cope with intra-party 
dissatisfaction, party elites adopted a multi-stage strategy. 
Firstly, structural constraints were imposed on the day-to- 
day operation of the government. The Danish case (SD, 1977- 
78) and the Norwegian one (SP, 1985-86, 1989-90) spring 
immediately to mind. Different tactics were adopted by the 
Italian Communist Party. It established a transitional
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period before a formal alliance was formed, as well as 
initiating an 'explanatory pedagogy' and an 'articulation of 
ends'. Secondly, all the highly institutionalized parties 
under investigation finally modified their alliance strategy 
in order to maintain party cohesion and stability. In other 
words, these elites failed to pacify the internal 
dissatisfaction without changing their alliance strategy.
Attention now turns to the relative bargaining power 
possessed by the parties in the different groupings. It 
will be recalled that the advantage of the weakly 
institutionalized parties was rooted in their organizational 
weakness. The existence of mechanisms for the diffusion of 
dissent significantly improved their ability to cope with 
internal challenges. Not surprisingly, their advantage was 
translated into a superior position in the parliamentary 
bargaining plane.
The highly institutionalized parties, on the other hand, 
were significantly affected by the lack of such mechanisms. 
Their inability to pacify internal dissatisfaction was 
translated into an inferior position in the parliamentary 
bargaining plane. This is not to say that these parties 
lacked impact on the policy process and its outcomes. On the 
contrary, Lindblom's observation, that all affected interests 
can have at least some influence in the policy-making 
process, appears to be valid.^ However, the bargaining 
power of those parties did not lie in their ability to effect 
the outcome. Rather, some outcomes were designed with 
consideration of their positions.
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An additional constraint on the operation of such 
parties was the evolution of followers' dissatisfaction which 
was manifested mainly outside the party. Highly
institutionalized parties which faced such an opposition had 
to change their alliance strategy immediately. The general 
strike of the metal workers at the end of 1977, as a result 
of the co-operation of the PCI with the DC, and the violent 
demonstration by CGT members, as a result of the co-operation 
between the PCF and the PS over the 1989 Budget, contributed 
to the decision of the PCI and the PCF to modify their 
alliance strategy. The immediate change in PCF and the
PCI's alliance strategy indicates the extremely low level of 
bargaining power possessed by the party elites.
A different presentation of the above-mentioned 
conclusions, provides a better insight on the preferable 
strategies of parties in minority situations. Table 8.2 
presents four groupings of highly institutionalized parties 
according to two dimensions; their parliamentary position and 
the type of alliance they pursued. A comparison amongst the 
four groups reveals that highly instituionalized parties in 
a governmental position which form informal minority 
governments tend to possess a relatively high level of 
bargaining power. On the other hand, whenever such parties 
form formal minority governments, they tend to possess a 
relatively low level of bargaining power.
A substantial reason behind this conclusion probably 
lies in the fact that intra-party conflicts seem less likely
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Figure 8.2 Bargaining Power of Highly Institutionalized
----------  Parties during coalitional Behaviour
Parliamentary Position 
Government External Support
Type of
Inter-Party
Relationships
formal
SD (Den.) 
SP (Nor.)
BP -
1978-79
1985-86
1989-90
PCI (Ita.) 
BP -
1978-79
informal
SD (Den.) 
DNA (Nor. 
BP +
1975-78 
1979-82 
)1976-81 
1986-89
PCF
PCI
(Fra.) 
(Ita.)
BP -
1988-90
1976-78
to occur as a result of informal alliances and the control 
of the highly institutionalized parties over ministerial 
portfolios (i.e. policy formation and implementation). By 
avoiding formal alliances, such parties minimize potential 
conflicts, as well as maximize their policy gains. 
Negotiating each issue separately and on an ad hoc basis 
enables highly institutionalized parties to select the least 
'expensive' alliance partner available. 'Expensive' refers 
to both the threat a partner might pose to their stability, 
and to its policy demands.
With regard to the relative bargaining power possessed 
by the weakly institutionalized parties under examination. 
Table 8.3 presents three groupings over the same dimensions 
presented above. At the outset, no cases of weakly 
institutionalized parties which provide an informal external
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Figure 8.3 Bargaining Power of Weakly Institutionalized
----------  Parties during coalitional Behaviour
Parliamentary Position 
Government External Support
formal
Type of 
Inter-Party
CP (Nor.)
Lab(U.K.) 
DC (Ita.) 
RV (Den.) 
BP +
1985-86
1989-90
1977-78
1976-79
1988-90
Lib.(U.K.) 1977-78 
BP +
Relationships PS (Fra.) 1988-90
informal
BP +
NA
support were examined. Only one case was examined in each of 
the following categories: informal alliance/external support 
and formal alliance/government. However, a comparison of the 
three groups reveals no clear differences in terms of the 
relative bargaining power possessed by those parties. All 
the weakly institutionalized parties under investigation 
possessed a relatively high level of bargaining power over, 
at least, one of their desicive preferences.
A substantial reason behind this conclusion lies in the 
flexibility of such parties in terms of their ability to 
pacify and neutralize internal dissatisfaction without 
modifying their alliance strategy. The source of this 
flexibilty seems to be primarily structural. The existence 
of mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent enables the party 
elites to mobilize and control internal opposition. Such an
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advantage is immediately translated into a superior position 
in the parliamentary bargaining arena.
The above-mentioned conclusions raise two basic 
questions, as follows: (i) Why do some highly
institutionalized parties form formal alliances?, and (ii) 
Why do some weakly institutionalized parties form informal 
alliances?. For the former, highly institutionalized anti­
system or protest parties might seek legitimacy through a 
formal alliance with a governmental party (PCI, 1976-1979). 
Additionally, a highly institutionalized party which occupies 
a governmental position might be willing to commit itself to 
formal co-operation in order to 'share' the 'burden' of
economic crisis (SD, 1978-1979).
Regarding weakly institutionalized parties, an informal 
alliance might be the plausible strategy to be implemented by 
a new party which would like to avoid being identified (in 
ideological terms) with a governmental party. A classic 
example is the informal alliance between the new Democratic 
Renewal Party and the Social Democratic Party in Portugal 
during 1985-1987. Additionally, a 'bad' past experience of 
co-operation might lead to the formation of an informal
alliance. This reason seems most relevant in the case of the 
external support provided by the Socialist Party to the
Social Democrats in Portugal during 1985-1987, as a result of
the 'turbulent' co-operation amongst both parties during 
1983-1985. Another case is when a parliamentary situation 
enables a weakly institutionalized party to take for granted 
the external support of other weakly institutionalized
25y
parties. A classic example is the relationship between the 
CPP-V-RV government and the external support parties, CD and 
the KrF, in Denmark during 1989-1990.
Up to now, the thesis has established that intra-party 
conflicts bore a direct impact on a party's alliance strategy 
in minority situations. The interesting question is what 
this conclusion really entails? Is it restricted to the 
realm of minority governments or does it bear an impact on 
other aspects of coalition behaviour? In the next section, 
the thesis demonstrates the relevancy of its findings to the 
study of coalition stability by comparing the duration of the 
minority governments under study according to their 
composition and the degree of formality.
8.2 THE INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANT OF COALITION STABILITY
The idea this study raises at the final stage of the 
analysis is that there is a need for scholars of cabinet 
durability to concern themselves with party attributes. 
Cabinet durability - the length of time an incumbent cabinet 
government survives in office without an election, 
government's resignation and changes in party membership of 
cabinet or Prime Minister - has long being viewed as a
7
critical indicator of coalition maintenance. Several 
approaches have been suggested as factors affecting cabinet 
durability.
The 'regime attributes' approach has concentrated on the 
relationship between cabinet stability and a number of
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features of the political system in general, such as the
o
'size' or fragmentation of the party system. Another
tradition, the 'coalition attributes' approach, looks at
properties of particular coalitions that might contribute to 
their stability, the most obvious of which is majority
9
status. A third possibility is to look at the structure
of the bargaining system within which coalitions must
e x i s t . A  more recent attempt, the 'events' approach,
takes into account the fact that the actual downfall of a
cabinet is typically the product of a particular 'critical'
or 'terminal' event that is liable to occur at any time
during its life.^^
Undoubtedly, it was Paul Warwick's study of cabinet
durability which has achieved the most interesting 
12result. Warwick reported that approximately 50 per cent
of the variance in cabinet duration is explained by the
conjunction of the independent variable; cabinet majority 
status, number of governing parties, minimal winning cabinet 
status, and an index of ideological cleavage among cabinet 
a c t o r s . H o w e v e r ,  a large number of above-mentioned
models, which are based on structural variables, failed to 
improve upon prediction of cabinet duration. This, in turn, 
leads to the assertion that while such factors may contribute 
substantially to some coalition processes of formation and 
payoffs allocation, they should not be expected to 
significantly affect cabinet durability.
At this stage, the thesis suggests an alternative 
explanation for cabinet durability, namely 'party
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attributes'. To understand how party attributes affect 
coalition stability, it is necessary to assume a minimal 
number of members in political coalitions. Arguing along 
this basic assumption, any change in a party's alliance 
strategy should affect the status of the coalition.
As noted in the first section, two types of alliances, 
involving different mixture of party attributes, were found 
to be relatively immunized against the negative influences of 
internal conflicts (i.e. in terms of the need of party elites 
to modify alliance strategy). Firstly, formal alliances 
amongst weakly institutionalized parties were found to be 
relatively effective in minimizing party disunity. 
Secondly, informal alliances which involved highly 
institutionalized parties occupying a governmental position 
were found to be relatively effective in deterring internal 
conflicts.
At the opposing extreme, formal alliances amongst weakly 
and highly institutionalized parties were found to be much 
less effective in minimzing party disunity. In fact, this in 
an understatement. All the case studies under examination, 
which involved such alliances, were bound to destabilize the 
highly institutionalized partner. The failure of all those 
party elites to neutralize internal dissatisfaction, finally, 
led to a modification of the party's alliance strategy.
Further research can therefore examine the following set 
of hypotheses: (i) informal alliances which involve highly 
institutionalized parties occuping a governmental position, 
as well as formal alliances amongst weakly institutionalized
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parties are most likely to be relatively durable, and (ii) 
formal alliances between highly and weakly
institutionalized parties are most likely to be short-lived 
co-operations.
These hypotheses derive from the thesis' conclusion
which contradicts a well-known theory of minority government
which suggests that formal external support agreements are
the least attractive legislative strategy for minority
14governments that want to maximize their policy influence. 
This theory is based on the assumption that a party is a 
unitary actor. Viewing a party as a complex organization, 
however, reveals a different picture. The preceeding 
chapters demonstrated that Strom's theory cannot be applied 
to cases which involves weakly institutionalized parties. 
Weakly institutionalized parties which coalesced formally 
were proved to be able to pacify internal dissatifaction, and 
at the same time, to possess a relatively high level of 
bargaining power.
At this stage one may raise the following question: 
Does 'ideology' matter in coalition stability? Some 
theorists have identified the degree of preference agreement 
among some set of actors as decisive in determining the 
outcome of coalition stability. The basic notion of 'closed 
coalition', i.e. that coalition is predicted to form which is 
winning and in which all members are adjacent on some 
dimension of preference, has been raised by De Swaan.^^ 
Perhaps the most important variation which has been imposed 
upon this basic concept is Axelrod's notion of the 'Minimal
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Connected Winning Coalition'. This is a coalition which 
meets the following criteria: (1) winning, (2 ) connected, in
the sense that all members are adjacent on an affinity 
(policy) scale, and (3) minimal in the sense that is contains 
no more members than are necessary for a closed coalition to 
win.
A contradictory argument concerning the ideological- 
incompatibility amongst coalition members, was suggested by 
P a n e b i a n c o . B a s e d  on the view that an environment with 
competitors (i.e. ideologically similar) is complex and 
therefore unpredictable, he argued that an alliance between 
two competing parties is likely to threaten both parties' 
identity. The paradoxical effect - contradicting Axelrod and 
De Swaan's theory of coalitions - is that the most stable 
alliance take place among opponents (i.e. ideologically 
distant) while the least stable takes place among 
competitors.
Throughout the preceeding chapters, 'ideology' was taken 
to signify an issue which is a target for activity by intra­
party opposition. 'Ideology', therefore, was analysed as a 
mean in the power struggle within a party. By raising an 
ideological issue, one could expect dissatisfied party 
members to organize themseves around the matter. Party 
elites and members could use or take advantage of 'ideology' 
so as to improve both the degree and efficiency of the 
mobilization effort, as well as to consolidate their own 
power positions. Not surprisingly, the thesis found out that 
most of the internal conflicts under investigation had been
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evolved over matters of 'ideology'.
With regard to ideological compatibility/incompatibility
of alliance members, it is important to recognize that this
factor may depend upon the circumstances. In a given time, a
party's decisive preference may be compatible with its
partner's decisive preference, although both are diverging
with respect to all other policies. The PCI-DC alliance
during 1976-79 in the Italian polity and the SD-V alliance
during 1978-79 in the Danish polity suffice to underline this
point. Therefore, one must not think - as Axelrod and
Panebianco do - of ideological incompatibility in an absolute
or fixed sense.
Other explanation of governmental stability have focused
on the presence of anti-system or other 'extreme' parties.
Powell's comprehensive study, for example, suggested that the
strength of extremist parties is the major explanation of
18executive instability. It plays the major role in
linking ethnicity and electoral law to executive instability.
Similarly, Sartori argued that the presence of extremist
parties has a destabilizing effect on the overall political 
19system.
In light of the thesis, the above observations deserve 
modification. Destabilizing effects within the extremist 
party, as well as the party system, are most likely to occur 
under the following conditions: (i) the party is
characterized by highly institutionalized features, (ii) the 
party does not occupy a governmental position, and (iii) the 
party forms formal or informal alliances. The PCI strategy
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and its intra- and inter-party consequences during 1976-1979
in the Italian polity springs to mind. Another example of a
highly institutionalized party which disintegrated as a
result of its coalitional behaviour - the SF - was recorded
20in Denmark during 1966-1968. Any change in these
conditions however is less likely to be manifested in 
executive stability and destabilizing effects in the party 
systems. The Eshkol IV government during 1967-1969 in the 
Israeli polity, which comprised of an highly 
institutionalized, anti-system party (namely, Gahal) is a 
classic example of a relatively stable government in Israeli 
terms.
Finally, the above discussion of the institutional 
determinants in coalition stability leaves us with a 
surprisingly favourable impression of specific types of 
alliances. To be sure, minority situations tend to cause 
internal conflicts due to the complex process of constructing 
legislative majorities and the probable co-operation with 
untraditional partners. Yet, weakly institutionalized 
parties which form formal alliances and highly 
institutionalized parties which form informal alliances 
whilst occuping a governmental position enjoy substantial 
advantages in terms of bargaining power and are likely to 
maintain a relatively stable alliance. Clearly, other 
alliances are in most respects inferior to the above- 
mentioned alliances.
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8.3 CLOSING THE LACUNA OF COALITIONAL BEHAVIOUR
During the late 198 0s, a 'revolution' in the study of 
minority governments and intra-party politics was evident. 
Such a revolution just leaves us with a new beginning - it 
has to be followed up and made to bear fruit. The aim of 
this thesis was to raise new promises and to backed them with 
an appropriate theoretical framework. Furthermore, the use 
of a cross-national perspective was fundamental to the 
thesis' strategy. Beyond the genuine interest in the 
relationships between intra-party politics and coalitional 
behaviour, the choice of the Danish, Norwegian, Italian, 
British and the French cases was motivated by the desire to 
demonstrate the utility of middle-level comparison.
The dynamics of minority rule is therefore a 
generalization of resolutely modest ambition; it is not 
presumed to apply to parties beyond its geographic and 
temporal limits. Yet a determination to delimit the thesis' 
conclusions does not eliminate the possibility that its 
approach would be equally illuminating when applied to 
another cross-national assortment of cases. The conclusions, 
which aim at contributing to the field of coalitional 
behaviour, were formulated in general terms. The attempt to 
close the lacuna of coalitional behaviour, in fact, might 
well be helped by the core argument developed here which was 
examined by a core method (i.e. cross-national comparison). 
The thesis, therefore, tries to avoid the sterile 
abstraction inherent in universal comparison in search of
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law-like generalizations, without simultaneously accepting 
the chaos of a comparative school consisting primarily of 
one-nation expertise.
In all of these studies far greater stress could be 
placed on parties as complex organizations. Ultimately, it 
is absurd to explain the behaviour of any party by 
abstracting it from the changing social reality in which it 
operates. However, it is equally important for the student 
of parties to appropriate a measure of autonomy from the 
society around it. A substantial view underlying this study 
was that although parties are constrained constitutionally 
and socially by popular sentiment and cleavage structure, 
they are regularly able to exercise a significant degree of 
political independence. The thesis also accepts the notion 
that party behaviour stems from the independence of its 
elites as bargaining actors.
A focus on political parties as organizations in the 
study of coalitional behaviour, which deemphasizes the 
'rational actor' assumptions still so prevalent in the field, 
would discard their continued characterisation as office- 
seeking players. It would judge the internal dynamics of 
political parties as themselves influential to the outcome of 
political processes. While it would not of necessity have to 
proceed from the standpoint of party institutionalization, a 
detailed knowledge of any party elites' perception of their 
political mandate over time and their emphasis on certain 
political goods over others could contribute to a more subtle 
understanding of these dynamics. Plausible explanations
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concerning why parties do not appear to respond to certain 
coalition pressures, despite the penalties that apparent 
passiveness entails, and yet exhibit remarkable sensitivity 
to other demands, regardless of their limited policy 
benefits, might well result from the effort.
Lastly, in carrying through this project, the principal 
intention has not been to present only another study of 
coalitions in Western Europe but rather to attempt something 
more ambitious by taking a fresh look at coalition politics 
from an intra-party perspective. Inevitably, in view of the 
complexities of the subject, such an approach has to be 
inductive in its methodological design. The reliance on the 
method of elite interviewing has enabled us to relate 
internal conflict, which were manifested formally, as well as 
strifes which occured behind 'closed doors', to coalitional 
behaviour. Yet, the logic of inguiry was deductive in 
nature. After the model was constructed, the field research 
began. If one takes into consideration this research 
strategy, as well as the scope of the analysis, one must 
first of all adjust to the loneliness of the undertaking.
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Appendix 2.1
Oppositional influence by country
No. of 
Cou;ntry committees
Specia­
lization
Corres­
pondence
Member­
ship Chairs
Overall
value
Belgium + + + - + 4
Caniada + + + - - 3
Denmark + + + - - 3
Finland + + - - 3
France + + + + - 4
Iceland + + + + - 4
Ireland - - - - + 1
Israel - + - - + 2
Italy + + + + - 4
Netherlands + - + - - 2
Norway + + + + + 5
Portugal + + + — + 4
Spain + + + - - 3
Sweiden + + + - + 4
United
Ki;ngdom + 1
Source : Strom, K. Minority Government and Maioritv Rule.
(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 73.
Appendix 2.2
Electoral decisiveness by country
Country Identiflability Volatility Responsiveness Proximity
Belgium .10 . 08 .58 .48
Canada 1.00 .20 .76 .82
Denmark .76 . 12 .63 .65
Finland .00 . 08 .54 .37
France .00 . 18 .47 .14
Iceland .59 . 10 .51 .69
Ireland .87 . 08 .86 .77
Israel .14 . 14 .44 .38
Italy .12 .09 .47 .23
Netherlands .00 . 08 .47 .68
Norway .83 .10 .69 .52
Portugal .50 . 16 .56 .41
Spain .50 .21 .80 .80
Sweden 1.00 . 06 .45 .62
United
Kingdom 1.00 . 07 .94 .75
Source: Strom, K. Minority Government and Maioritv Rule. 
(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 75.
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Appendix 2.3 
List of elite interviewing
Ital:y
1. Alessandro Natta, PCI, President of the parliamentary 
group.
2. Giorgio Napolitano, PCI, Member of Parliament.
3. Gianni Cervetty, PCI, Member of Parliament.
4. Giovanni Berlinguer, PCI, Member of Parliament.
5. Flaminio Piccoli, DC, President of the Parliamentary 
group.
6 . Gerardo Bianco, DC, Member of Parliament.
7. Luigi Gui, DC, Minister of Interior 1974-1976.
8 . Mario Segni, DC, Member of Parliament.
9. Raffaele Valensis, MSI, Member of Parliament.
10. Francessco Giulio Baghino, MSI, Member of Parliament.
11. Giovanni Malagodi, PLI, Member of Parliament.
12. Luigi Preti, PSDI, President of the parliamentary group
13. Alberto Ciampaglia, PSDI, Member of Parliament.
14. Matteo Matteotti, PSDI, Member of Parliament.
15. Silvano Labriola, PSI, Member of Parliament.
16. Giorgio La Haifa, PRI, Member of Parliament.
Norway
1. Surlien Rakel, SP, Minister of Environment 1983-1986.
2. Ragnhild Queseth Haarstad, SP, Member of Storting.
3. Alice Ruud, V, party secretary 1980-1986.
4. Tor Mikkel Wara, FrP, Member of Storting.
5. Lars Roar Langslet, CP, Minister of Cultural Affairs 
1981-1986
6 . Oddrun Pettersen, DNA, Member of Storting.
7. Bjorn Tore Godal, DNA, Member of Storting.
8 . Sissel Ronbeck, DNA, Minister of Environment 1986-1989
9. Jens Holvard Bratz, CP, Minister of Industry 1981-1985
10. Carl I. Hagen, FrP, party leader.
11. Jen Simonsen, FrP, Member of Storting.
12. Anne Enger Lahnstein, SP, parliamentary group leader 
1986-1990.
13. Kare Willoch, CP, Prime Minister 1981-1986.
14. Svein Gronnern, CP, party secretary.
15. Hans J. Rosjorde, FrP, Member of Storting.
16. Tora A. Houg, SV, Member of Storting.
17. Willian Engseth, DNA, Minister of Municipal and Labour 
Affairs 1988-1989.
18. Jon Lilletun, KrF, Member of Storting.
19. Einar Forde, DNA, parliamentary leader 1981-1989.
20. Jo Benkow, CP, President of the Storting.
21. Per Ditlev-Simonsen, CP, Minister of Defence 1989-1990.
yj
22. Anders Aune, FFF, Member of Storting.
23. Ole Gabriel Ueland, SP, Member of Storting.
24. Theo Koritzinski, SV, Member of Storting.
25. Arne Synnes, KrF, head of parliamentary Secretariat.
26. Svein Sundsbo, SP, Minister of Agriculture 1985-1986
27. Thor E. Gulbrandsen, DNA, Member of Storting.
28. Hanna Kvanmo, SV, party leader 1976-1989.
29. Fridtjof F. Gundersen, FrP Member of Storting.
30. Per-Kristian Foss, CP, Member of Parliament.
31. Gunnar Berge, DNA, Finance Minister 1986-1989.
32. Oddmund H. Hammerstad, CP, Member of Storting.
33. Lise Enger Gjorv, DNA, Member of Storting.
34. Odvar Nordli, DNA, Prime Minister 1976-1981.
35. Inge Staldvik, DNA, Member of Storting.
36. Egil Sundar, editor of Aftenposten 1975-1989.
37. Kirsti Kolle Grondahl, DNA, Minister of Religious 
Affairs and Education 1986-1989.
38. Royseland Borghild, KrF Member of Storting.
39. John Dale, SP party secretary.
The U.K.
1. Willian Rodgers, Lab., Transport Secretary 1976-1979.
2. Harold Laver, Lab., Member of the House of Lords.
3. John Smith, Lab., Member of the House of Commons.
4. Lord Mackie, Lib., Member of the House of Lords.
5. John Frazer, Lab., Member of the House of Commons.
6 . Russell Johnston, Lib., Member of the House of Commons.
7. Teddy Taylor, Con., Member of the House of Commons.
8 . James Cornford, policy adviser. The Liberal Party.
9. Albert Booth, Lab., Employment Secretary 1976-1979.
10. John Morris, Cons., Member of the House of Commons.
11. John Pardoe, Lib., Economic Spokesman.
12. Andrew Gifford, Lib., Party leader's asssistant.
13. Merlyn Rees, Lab., Member of the House of Commons.
14. Lord Hooson, Lib., Member of the House of Lords.
15. George Robertson, Lab., Member of the House of Commons.
16. Tom McNally, Lab, Callaghan's privet secretary.
17. Denis Howell, Lab., Member of the House of Commons.
18. Alan Baith, Lib., Liberal's Chief Whip.
19. Jack Jones, TUC leader 1976-1979.
20. Timothy Raison, Con., Member of the House of Commons.
21. Richard Holme, An adviser of the Liberal party leader.
22. James Gardiner, Con., Member of the House of Commons.
23. James Molyneaux, Ulster Unioninst, Party leader.
24. Baroness Sear, Lib., Member of the House of Lords.
25. David Owen, Lab., Member of the House of Commons.
26. James Prior, Con., Member of the House of Lords.
27. James Lamond, Lab., Member of the House of Commons.
28. Lord Donoghou, Head of Labour's thinktank.
29. Stan Orme, Lab., Social Security Secretary 1976-1979.
30. Peter Shore, Lab., Environment Secretary 1976-1979.
ôdo
Denmark
1. Ahm Agner, Political Editor, 'Politiken'.
2. Benke Kim, FrP, Member of Folketing.
3. Bennedsen Dorte, SO former minister of education, 1978- 
1982.
4. Buksti A. Jacob, SO, head of the economic research 
department.
5. Christensen Arne, V, former minister of commerce, 1977- 
1978.
6 . Dam Hans, editor, Berlingske Tidende.
7. Dybkjaer Lone, RV, minister of environment, 1988-
8 . Elizabeth Arnold, RV, member of Folketing.
9. Elmquist Bjorn, V, member of Folketing.
10. Engaard Knud, V, former minister of interior, 1978-1979, 
1986-1988, former minister of energy, 1982-1986, former 
minister of economic affairs 1987-1988, minister of 
defence 1988-
11. Erling Olsen, SD, former minister of housing, 1977-1982.
12. Estrup Jargan, RV, member of Folketing.
13. Frandsen Aage, SF, member of Folketing.
14. Gade Steen, SF, member of Folketing.
15. Glistrup Mogens, FrP, former leader 1972-1988.
16. Glonborg Knud, KrF, member of Folketing.
17. Gredal Eva, SD, former minister of social affairs 1975- 
1977.
18. Grove Henning, GPP, former minister of fisheries, 1982- 
1986.
19. Hansen Bent, SD, former chief editor of the SD daily 
newspaper 'Aktuelt', former minister of social affairs 
1982.
20. Hansen Jens Kristian, SD, former minister of public 
works,1982
21. Helveg-Petersen Niels, RV, leader, minister of economic 
affair, 1988-1990
22. Herman Leif, SF, member of Folketing.
23. Hjortnaes Karl, SD, former minister of Justice, 1973, 
former minister of taxation, 1980-1981, former minister 
of fisheries, 1981-1982.
24. Jakobsen Erhard, CD, , former minister of economic- 
coordination, 1987-1988.
25. Jakobsen Svend, SD, former minister of inland revenue, 
1975-1977, former minister of fisheries, 1977-1979, 
former minister of finance, 1979-1982.
26. Jelved Marianne, RV, leader of the parliamentary group.
27. Kent Kirk, CPP, member of Folketing.
28. Kofod-Svendsen Flemming, KrF, leader, former housing 
minister, 1987-1988.
29. Kofoed-Anker Niels, V, former minister of Agriculture, 
1977-1978, 1982-1986.
30. Lykketoft Mogens, SD, former minister of taxation, 1981- 
1982, former minister of inland revenue, 1982.
31. Nyrup Rasmussen Poul, SD, memder of Folketing.
32. Pedersen Thor, V, former minister of housing, 1986-1987,
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minister of interior, 1987-
33. Petersen Gert, SF, leader.
34. Pundic Herbert, editor,' Politiken'.
35. Rahbeak Holler Kjeld, SF, Member of Folketing.
36. Stilling Pedersen Inger, KrF, Member of Folketing
37. Strange Ebba, SF, member of Folketing.
38. Voight Pelle, SF, member of Folketing.
France
1. Jean Auroux, PS, member of the National Assembly.
2. Raymond Barre, UDC, member of the National Assembly.
3. Dominique Boudis, UDC, member of the National Assembly.
4. Jean-Michel Belorgey, PS, President of the Cultural and 
Social Affair committee.
5. Huguette Bouchardeau, PS, member of the National 
Assembly.
6 . Jean-Christophe Cambadelis, PS, member of the National 
Assembly.
7. Michel Cointat, RPR, member of the National Assembly.
8 . Jean-Marie Daillet, UDC, member of the National 
Assembly.
9. Jean-Louis Debre, RPR, member of the National Assembly.
10. Francois Fillon, RPR, member of the National Assembly.
11. Yves Freville, UDC, member of the National Assembly.
12. Claude Labbe, RPR, member of the National Assembly.
13. Alain Lamassoure, UDF, member of the National Assembly.
14. Didier Mathus, PS, member of the National Assembly.
15. Michel Pezet, PS, member of the National Assembly.
16. Yann Piat, UDF, member of the National Assembly.
17. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, PS, President of the finance and 
economic committee.
18. Jean-Pierre Worms, PS, member of the National Assembly.
19. Gabriel Kaspereit, RPR, member of the National Assembly.
20. Gerard Longuet, UDF, member of the National Assembly.
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Appendix 3.1
A Classification of Political Parties in 
Denmark and Norway According to Degrees of 
Institutionalization
A classification of the Danish and Norwegian political 
parties, according to degrees of institutionalization, is the 
aim of the following Appendix. The classification is not 
the result of empirical research; rather, it is a 
historically-based analysis to describe some of the basic 
indicators explaining party institutionalization in the 
Danish and Norwegian context.
A twofold strategy is adopted. Firstly, the analysis 
examines the parties in question mainly according to three 
indicators of party institutionalization - namely, (1) the 
degree of development of the central extra-parliamentary 
organization, (2) the degree of homogeneity of organizational 
structures at the same hierarchical level, and (3) the 
relations with external collateral organizations. Secondly, 
the relations between the above-mentioned factors and the 
genetic models of party institutionalization (namely, the 
type of organizational development, the presence or absence 
of an external sponsoring organization, and personal charisma 
of the party leader) are examined. Any misfit between the 
two will be highlighted rather than investigated.
It will be established in the following analysis that the 
socialist parties (SD, DNA), left-socialist parties (SF,SV) 
and the Norwegian rural party (SP) can be classified as 
highly institutionalized parties. The Christian People's 
Party in both countries, the Conservative parties (CPP, CP), 
and the Danish Liberal (RV, CD) and rural (V)-parties can be 
considered weakly institutionalized parties. The Danish 
and Norwegian Progress Parties can be considered deviant 
cases due to the overwhelming, dominating presence of their 
founders. They can be therefore characterized by the 
existence of a cohesive dominant coalition despite the 
absence of institutionalization in the Danish case, and to a 
lesser extent in the Norwegian one.
The reasoning for choosing three out of Panebianco's 
five indicators of party institutionalization is of prime 
importance. As noted earlier, we have at our disposal 
five indicators of the different degrees of 
institutionalization in parties - namely (1) the degree of 
development of the central extra-parliamentary organization, 
(2) the degree of homogeneity of organizational structures at 
the same hierarchical level, (3) ,the method of finance, (4) 
relations with the external collateral organizations, and (5) 
the degree of correspondence betweeg a party's statutory 
norms and its 'actual power structure'.
Considering the finance method, the provision of state 
subventions for parties in Norway (1970) and Denmark (1965- 
parliamentary groups; 1987- party organizations) accounts for
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50-60 per cent of Norwegian parties' injome and up to 94 per 
cent of some Danish party income. It is therefore
incorrect to rely heavily on such a factor as a determinate 
of institutionalization in the Scandinavian case studies. 
Additionally, due to the difficulty of identifying the 
'actual power structure' as a result of the reluctance of 
parties to provide data concerning the issue, it is difficult 
to substantiate factor 5 in the relevant context. As it is 
reasonable to assume that relations with the external
collateral organizations significantly effect both the 
party's finance method and the degree of correspondence
between a party's statutory norms and its 'actual power 
structure', the following examination focuses on factors 1,2 
and 3 .
Based on the above factors, the socialist parties in 
Denmark and Norway, namely, SD and DNA, can be classified as 
highly institutionalized parties. For the former, party and 
trade-unions are relatively separated. There is not even 
the collective affiliation of local trade unions which is 
practised in the DNA. The constitution of the DNA moreover 
specifies that 'the Labour Party and the Federation of Labour 
each recognize the independence of the other'. Similar
structural separation is evident also in the Norwegian case. 
Knut Heidar's description of the Norwegian reality seems to 
have a general applicability to the Danish case:
The relationship between the two most important sections 
of the labour movement - party and trade unions - has 
for most of the time been 'one body, two arms': the 
separation was much clearer in organizational structure 
than organizational practice.
Thus, structurally, the two organizations are in both cases 
relatively autonomous. An 'organizational chart' would 
reveal very few formal connections between them, for the 
basis of their intimate co-operation and co-ordination is 
primarily informal.
An exception to the informal party-union relationships 
is the Norwegian Joint Committee which allows for co­
ordination of policy-making by those most directly involved 
in decision-making. The existence of the extensive party- 
union co-ordination does not mean that the decisive policy­
making process takes place outside the party. Its importance 
concerns not so much the 'if' of union influence as the 'how' 
it influences. This point is well elaborated by Francis 
Castles who claims that 'in so far [as] the unions feel 
themselves to be part of a unified labour movement they must 
acceptg restraint on their actions in a whole variety of 
ways'. In other words, as long as the post-war strategy 
of the Danish and Norwegian socialist parties centred around 
the need to guarantee full employment and prevent wage 
restrictions, which were the trade unions'„chief demands, 
trade unions' conformity seemed to be ensured.
The absence of any form of collective affiliation in 
Denmark with the existence of this linkage at the grass roots
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level of the union branch in Norway constitutes an additional 
difference between the two parties. The importance of the 
collective membership, however, can hardly be overemphasized. 
The DNA has no idea who the collective affiliated members 
are, and they cannot contact them with a membership mailing 
because the required names and adresses are unavailable under 
the anonymous subscription of the collective-membership 
arrangement. Moreover, collective affiliated union locals 
have been criticized by party secretaries for their lack of 
political activity. Therefore, the autonomy of the DNA
is not eroded by its external collateral organization.
The source of the SD and DNA's highly institutionalized 
organizations can be attributed to the relatively high degree 
of development of the central extra-parliamentary 
organization and the homogeneity of jjganizational 
structures at the same hierarchical level. The above
characteristics, together with party dominance in the Danish 
case and balanced relationships in the Norwegian one, call 
into question the linkage - proposed by Panebianco - between 
different parties' 2 genetic models and degrees of 
institutionalization. The organizational development of
both parties was characterised by a simultaneous diffusion 
(i.e. local elites constructing party associations which were 
only later integrated into the national organization) and 
penetration (i.e. when the 'centre' control, stimulates, or 
directs the constitution of local and intermediate party 
associations). Furthermore, both parties benefited from
an external 'sponsor' institution, i.e. the trade unions.
When 'mixed' types of organizational development 
prevail, Panebianco argues, development- initially takes 
place through territorial diffusion. According to
Panebianco, therefore, an initial development through 
diffusion, along with the existence of a sponsoring 
organization impedes the formation of strong organizational 
loyalties (i.e. a highly institutionalized party). The 
above discussion concerning the degree of
institutionalization of the SD and DNA, however, 
significantly undermines Panebianco's prediction. It can 
concluded that the socialist parties in Denmark and Norway, 
namely, SD and DNA, can be classified as highly 
institutionalized parties.
Similar institutionalization is evident in the Danish SF 
and the Norwegian SV. Whilst the former was founded by 
Aksel Larsen in 1959 as a result of a split within the Danish 
Communist Party, the latter was established in 1961 by left- 
wing dissidents from the Labour Party and by independent 
socialists who were critical of Norway's membership of NATO. 
In other words, both parties are characterized by a similar 
pattern of organizational development, this pattern is a 
parliamentary elite which built the organization through 
territorial penetration. This process resulted in a strong 
institution.
Not surprisingly, the Danish SF and the Norwegian SV are 
characterized by relatively high degrees of development of 
the central extra-parliamentary organization and the degree
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of homogeneity of^gorganizational structures at the same 
hierarchical level. Furthermore, their organization is
particularly characterized by the tighter accountability of 
their parliamentary group to the national party organization 
than in most other Danish and Norwegian parties. Their 
parliamentary groups have to follow the guidelines laid down 
in by annual conference and have an obligation to report to 
the party's central committee or executive.gcommittee before 
voting on important political matters. The Danish SF's 
organization also has a greater say over the order in which 
the party's Folketing candidates are elected. At times this 
has seriously limited t^g room for manoeuvre of the 
parliamentary leadership. It can be concluded that
the left socialist parties in Denmark and Norway can be 
clearly classified as highly institutionalized parties.
The Norwegian Centre Party can also be classified as a 
highly institutionalized party. The organizational
development of the SP was predominantly due to territorial 
penetration which was accompanied by the existence of a 
sponsoring organization. The party was founded in 1920 at 
the instigation of the Norsk Landmandsforbund (Norwegian 
Farmers Union). Although the actual division of tasks and 
responsibilities between the two organizations has varied 
over time, the basic premise of a unified and integrated 
farmer's 'movemegj' has never been seriously questioned by 
those involved. One can, therefore, consider the two
organizations as relatively autonomous. This is not to say 
that members of the farmers' union cannot influence party 
strategy. Rather, it is to stress that the union 
representatives have an intimate relationship with the party 
through informal channels.
The high degree of the SP institutionalization is also 
manifested by the relatively high degree of homogeneity of 
organizational structures at the same hierarchical level. 
The SP has around 480 local branches within 19 county 
organizations and it is the only party which has been 
consistent in developing ward organizations in the communes 
in which it has a local chapter. With regard to the
election of delegates to the party's national ggonvention, 
moreover, the delegation is membership-skewed. In other 
words, delegates are elected, to a larger extent, from within 
the party organization. It can be concluded that the SP 
can be classified as a highly institutionalized party.
A classic example of the existence of a cohesive 
dominant coalition despite the absence of a process of 
organizational institutionalization can be found in the 
Danish Progress Party, and to a lesser extent (with respect 
to the above-mentioned process) also in the Norwegian 
Progress Party. This is due to the personal charisma of 
their respective leaders, namely Mogens Glistrop and Carl 
Hagen. The Danish Progress Party explicitly rejects 
traditional forms of organization. Not surprisingly, it had 
developed a formal organizational structure two years after 
its foundation, i.e. in 1974. At the opposing extreme, the 
Norwegian Progress Party adopted a relatively articulate
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24organizational structure.
Still, both parties' organizational structure reflects 
the overwhelming, dominating presence of the founders and 
undisputed leaders of the parties. Although local branches, 
county organizations and party bodies were initially formed, 
the concentration of control over the 'zones of 
organizational uncertainty' remained in the leaders' hands. 
The Danish Progress Party's organization both inside and 
outside the Folketing remained loose, whilst the Norwegian 
counterpart still has no central registration ofg^ts members 
despite its organizational institutionalization. It can
be concluded that both parties are characterized by the 
existence of a cohesive dominant coalition due to the impact 
of their charismatic leaders.
The analysis discussed up to now the characteristics of 
party institutionalization in the Danish and Norwegian cases 
studied considering those parties classified as highly 
institutionalized. Attention now turns to discuss the 
characteristics of parties which can be considered weakly 
institutionalized. The relevance of this group derives from 
the inevitable comparison with the highly institutionalized 
parties in the same political arena. A classic example to 
the inevitable comparison between the two groups of parties 
is suggested by Henry Valen and Daniel Katz:
The knowledge of the development of party organizations 
in Norway is scanty. There are, however, reasons to 
believe that from the beginning Labour differed in 
character from the two older parties. The Liberal Party 
and the Conservative Party had relatively weak 
organizations. The policies of the respective parties 
were mainly decided in the party caucuses in the 
Storting. The Labour Party, on the other hand, 
developed as a grass roots movement with a strong and 
active organizatiog^and with a relatively large dues- 
paying membership.
Clearly this does not mean that the Conservative and Liberal 
Parties lack an articulate organizational structure. On the 
contrary, the Conservatives greatly strengthened their 
organizational structure during the 1970s and increased their 
membership from under 100,000 in 1973 to 178,000 by 1983.
It is rather to stress that the organizational developments 
which occured during the 1970s did not change the focus of 
power within the party (i.e. the parliamentary group). The 
fact that the resolutions of the party's annual national 
congress are still not binding on the Conservative^^ 
parliamentary group suffices to underline this point. 
Additionally, the delegation of the party's national 
convention js based on electoral success rather than party 
membership.
A similar structure is evident in the Danish case. 
Although the Danish Conservative People's Party has Jq broad 
and relatively homogeneous geographical coverage, the
party organization remains weak compared to the SD. Most
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visible is the decisive process of decision-making which 
usually takes place within the parliamentary group. At 
national level, moreover, the resolutions of the annual 
national congress (Landsradet) are not binding on the 
Conservative parliamentary^^group, which therefore enjoys 
great freedom of manoeuvre. Even within the top party
elite, leadership has rested with the chairman of the 
Conservative parliamentary group, elected by its members, 
rather than with the national chairman who is elected by the 
representative assembly.
The course of the organizational development of the 
Conservative parties in ^genmark and Norway comes close to 
territorial penetration, the linkage - proposed by
Panebianco - between different parties' genetic models and 
degrees of institutionalization is called into question. 
According to Panebianco, such a process of organizational
development results in a strong institution. However,
the above discussion concerning the degree of 
institutionalization of both parties significantly 
undermines Panebianco's prediction. It can be concluded that 
the Conservative Parties in Denmark and Norway can be 
classified as weakly institutionalized parties.
The Danish rural Liberal Party (Venstre) can be
considered a weakly institutionalized party. At the outset, 
the Venstre organization is similar to that of the SD, i.e. 
based .on strong local units and on its parliamentary
groups. It has the largest number of local branches 
(957) of any Danish party. Still, some observers feel
that it is still weaker vis-a-vis the.-local organizations 
than are other parties' national units.
From its beginning, Venstre's territorial spread was 
characterized by a simultaneous diffusion and penetration
together with- the absence of an external sponsoring
organization. Based on Lars Svasand's argument, that
establishment of some kind of national body normally will 
cause a shift from diffusion to penetration, the linkage 
- proposed by Panebianco - between different parties' genetic 
models and degrees of institutionalization is again called 
into question. According to Panebianco, such a process of
organizational development results in a strong 
institution. Viewing, for example, the relationships
between the rural party and the farmers' organizarions 
reveals a different picture. Although Venstre has no formal 
links with farmers' organizations, there is a good deal of 
overlapping membership^^- a characteristic of a weakly 
institutionalized party. Based on the above discussion, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the Venstre can be 
classified as a weak organization.
By contrast with the Venstre, the Radical Liberals are a 
small party with a lo^^ratio of members to voters and few 
local councillors. They rely heavily on the
parliamentary group and on the ability of their leaders to 
make an effective impact through the mass-media. The low 
degree of their organizational structure's homogeneity is 
evident in the several combining of a constituency
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association which form the county level organization. The 
county level organization may comprise constituency 
delegates or a county assembly. Local associations may also 
operate below constituency level, so that the RV can operate 
very flexibly^gin response to a variation in the number of 
local members.
Added to the relatively low degree of homogeneity of 
organizational structures is the relationships between the 
extra-parliamentary organizations and the parliamentary 
group. Basically, the party's parliamentary group chooses 
its own chairman, who is normally the political leader of the 
party (unless its political leader is a government minister). 
The RV parliamentary group, furthermore, is given great 
freedom of manoeuvre by the national pajty organization, 
which cannot bind its decisions in any way.
The RV organizational development calls into question 
the linkage - proposed by Panebianco - between different 
parties' genetic models and degrees of institutionalization. 
Primarily, the RV represents what Duverger terms 'internally 
created' parties. The parliamentary group which lacks an 
external sponsoring organization builds the party 
organization through territorial penetration. Such a 
process, acggrding to Panebianco, results in a strong 
institution. The above discussion concerning the level
of RV institutionalization, however, suggests that the RV can 
be clearly classified as a weakly institutionalized party.
Among the most frequently cited factors according to 
which the Danish Centre Democrats can be considered as weakly 
institutionalized is its leaders' belief that political power 
should be left with the voters and the electgd 
parliamentarians rather than with the party activists. 
Consequently, a relatively low degree of development-of the 
central extra-parliamentary organization is evident. An
additional indirect consequence of the CD leaders' belief is 
the relatively low degree of homogeneity of organizational 
structures at the same hierarchical level. Where the party 
is stronger it is organized in individual communes and where 
weaker in the wider electoral constituencies, but in either 
case there is only ong^tier of local organization to avoid 
unnecessary bureaucracy.
In the CD case, it seems reasonable to apply 
Panebianco's argument that personal charisma can be 
associated with^o strong resistence to
institutionalization. The CD leader, Erhard Jakobsen,
has no interest in organizational reinforcement which would 
inevitably set the stage for the party 'emancipation' from 
his control. We can thus conclude, as Panebianco would have, 
that the CD can be classified as a weakly institutionalized 
party, but, still, characterized by a cohesive elite.
A number of factors have contributed to the 
classification of the Danish and Norwegian Christian 
People's Parties as weakly institutionalized organizations. 
Most important in the Norwegian case is the KrF traggition 
from a regional party to a national party in 1945. The 
diffused character of the party spread was furthermore
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manifested by the party collaboration with a small but 
important group whose identification with the Christianfolk 
had not previousl^^ been accepted on either side, i.e. the 
'Moral Rearmament'.
The Danish KrF, unlike its Norwegian couterpart, was 
founded in April 1970 in reaction against what they saw as 
growing permissiveness in Danish society. Howevej, as
leaders and followers of the party were a mixed bag, they 
found it difficult to formulate a general, which is to say 
secular, political platform. Internal factional conflicts 
deprived the party of electoral support and representation in 
1971, but in 1973 it gained a modest hold. Mogens H.
Pedersen's description of the Danish new comers (except of 
the Communist and the Justice Party) of the 1973 election is
of utmost relevance to the organizational structure of the
KrF (as it is also applicable to the CD case):
[...] They were not able to organize and create a 
membership base to the same extent as the older parties. 
During the first years, co-optation into leadership 
positions was a common practice. The national 
leadership tried to control nominations, but often found 
it difficult to do so. Local activists formed 
committees that financed and carried out campaigns, and 
these local 'notables' often wanted more autonomy than 
the national leaders and the parliamentary groups were 
willing to concede. The new parties had many of the 
characteristics of the cadre party described by Maurice 
Duverger.
Given the relatively powerful position of local 
activists at the stage of the KrF formation, it is reasonable 
to argue that its organizational spread was characterized by 
patterns of diffusion. Not surprisingly, the Danish KrF, as 
well as the Norwegian one, developed weakly 
institutionalized features. We can conclude that both 
parties would have been classified also by Panebianco as 
weakly institutionalized parties.
Finally, it is important to note that the fact that a 
party is highly institutionalized is no guarantee that de­
institutionalization and loss of autonomy vis-a-vis the 
environment will not take place when its environment 
undergoes radical changes. Nor is a weakly institutionalized 
party necessarily condemned to always remain the same. 
According to Panebianco, however, the way that 
institutionalization has taken place generally continues to 
condition, the party's internal competition system for 
decades. The classification of parties according to
degrees of institutionalization and their genetic model in 
the Scandinavian setting highlighted the misfit between the 
two. The analysis, therefore, does not share the historical 
conception of Panebianco's 'party institutionalization'.
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Appendix 3.2
Party Composition of the Folketing, 1953-1988
S ep t.
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:t R ad ikale Venstre 7.8% 7.8% 5.8% 5.3% 7.3% 15.0% 14.4% 11.2% 7.1% 3.6% 5.4% 5.1% 5.5% 6.2% 5.6%
(14) (1 4 ) (1 1 ) (1 0 ) (1 3 ) (2 7 ) (27) (2 0 ) (1 3 ) (1 6 ) (1 0 ) (9) (10) (1 1 ) (1 0 )
m m arks K om m unistnske P an i 4.3% 3.1% 1.1% 1.2% 0.8% 1.0% 1.4% 3.6% 4.2% 3.7% 1.9% 1.1% 0.2% 0.9% 0.8%
C om m un ists) (8) (6 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0) (0) (6 ) (7 ) (7 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 )
nm arks R eisforbundi 3.5% 5.3% 2.2% 1.3% 0.7% 0.7% 1.7% 2.9% 1.8% 3.3% 2.6% 1.4% 1.5% 0.5%
Ju stice P a n y ) (6) (9 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0) (5 ) (0 ) (6 ) (5 ) (0) (0 ) (0 )
ciaiistisk F o lk e p a n i 6.1% 5.8% 10.9% 6.1% 9.1% 6.0% 5.0% 3.9% 5.9% 11.3% 11.5% 14.6% 13.0%
S ocia list P eop le’s Pairty) (1 1 ) (1 0 ) (2 0 ) (1 1 ) (17 ) (1 1 ) (9 ) (7 ) (1 1 ) (2 1 ) (2 1 ) (2 7 ) (23 )
n stresocia listerne _ _ — — 2.0% 1.6% 1.5% 1 1 % 1 7 % 3.7% 1 7 % 1 7 % 1.4% 0.6%
L eft S ocia list) (4) (0) (0 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 ) (5 ) (5 ) (0 ) (0 )
isteligt F o lk e p a n i _ _ — — — 1 0 % 4.0% 5.3% 3.4% 2.6% 1 3 % 2.7% 2.4% 2.0%
C h n stia n  P eop le’s P a n y ) (0) (7 ) (9 ) (6 ) (5 ) (4 ) (5 ) (4 ) (4 )
tm sk n d tsp a n ie t _ _ — — — — 15.9% 13.6% 14.6% 11.0% 8.9% 3.6% 4.8% 9.0%
Progress P an y) (2 8 ) (2 4 ) (2 6 ) (2 0 ) (1 6 ) (6 ) (9 ) (1 6 )
ntrum  D em okratem o- _ _ — — — — — 7.8% 2.2% 6.4% 3.2% 8.3% 4.6% 4.8% 4.7%
C entre D em ocrats) (1 4 ) (4 ) (1 1 ) (6 ) (1 5 ) (8 ) (9 ) (9 )
lies Kurs 1 2 % 1.9%
C o m m o n  C ause) (4) (0 )
hers 3 2% 2.7% 3.7% 3.7% 4.1% 2.2% 0.2% — — 0.9% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 1.5% 1.3%
(1) (1 ) (7 ) (5 ) (4 ) (0 ) (0) (0 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0) (0 ) (0 )
Source: Jacobs, F. 'Denmark', in Jacobs, F. (ed.) Western 
European Political Parties: A Comprehensive Guide. (Harlow: 
Longman, 1989), p. 33.
Appendix 3.3
Party Composition of Danish Governments, 1971-1991
Period Parties (seats) Per cent of seats 
in parliament _ 
held by parties 
in government
Oct. 1971-Oct. 1972 Social Democrats 70) 39
Oct. 1972-Dec. 1973 Social Democrats 70) 39
Dec. 1973-Feb. 1975 Liberals (22) 12
Feb. 1975-Aug. 1977 Social Democrats 53) 30
Feb. 1977-Aug. 1978 Social Democrats 65) 36
Aug. 1978-Oct. 1979 Social Democrats 
Liberals (21)
(65) 48
Oct. 1979-Dec. 1981 Social Democrats 68) 38
Dec. 1981-Sep. 1982 Social Democrats 59) 33
Sep. 1982-Jan. 1984 Conservatives (26 
Liberals (20) 
Centre Democrats 
Christian People'
15)
Party (4)
36
Jan. 1984-Sep. 1987 Conservatives (42 
Liberals (22) 
Centre Democrats 
Christian People'
8 )
Party (5)
43
Sep. 1987-June 1988 Conservatives (38 
Liberals (19) 
Centre Democrats 
Christian People'.
9)
Party (4)
39
June 1988-Dec. 1990 Conservatives (35 
Liberals (22) 
Radical Liberals 10)
37
Dec. 1990- Conservatives (30 
Liberals (29)
33
1. Percentages are calculated on the basis of all 179 members 
of the Folketing. i.e. including the two MP's from Greenland 
and the two from the Faroe Islands.
2. The Prime Minister's party is given first in the case of 
coalition governments.
Source: Keesina Contemporary Archives, 1971-1991.
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Appendix 4.1
Party Composition of the Storting, 1945-1985
1945 1949 1953 1 957 1961 1965 1969 1 973 1977 1981 ' i 9 s r 1985
D e t N o n k e  A r b e id er p a r ti 41% 45.7% 46.7% 48.3% 46.8% 43.1% 46.5% 35.3% 42.3% 37.1% 37.2% 40.8%
(N o rw eg ia n  L abtour P arty ) (7 6 ) (8 5 ) (7 7 ) (7 8 ) (74 ) (68 ) (74 ) (6 2 ) (76 ) (6 5 ) (6 6 ) (7 1 )
H oyre 17% 18.3% 18.6% 19% 20% 21% 19.6% 17.4% 24.8% 31.8% 31.7% 30.4%
(C onservative P a r ty ) (2 5 ) (2 3 ) (2 7 ) (2 9 ) (29 ) (31) (29 ) (2 9 ) (41 ) (5 4 ) (5 3 ) (5 0 )
K riste lig  Folkepartti 7 .9% 8 J % 10.5% 10.2% 9.6% 8.1% 9.4% 12.2% 12.4% 9.4% 9.4% 8.3%
(C hristian  P eop lie 't P a rty ) (8 ) (9 ) (M ) (1 2 ) (15) (13 ) (14) (2 0 ) (22 ) (1 5 ) (15 ) (1 6 )
Senterpartiet 8 .1% 7.9% 9.1% 9.3% 9.3% 9.9% 10.5% 11% 8.6% 6.6% 6.6% 6.6%
(C en tre  Party) (1 0 ) (1 2 ) (M ) (1 5 ) (1 6 ) (18 ) (20 ) (2 1 ) (1 2 ) (1 1 ) (1 1 ) (1 2 )
V enstre 13.8% 13.1% 10.0% 9.7% 8.8% 10.4% 9.4% 3.5% 3.2% 3.9% 3.9% 3.1%
(L iberal Party) (2 0 ) (2 1 ) (1 5 ) (1 5 ) (1 4 ) (18 ) (13 ) (2 ) (2) (2 ) (2 ) (0 )
D e t L ibérale F o lk e tp a n i — — — — — — — 3.4% 1.4% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5%
(L iberal P eo p le '»  P arty ) (1 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 )
N  orges K otn tn uoisttisk e Parti 11.9% 5.8% 5.1% 3.3% 2.9% 1.4% 1% — 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2%
(N o rw eg ia n  C o n n m u n ist P arty) (1 1 ) (0 ) (3 ) (1 ) (0 ) (0) (0 ) (0) (0 ) (0 ) (0 )
S o sia listisk  F olkep iarti — 2.4% 6% 3.5% — — — — —
(S o cia list P e o p le 's  P a rty ) (2) (2) (0 )
S osia listisk  V a lg fo irb u n d — — — — — — — 11.2% — — — —
(S o cia list E lectoiral A llia n c e ) (1 6 )
S o sia listisk  V enstr<eparti — — — — — — — — 4.2% 5% 4.9% 5.5%
(S o cia list L eft P a r ty ) (2 ) (4 ) (4) (6 )
V algallianse — — — — — — — 0.4% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6%,
(R ed  E lectoral A J lia n c e ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 )
Frem skrittpartiet — — — — — — — 5% 1.9% 4.5% 4.5% 3.7%
(P rogress Party) (4 ) (0 ) (4 ) (4) (2 )
O thers 0 .3% 0.7% 0-0% 0  2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.4%
'Figura in^UdS atintiited ibart Out individual paru«* won wbcn tbey p aniap aied  In joint lût* in tom e constitucnciei.
'Second fa u lts  ifi 198>i are accounted for by a re-run election in the con stitu eocia  o f  Troms and Buskcrud. Figura quoted are final corrected fig u ra  after the re-run caused by voting irregulanties 
the first time around.
Source: Jacobs, F. 'Norway', in Jacobs, F. (ed.) Western 
European Political Parties; A Comprehensive Guide. (Harlow: 
Longman, 1989), p. 588.
00346
Appendix 4.2
Party Composition of Norwegian Governments, 1945-1989
Period Parties (seats) Per cent of seats 
in parliament 
held by parties 
in government
Nov. 1945-Oct. 1949 Labour Party 50
Oct. 1949-Nov. 1951 Labour Party 56
Nov. 1951-Oct. 1953 Labour Party 56
Oct. 1953-Jan. 1955 Labour Party 51
Jan. 1955-Oct. 1957 Labour Party 51
Oct. 1957-Sep. 1961 Labour Party 52
Sep. 1961-Aug. 1963 Labour Party 49
Aug. 1963-Sep. 1963 Conservatives
Liberals
Christian People's 
Centre Party
Party
49
Sep. 1963-Oct. 1965 Labour Party 49
Oct. 1965-Sep. 1969 Centre Party
Conservatives
Liberals
Christian People's Party
53
Sep. 1969-Mar. 1971 Centre Party
Conservatives
Liberals
Christian People's Party
50
Mar. 1971-Oct. 1972 Labour Party 49
Oct, 1972-Oct. 1973 Christian People's 
Centre Party 
Liberals
Party 26
Oct. 1973-Jan. 1976 Labour Party 40
Jan. 1976-Sep. 1977 Labour Party 40
Sep. 1977-Jan. 1981 Labour Party 49
Feb. 1981-Oct. 1981 Labour Party 49
Oct. 1981-Jun. 1983 Conservatives 34
Jun. 1983-Sep. 1985 Conservatives 
Christian People's 
Centre Party
Party
51
Sep. 1985-May 1986 Conservatives 
Christian People's 
Centre Party
Party
49
May 1986-Sep. 1989 Labour Party 45
Sep.1989-Oct. 1990 Conservatives 
Christian People's 
Centre Party
Party
37
Source: Keesino Contemporary Archives. 1945-1989.
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Appendix 5.1
Party Composition of the Chamber of Deputies, 1948-1987
194S 1953 J958 1963 1968 1972 1 9 7 6 1979 1983 1987
D C 48.5% 40.1% 42.4% 38.3% 39.1% 38.8% 38.7% 38.3% 32.9% 34.3%
(C h n stia n  D e m to cra is) (3 0 5 ) (2 6 3 ) (2 7 3 ) (260) (266) (267) (2 6 2 ) (2 6 2 ) (2 2 5 ) (2 3 4 )
PCI 31 % 22.6% 22.7% 25.3% 26.9% 27.2% 34.4% 30.4% 29.9% 26.6%
(C om m u n ists) (1 4 3 ) (1 4 0 ) (166) (177) (1 7 9 ) (2 2 8 ) (2 0 1 ) (1 9 8 ) (1 7 7 )
jo in t
PSI 12.8% 14.2% 13.8% 14.5% 9.6% 9.6% 9.8% 11.4% 14.3%
(S ocia lists) (1 8 3 ) (7 5 ) (84 ) (87 ) (61 ) (5 7 ) (6 2 ) (7 3 ) (9 4 )
m erged P S I /P S D I
P SD I 7.1% 4.5% 4.5% 6.1% 5.1% 3.4% 3.8% 4.1% 3.0%
(S ocia l D cm ocrrats) (3 3 ) (1 9 ) (22 ) (3 3 ) (91 ) (2 9 ) (1 5 ) (2 0 ) (2 3 ) (1 7 )
PRI 2.5% 1.6% 1.4% 1.4% 2.0% 2.9% 3.1% 3.0% 5.1% 3.7%
(R ep ub licans) (9 ) (5 ) (6 ) (6 ) (9) (14) (1 4 ) (1 6 ) (2 9 ) (2 1 )
PLI 3.8% 3.0% 3.5% 7.0% 5.8% 3.9% 1.3% 1.9% 2.9% 2.1%
(L iberals) (1 9 ) (1 3 ) (1 7 ) (39 ) (31) (21) (5 ) (9 ) (1 6 ) (1 1 )
PR — — (w ith  R epu b lican s — — — 1.1% 3.5% 2.2% 2.6%
(R adica ls) —  see a b ove) (4 ) (1 8 ) (11 ) (1 3 )
MSI 2.0% 5.8% 4.8% 5.1% 4.4% 8.7% 6.1% 5.3% 6,8% 5.9%
(Ita lian  S ocia l iM o v e m en t) (6 ) (2 9 ) (24 ) (27 ) (24) (56 ) (3 5 ) (3 0 ) (4 2 ) (3 5 )
M onarchists 2.8% 6.9% 4.8% 1.7% 1.3%
(14) (4 0 ) (25 ) (8 ) (6 )
D P 1.6% 0.8% 1.5% 1.7%
(P roletarian  D em iocracy) (6 ) (0 ) (7 ) (8 )
Verdi 2.5%
(G reen ) (1 3 )
O thers 2.5% 2.7% 1.7% 1.3% 6.0% 4.0% 0.8% 4.1% 2.7% 3.2%
(2 ) (3 ) (5) (4 ) (26) (4 ) (4 ) (1 2 ) (6 ) (6 )
Source: Jacobs, F. 'Italy',
European Political Parting» 
Longman, 1989), p. 173.
in Jacobs, F . (ed.) Western 
A Comprehensive Guide. (Harlow:
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Appendix 5.2
Party Composition of Italian Governments, 1946-1979.
Period Parties (seats) Per cent of seats 
in parliament 
held by parties 
in government
Jul. 1946-Jan. 1947 DC,PCI,PSIUP,PRI 81
Feb. 1947-May 1947 DC,PCI,PSI 69
May 1947-Dec. 1947 DC 37
Dec. 1947-May 1948 DC,PLI,PSLI, PRI 56
May 1948-Oct. 1949 DC,PLI,PSLI, PRI 63
Nov. 1949-Jan. 1950 DC,PLI,PRI 58
Jan. 1950-Apr. 1951 DC, PS LI, PRI 60
Apr. 1951-Jul. 1951 DC,PRI 54
Jul. 1951-Jun. 1953 DC,PRI 54
Jul. 1953-Jul. 1953 DC 44
Aug. 1953-Jan 1954 DC 44
Jan. 1954-Jan. 1954 DC 44
Feb. 1954-Jun. 1955 DC,PLI,PSDI 50
Jul. 1955-May 1957 DC,PLI,PSDI 50
May 1957-Jun. 1958 DC 44
Jul. 1958-Jan. 1959 DC,PSDI 49
Feb. 1959-Feb. 1960 DC 45
Mar. 1960-Jul. 1960 DC 45
Jul. 1960-Feb. 1962 DC 45
Feb. 1962-May 1963 DC,PSDI,PRI 50
Jun. 1963-Nov. 1963 DC 41
Dec. 1963—Jun. 1964 DC,PSDI,PSI, PRI 61
Jul. 1964-Jan. 1966 DC,PSI,PSDI, PRI 61
Feb. 1966—Jun. 1968 DC,PSI,PSDI, PSI 61
Jun. 1966—Nov. 1968 DC 42
Dec. 1968-Jul. 1969 DC,PSU,PRI 58
Aug. 1969-Feb. 1970 DC 42
Mar. 1970-Jul. 1970 DC,PSI,PSDI, PRI 58
Aug. 1970-Mar. 1971 DC,PSI,PSDI, PRI 58
Mar. 1971-Jan. 1972 DC,PSI,PSDI 56
Feb. 1972-Feb. 1972 DC 42
Jun. 1972-Jun. 1973 DC,PSDI,PLI 50
jUL. 1973-mAR. 1974 DC,PSI,PSDI, PRI 58
Mar. 1974-Oct. 1974 DC,PSI,PSDI 56
Nov. 1974-Jan. 1976 DC,PRI 44
Feb. 1976-Apr. 1976 DC 42
Jul. 1976—Jan. 1978 DC 41
Mar. 1978-Jan. 1979 DC 41
Mar. 1979-Mar. 1979 DC,PSDI,PRI 41
Aug. 1979-Mar. 1980 DC, PSDI,PLI 46
Source: Strom, K. Minority Governments and Majority Rule. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 260-1.
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Appendix 5.3
The Membership of the PCI: Total Membership, Party Adherence
rate. Ne Recruits, Non Renewal, and PCI Votes as Percentage 
of Total Vote Cast, 1945-1979.
Year
Membership 
total 
(in 1000s)
New Non- PCI Shaje
Adherence Recruits renewals of vote
rate (in 1000s) (in 1000s)(percent)
1945 1,719 6.14 1,352 18.9
194 6 2,068 7.38 427 77
1950 2,113 7.14 176 91 22.6
1953 2,134 7.05 164 124 22.7
1958 1,819 5. 60 116 123
1961 1,729 5.16 132 196
1962 1,631 4.82 105 203
1963 1,613 4.72 130 147 25.3
1964 1,636 4.78 139 116
1965 1,611 4.66 122 148
1966 1,571 4 . 51 108 148
1967 1,530 4.36 102 143
1968 1,496 4 .20 98 133 27.0
1969 1,496 4 .16 101 101
1970 1,498 4 .12 106 103
1971 1,510 4 .11 113 100
1972 1,576 4.24 151 88 27.2
1973 1,611 4 .32 137 99
1974 1,644 4.38 133 100
1975 1,715 4.54 156 84
1976 1,798 4.72 172 90 34.4
1977 1,796 6.70 127 128
1978 1,772 4.46 100 124
1979 1,742 4 . 38 92 122 30.4
1. The adherence rate measures the percentage of party
members as a ratio of the total electorate, 21 years and
older.
2. National elections were held 
and 1979.
in 194 6,1953,1963,1972,1976
Source: Barbagli, M. and Corbetta P. 'The Italian Communist
Party and the Social Movements, 1968-1976', Political Power 
and Social Theory: A Research Annual. Vol. 3, 1982, p. 80.
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Appendix 5.4
Christian Democratic Party National Membership, 1945-1980
194 5 537582
1946 607977
1947 800378
1948 1127182
1949 766023
1950 885291
1951 920072
1952 960785
1953 1146652
1954 1255452
1955 1189348
1956 1377286
1957 1295028
1958 1410179
1959 1608608
1960 1473789
1961 1565185*
1962 1476622
1963 1621620*
1964 1676222*
1965 1613314
196.6 1641615
1967 1621866
1968 1696402*
196.9 1743651
1970 1738996
1971 1814580
1972 1827925*
1973 1879429
1974 1843515
1975 1732501
1976 1366187
1977 1301707
1978 1355423
1979 1383650
198 0 1385141
Figures for these six years are estimated because of 
missing membership data from one or more provinces.
Source: Leonardi, R. and Wertman D.A. Italian Christian 
Democracy: The Politics of Dominance (Houdmills: Macmillan,
1989), p. 127.
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Appendix 6.1
Party Composition of the House of Commons, 1955-1987
Fab. Oct.
1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 1974 1979
Conservatives 344 365 304 253 330 297 277 339
49.7% 49.4% 43.4% 41.9% 46.4% 37.9% 35.9% 43.9%
Labour 277 258 317 364 288 301 319 269
46.4% 43.8% 44.1% 48.0% 43.1% 37.2% 39.2% 36.9%
Liberal Party 6 6 9 12 6 14 13 11
2.7% 5.9% 11.2% 8.5% 7.5% 19.3% 18.3% 13.8%
Scottish
Nationalists - - - - 1 7 11 2
(SNP) 1.1% 2.0% 2.9% 1.6%
Plaid Cymru _ 2 3 2
- — — — — — 0.6% 0.6:% 0.4%
Others 3 1 — 2 6 14 12 12
1.1% 0.4% 0.6% 1.4% 3.0% 3.1% 3.3%
Source: Jacobs, F. 'United Kingdom' , in: Jacobs, F. (ed.)
Western European Political Parties: A Comprehensive Guide. 
(Harlow: Longman, 1989), p. 379
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Appendix 6.2
The Lib-Lab Pact: A Joint Statement by the Prime Minister and 
the Leader of the Liberal Party
We agreed today the basis on which the Liberal Party would 
work with the government in the pursuit of economic recovery.
We will set up a joint consultive Committee under the 
Chairmanship of the Leader of the House, which will meet 
regularly. The Committee will examine Government policy and 
other issues prior to their coming before the House, and 
Liberal policy proposals.
The existence of this Committee will not commit the 
Government to accepting the views of the Liberal Party, or 
the Liberal Party to supporting the Government on any issue.
We agree to initiate regular meetings between the 
Chancellor and the Liberal Party economic spokesman, such 
meetings to begin at once. In addition, the Prime Minister 
and the Leader of the Liberal Party will meet as necessary.
We agree that legislation for Direct Elections to the 
European Assembly in 1978 will be presented to Parliament in 
this Session. The Liberal Party re-affirm their strong 
conviction that a proportional system should be used as the 
method of election. The Government is publishing next week a 
White Paper on Direct Elections to the European Assembly 
which sets out the choices among different electoral systems, 
but which makes no recommendation. There will now be
consultation between us on the method to be adopted and the
Government's final recommendation will take full account of 
the Liberal Party's commitment. The recommendation will be
subject to a free vote of both Houses.
We agree that progress must be made on legislation for 
devolution, and to this end consultations will begin on the 
dêtâiled memorandum submitted by the Liberal Party today. In 
any future debate on proportional representation for the
devolved Assemblies there will be a free vote.
We agree that the Government will provide the extra time 
necessary to secure the passage of the Housing (Homeless 
Persons) Bill, and that the Local Authorities (Works) Bill 
will now be confined to provisions to protect the existing 
activities of Direct Labour Organizations in the light of 
local government reorganization.
We agree that this arrangement between us should last 
until the end of the present Parliamentary Session, when both 
Parties would consider whether the experiment has been of 
sufficient benefit to the country to be continued.
We also agree that this understanding should be made 
public.
10 Downing Street 
23 March 1977
Source: Steel, D. Against Goliath: David Steel's Storv.
(London: Weidenfeld, 1989), pp. 129-130.
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Appendix 7.1
Party Composition of the National Assembly, 1978-1988
Party/Year 1978 1981 1984 1988
PS 206
PS-MRG 112 285 - 276
MRG - - 2 -
PCF 86 44 35 27
Other left - 5 7 -
Ecologies - - - -
RPR 145 88 76 128
UDF 120 62 53 130
RPR-UDF _ _ 147
Joint list
FN - - 35 1
Other right - 7 14 13
Other major 11
parties
Source: Keesina' s ConteniDorarv Archives, 1978-1988.
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Appendix 7.2
The Result of the Elections to the European Parliaments in
France, 1984-1989.
PC PS+ Other Green UDF RPR Other FN
MRG Left Right
1984 11.2 20.8 3.6 3.4 -43- 3 10.9
1989 7.7. 23.6 - 10.6 -28.9- 8.4 11.7
Source: Machin, H. 'Stages and Dynamics in the Evolution of 
the French Party System', West European Politics, vol. 12, 
no. 4, October 1989, pp. 61-2.
355
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
Aarebrot, F. 'Norway: Centre and Periphery in a 
Peripheral State', in: Rokkan, S. and Urwin, D.W. (eds.) 
The Politics of Territorial Identity. (London: Sage, 
1982), pp. 75-111.
Aberbach,' J.D. Putnam, R.D. and Rockman,B.A. Bureaucrats 
and Politicians in Western Democracies. (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1981).
Alexander, H.E. (ed.) Comparative Political Finance in 
the 1980s. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989).
Almond. G. A. and Verba, S. The Civic Culture: Political 
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963) .
Andersen, P.O. Kristen Politik. (Odense:Odense 
Universitetsforlag, 1975).
Andreotti, G. Diari 1976-79: all anni della 
solidarieta. 2 ed. (Milan: Rizzoli,1981).
Andrews, W. G. Presidential Government in Guallist 
France. (Albany: Suny Press, 1982) .
Axelrod, R. Conflict of Interest: theory of divergent 
goals with applications to politics. (Chicago: Markham, 
1970).
Bacharach, S.B. and Lawler, E.J. Bargaining: Power. 
Tactics and Outcomes. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,
1981).
Barbagli, M. and Corbetta, P. 'After the Historic 
Compromise: a Turning Point for the PCI', European 
Journal of Political Research, vol. 10, no. 3, September 
1982, pp. 213-240.
Barbagli, M. and Corbetta, P. 'Una tattica e due 
stratégie: Inchiesta sulla base del Pci', II Mulino. 
vol. 27, November 1978, pp 923-967.
Barbagli, M. and Corbetta, P. 'After the Historic 
Compromise: a Turning Point for the PCI', European 
Journal of Political Research, vol. 10, no. 3, September 
1982, 213-240.
Barbagli, M. and Corbetta, P. 'The Italian Communist 
Party and the Social Movements 1968-1976', Political 
Power and Social Theory: A Research Annual. Vol. 3, 
(Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press,1982), pp. 77-112.
356
Barbagli, M. Corbetta, P. Parisi, A. Hans, M. and 
Schadee, A. Fluidita Elettorale e Classi Social! in 
Italia. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1979).
Barnes, S.H. Representation in Italy. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1977).
Barnes, S.H. 'Italy: Opposition on Left, Right and 
Center', in Dahl, R.H. (ed.) Political Oppositions in 
Western Democracies. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press,1981), pp. 303-331.
Barnett, J. Inside the Treasury. (London: Andre Deutsch, 
1982) .
Beith, A. 'The Working of the Lib-Lab-Arrangement' in: 
Problème von Koalitionsreaierunaen in Westeuropa. (Bonn: 
Liberal-Verlag GmbH, 1978), pp. 29-38.
Benn, T . Conflicts of Interests: Diaries 1977-80. 
(London; Hutchinson, 199 0).
Beer, S.H. Modern British Politics: A Studv of Parties 
and Pressure Groups. (London:Faber, 1965).
Bell, D.S. and Criddle, B. The French Socialist Partv: 
The Emergence of a Party of Government. 2nd edition, 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1988).
Bendix, P. 'Valget, Som en Politiker Ser Det' in: 
Decembervalaet 1973. (Copenhagen: Schultz, 1974).
Berger, S. 'Religious Transformation and the Future of 
Politics', in: Maier, C.S. (ed.) Changing Boundaries of 
the Political: Essays on the Evolving Balance Between 
the State and Society, Public and Privet in Europe. 
(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 107- 
150.
Blackmer, D.L.M. and Tarrow, S. (eds.) Communism in 
Italy and France. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press,1975), pp. 259-304.
Blanchard, O. Dornbusch, R. and Layard, R. (eds.) 
Restoring Europe's Prosperity: Macroeconomic Papers from 
the Centre for European Policy Studies. (Cambridge,
Mass: MIT Press,1986).
Blondel, J. Voters, Parties, and leaders: The Social 
Fabric of British Politics. (Harmondsworth:
Penguin,1967).
Bogdanor, V. (ed.) Coalition Government in Western 
Europe. (London: Heinemann, 1983).
Bogdanor, V. (ed.) Constitutions in Democratic Politics.
357
(Aldershot: Gower, 1988).
Bogdanor, V. Multi-Party Politics and the Constitution. 
(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1983).
Bogdanor, V. Devolution. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1979).
Braunthal, G. 'The Social Democratic Party: Reformism in 
Theory and Practice', in: Merkl, P.M. (ed.) The Federal 
Republic of Germany at Forthv. (New-York: New-York 
University Press, 1989), pp. 265-286.
Browne, E.C. and Dreijmanis, J. (eds.) Government 
Coalitions in Western Democracies. (N.Y.: Longman,
1982).
Browne, E. Frendreis, J. and Gleiber, D. 'The Process of 
Cabinet Dissolution: An Exponential Model of Duration 
and Stability in Western Democracies', American Journal 
of Political Science, vol. 30, no. 2, May 1986, pp. 628- 
650.
Budge, I. 'Parties and Democratic Government: A 
Framework for Comparative Explanation', West European 
Politics, vol. 7, no. 1, January 1984, pp. 95-118.
Budge, I. and Herman, V. 'Coalitions and Government 
Formation: An Empirical Relevant Theory' British 
Journal of Political Science, vol. 8, part 4, October 
1978, pp. 459-77.
Budge, I. and Laver, M. 'Office Seeking and Policy 
Pursuit in Coalition Theory', Legislative Studies 
Ouarterlv. vol. 11, no. 4, November 1986, 485-506.
Budge, I. and Keman, H. Parties and Democracv: Coalition 
Formation and Government Functioning in Twentv States. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
Butler, D. and D. Stokes, Political Change in Britain. 
(London: Macmillan,1969).
Callaghan, J. Time and Change. (London: Collins, 1987).
Castles, F.G. The Social Democratic Image of Societv: A 
Studv of the Achievements and Origins of Scandinavian 
Social Democracv in Comparative Perspective. (London: 
Routledge, 1978).
Cayrol, R. and C. Ysmal, 'Les Militants du PS', Proiet. 
May 1982, pp. 572-586.
Cayrol, R. and P. Ignazi, 'Cousins ou Freres? Attitude 
politique et conceptions du parti chez les militants
358
socialistes français et italiens', Revue Français de 
Science Politique, vol. 33, no. 4, August 1983, pp. 629- 
650.
Cervetti, G. 'A Mass Debate on the Party, the Movement 
and the Political Picture', The Italian Communists, no. 
2, April-June, 1977, pp. 119-128.
Chariot, M. 'I/emergence du Front National', Revue 
Français de Science Politique, vol. 36, no. 1, February 
1986, pp. 30-45.
Chiaromonte, G. Le Scelte della Solidarieta 
Democratica. (Roma: Editori Riuniti,1986).
Coats, D. Labour in Power?: A Studv of the Labour 
Government 1974-1979. (London : Longman,1980).
Cole, A.M. 'La France Unie? Francois Mitterrand', in: 
Gaffney, J. (ed.) The French Presidential Elections of 
1988: Ideoloav and Leadership in Contemoorarv France. 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1988), pp. 81-100.
Cole, A.M. 'Factionalism, The French Socialist Party and 
The Fifth republic: An Explanation of Intra-Party 
Decisions', European Journal of Political Research, vol. 
17, no. 1, January 1989, pp. 77-94.
Crewe, I. Sarlvik, B. and J. Alt, 'Partisan Dealignment 
in Britain 1964-1974', British Journal of Political 
Science, vol. 7, part 2, April 1977, pp. 129-190.
Daalder, H. 'Cabinet and Party Systems in Ten Smaller 
European Democracies', Acta Politica. vol. 6, part 3, 
July 1971, pp. 282-303.
Daalder, H. (ed.) Partv Svstems in Denmark. Austria. 
Switzerland. The Netherlands, and Belgium. (London: 
Frances Pinter, 1987).
Dahl, R.A. Who Governs?: Democracv and Power in an 
American Citv. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).
Dahl, R.H. (ed.) Political Oppositions in Western 
Democracies. (New Haven: Yale University Press,1981).
D'Alimonte, R. 'Competizione Elettorale e Rendimento 
Politico: IL Caso Italiano', Revista Italiana di Scienza 
Politica. vol. 8, 1978, 457-93.
Dalton, R.J. Flanagan, S.C. and Beck, P.A. Electoral 
Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment 
or Dealignment? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1984).
Dalyell, T. Devolution; The End of Britain?. (London:J. 
Cape, 1977).
Damgaard, E. 'Stability and Change in the Danish Party 
System over Half a Century', Scandinavian Political 
Studies. vol. 9, 1974, pp. 104-125.
Damgaard, E. 'Parlamentarimens danske tilstande', in: 
Damgaard, E. Anckar, D. Rommetvedt, H. Sannerstedt, A. 
Sjolin, M. (eds.) Parlamentarisk forandrina i Norden. 
(Oslo: Universitetaforlaget, 1990), pp. 15-44.
Damgaard, E. 'Party Coalitions in Danish Law-Making 
1953-1970', European Journal of Political Research, vol 
If no. If 1973, pp. 36-66.
Damgaard, E. 'The Parliamentary Basis of Danish 
Governments', Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 4, 
1969, pp. 30-57.
Damgaard, E. 'Danish Experiments in Parliamentary 
Government', Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions 
of Workshops. Bochum, April, 1990.
Damgaard, E. and Svensson, P. 'Who governs? Parties and 
Policies in Denmark', European Journal of Political 
Research, vol. 17, no. 6, 1989, p. 734-745.
Damgaard, E. Anckar, D. Rommetvedt., H. Sannerstedt, A. 
Sjolin, M. (eds.) Parlamentarisk forandrina i Norden. 
(Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1990).
De Swaan, A. Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation. 
(Amsterdam:Elsvier, 1973).
Di Giulio, F. and Rocco, E. Un Ministro-Ombra si 
confessa. (Milan: Rizzoli, 1979) .
Di Palma, G . Surviving Without Governing: The Italian 
Parties in Parliament. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977).
Dodd, L.C. Coalitions in Parliamentary Governments. 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).
Doron, G. and Maor, M. 'Barriers to Entry into a 
Political System: A Theoretical Framework and Empirical 
Application From the Israeli Experience', Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, vol. 3, no. 2, April 1991, pp. 
175-188.
Dunleavy, P. 'The Urban Basis of Political Alignment' 
British Journal of Political Science, vol. 9, part 4, 
October 1979, pp. 409-444.
360
Duverger, M. Political Parties: Their Organization and 
Activity in the Modern State. (London: Methuen, 1967).
Eckstein, H. Division and Cohesion in Democracv: A Studv 
of Norway. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1966).
Elklit, J. 'The Formation of Mass Political Parties in 
the Late 19th Century: The Three Models of the Danish 
Case', Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions of 
Workshops,Grenoble. France, April, 1978.
Elklit, J. 'Party Behaviour and the Formation of 
Minority Coalition Governments: Some Recent Danish 
Experiences', Paper prepared for presentation at the 
ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Essex, March, 1991.
Epstein, L.D. Political Parties in Western Democracies. 
(London:Pall Mall, 1967).
Erskine May, Treatise on the Law, Priviliaes.
Proceedings and Usage of Parliament. Sir David 
Lidderdale, ed., 19th ed., (London: Butterworths,1976).
Esping-Andersen, G. Politics Against Markets: The Social 
Democratic Road to Power. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1985).
Finer, S.E. (ed.) Adversary Politics and Electoral 
Reform. (London: Wigram, 1975) .
Fitzmaurice, J. 'Coalition Theory and Practice in 
Scandinavia', in: Pridham, G. (ed.) Coalitional 
Behaviour in Theory and Practice: An Inductive Model for 
Western Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986), pp. 251-277.
Fitzmaurice, J. 'Denmark', in: Henig, S. (ed.) Political 
Parties in the European Community. (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1979), pp. 28-50.
Friesenhahn, E. 'Parlament und Regierung in Modernen 
Staat' in: Kluxen, K. (ed.) Parlamentarismus. (Cologne: 
Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1971), pp. 307-319.
Gaffney, J. (ed.) The French Presidential Elections of 
1988: Ideology and Leadership in Contemporary France. 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1988).
Galenson, W. Labor in Norway. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1949).
Galenson, W. The Danish System of Labour Relations: A 
Studv on Industrial Peace. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1952).
j d I
Gallagher, T. and Marsh, M. (eds.) Candidate Selection 
in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of 
Politics. (London: Sage, 1988).
Graziano, M. 'The Historic Compromise and Consociational 
Democracy: Toward a New Democracy?', International 
Political Science Review, vol. 1, no. 3. 1980, pp. 345- 
368.
Groennings, S. Kelley, E.W. ans Leisersen, M. (eds.) The 
Studv of Coalition Behavior: Theoretical Perspectives 
and Cases from Four Continents. (New-York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1970) .
Groennings, S. 'Notes Toward Theories of Coalition 
Behavior in Multiparty Systems: Formation and 
Maintenance', in: Groennings, S. Kelley, E.W. ans 
Leisersen, M. (eds.) The Studv of Coalition Behavior: 
Theoretical Perspectives and Cases from Four Continents. 
(New-York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 445- 
465.
Hall, P.A. Hayward, J and Machin, H. (eds.) Developments 
in French Politics. (London: Macmillan, 1990).
Healey, D. The Time of mv Life. (London: Michael Joseph, 
1989).
Heidar, K. 'Party System Change in Norway and Denmark 
1970-1988: Spring time for 'Frozen Cleavages'?' Paper 
presented at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the 
ECPR. Rimini, 1988.
Heidar, K. 'Nar Partiene Kommer Pa Trygd - Far 
Partimedlemmene Da Statsstipend?', Paper Prepared for 
the Nordic Congress of Political Science. Rekjavik,
1990.
Heidar, K. 'A New Party Leadership?', Institutt for 
Statsvitenskap. Universitetet i Oslo. September 1990.
Heidar, K. 'The Norwegian Labour Party: Social Democracy 
in a Periphery of Europe', in: Paterson, W.E. and 
Thomas, A.H. (eds.) Social Democratic Parties in Western 
Europe. (London: Croom Helm, 1977), pp. 292-315.
Heilman, S. Italian Communism in Transition: The Rise 
and Fall of the Historic Compromise in Turin. 1975-1980. 
(New-York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
Henig, S. (ed.) Political Parties in the European 
Community. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1979).
362
Herman, V. and Pope,J. 'Minority Governments in Western 
Democracies', British Journal of Political Science, vol. 
3, part 2, April 1973, pp. 191-212.
Mine, D. 'Surviving or Reviving: The Italian Socialist 
Party under Craxi', in: Lange, P. and Tarrow, S. (eds.) 
Italv in Transition: Conflict and Consensus.
(London:Frank Cass, 1980), pp. 133-148.
Hine, D. 'The Italian Socialist Party under Craxi: 
Surviving but not Reviving', West European Politics, 
vol. 2, no. 3, October 1979, pp. 133-148.
Hine, D. 'Italy (1948): Condemned by its Constitution?' 
in: Bogdanor, V. (ed.) Constitutions in Democratic 
Politics. (Aldershot: Gower, 1988), pp. 206-228.
Hirschman, A.O. Exit, Voice and Lovaltv: Responses to 
Decline in Firms. Organizations, and States. (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).
Huber, J.D. 'Parliamentary Rules and Party Behavior 
during Minority Government in France', Paper prepared 
for presentation at the ECPR Joint Sessions of 
Workshops. Essex, 1991.
Huntington, S.P. Political Order in Changing Societies 
(New-Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
Jacobs, F. 'Denmark', in: Jacobs, F. (ed.) Western 
European Political Parties: A Comprehensive Guide. 
(Harlow: Longman, 1989), pp. 29-78.
Jacobs, F. 'Norway', in: Jacobs, F. (ed.) Western 
European Political Parties: A Comprehensive Guide. 
(Harlow: Longman, 1989), pp. 585-608.
Jacobs, F. 'Italy', in: Jacobs, F. (ed.) Western 
European Political Parties: A Comprehensive Guide. 
(Harlow: Longman, 1989), pp. 168-231.
Jacobs, F. 'United Kingdom'', in: Jacobs, F. (ed.) 
Western European Political Parties: A Comprehensive 
Guide. (Harlow: Longman, 1989) , pp. 374-440
Jacobs, F (ed.) Western European Political Parties: A 
Comprehensive Guide. (Harlow: Longman, 1989) .
Johnson, N. 'Adversary politics and electoral reform: 
Need we be afraid?' in: Finer, S.E. (ed.) Adversary 
Politics and Electoral Reform. (London: Wigram,1975), 
71-95.
Jones, J. and Morris, M. A-Z of Trade Unionism and 
Industrial Relations. (London: Sphere Books, 1986).
363
Jorgensen, A. Braendinaen: Fra mine daaboaer 1978-1982. 
(Copenhagen: Fremad, 1990).
Jorgensen, A. Bolaensen: Fra mine daaboaer 1972-1975. 
(Copenhagen: Fremad, 19 89).
Jorgensen, A. Til venstre for midten. Taler, artikler oa 
interviews ved Bent Hansen. (Copenhagen: Fremad, 1975).
Kaarsted, T . Reaeringen. vi aldria fik. 
Reaeringsdannelsen i 197 5 og dens baaarund. (Odense: 
Odense University Press, 1988), p. 12ff, 91.
Katz, R.S. (ed.) Party Governments: European and 
American Experiences. (Berlin, New-York: De 
Gruyter,1987).
Katz, R.S. and Mair, P. 'Three Faces of Party 
Organization: Adaptation and Change', EPRU Working 
Paper. Department of Government, Victoria University of 
Manchester, 1990.
Kirchner, E.J. Liberal Parties in Western Europe. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
Kluxen, K. (ed.) Parlamentarismus. (Cologne: Kiepenheuer 
and Witsch, 1971).
Kuhnle, S. Strom, K. and Svasand, L. 'The Norwegian 
Conservative Party: Setback in an Era of Strength', West 
European Politics, vol. 9, no. 3, 1986, pp. 448-471.
Kvanmo, H. Dommen. (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1990), 
pp. 137-154.
Laegreid, P. and Olsen, J.P. 'The Storting - A Last 
Stronghold of the Political Amateur', in: Suleiman,
E.N. (ed.) Parliaments and Parliamentarians in 
Democratic Politics. (New-York: Holmes and Meier, 1986), 
pp. 176-222.
Lane, J-E, and Ersson, S. Politics and Societv in 
Western Eurpoe. (London: Sage, 1987).
Lange, P. 'The PCI at the Local Level: A Study of 
Strategic Performance', in: Blackmer, D.L.M. and
Tarrow, S. (eds.) Communism in Italy and France. 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,1975), pp. 
259-304.
Lange, P. 'Crisis and Consent, Change and Compromise: 
Dilemmas of Italian Communism in the 1970's', in: Lange, 
P. and Tarrow, S. (eds.) Italy in Transition: Conflict 
and Consensus. (London: Frank Cass,1980), pp. 110-132.
364
Lange, P. and Vannicelli, M. (eds.) The Communist 
Parties of Italv. France and Spain: Postwar Change and 
Continuity. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981).
Lange, P. and Tarrow, S. (eds.) Italy in Transition: 
Conflict and Consensus. (London: Frank Cass, 1980) .
LaPalombara, J. 'Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: The 
PCI's Struggle',in: Penniman, H.R. (ed.) Italy at the 
Polls: The Parliamentary Elections of 1979. (Washington, 
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research,1981), pp. 104-140.
LaPalombara, J. 'Italian Elections as Hobson's Choice' 
in: Howard R. Penniman (ed.) Italy at the Polls: The 
Parliamentary Elections of 1976. (Washington, D.C.: 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research,1977), pp. 1-40.
Laver, M. 'Dynamic Factors in Goyernment Coalition 
Formation', European Journal of Political Research, vol. 
2, no. 3, September 1974, pp. 259-270.
Laver, M. and Schofield, N. Multiparty Government: The 
Politics of Coalition in Europe. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990) .
Laver, M. and Schofield, N. Multiparty Government: The 
Politics of Coalition in Europe. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 199 0) .
Laver, M. and Shepsle, K.A. 'Government Coalitions and 
Intraparty Politics'. British Journal of Political 
Science. Part 4, Oct. 1990, pp. 489-508.
Laver, M. and Shepsle, K.A. 'Coalitions and Cabinet 
Government', American Political Science Review, vol. 84, 
no. 3, September 1990, pp. 873-890.
Lawson, K. (ed.) Party Linkages in Comparative 
Perspective. (New Haven: Yale University Press,1981).
Lawson, K. and Merkl, P.H. (eds.) When Parties Fail: 
Emerging Alternative Organizations. (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1988).
Leonardi, R. and Wertman, D.A. Italian Christian 
Democracy; The Politics of Dominance. (Houndmills: 
Macmillan,1989).
Leonardi, R. 'Political Power Linkages in Italy: The 
Nature of the Christian Democratic Party Organization' 
in: Lawson, K. (ed.) Party Linkages in Comparative 
Perspective. (New Haven: Yale University Press,1981),
365
pp. 243—265.
Lepsius, M.R. 'From Fragmented Party Democracy to 
Government by Emergency Decree and National Socialist 
Takeover: Germany' in: Linz, J.L. and Stepan, A. (ed.) 
The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe. (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), PP. 34-79.
Lewis-Beck, M.S. 'France: The Stalled Electorate', in: 
Dalton, R.J. Flanagan, S.C. and Beck,P.A., Electoral 
Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment 
or Dealignment?. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1984).
Lieserson, M. 'Factions and Coalitions in One-Party 
Japan: An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games', 
American Political Science Review, vol. 62, no. 3, 1968, 
pp. 70-87.
Lijphart, A. 'Measures of Cabinet Durability: A 
Conceptual and Empirical Evaluation', Comparative 
Political Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, July 1984, pp. 265- 
279.
Lijphart,A. Democracies: Patterns of Mioritarian and 
Consensus Government in Twentv-One Countries. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press,1984).
Lindblom, C.E. The Intelligence of Democracv: Decision 
Making through Mutual Adjustment. (New-York: Free Press, 
1965).
Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (eds.) The Breakdown of 
Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and 
Reequilibration. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1978).
Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. 'Cleavage Structures, Party 
Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction' in;
Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. (eds.) Partv Svstems and 
Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives. (New- 
York:Free Press, 1967), pp. 1-64.
Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. (eds.) Partv Svstems and 
Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives. (New- 
York: Free Press, 1967) .
Lowi, T.J. The Politics of Disorder. (New-York: Norton 
Co., 1971).
Luebbert, G.M. Comparative Democracv: Policvmaking and 
Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel. (New-York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986).
Machin, H. (ed.) National Communism in Western Europe: A
366
Third Wav to Socialism?. (London: Mathuen, 1983) .
Machin, M. 'Political Leadership', in: Hall, P.A. 
Hayward, J and Machin, H. (eds.) Developments in French 
Politics. (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 95-113.
Madeley, J.T.S. 'Religion and the Political Order: The 
Case of Norway', in: Hadden, J.K. and Shupe, A. (ed.) 
Secularization and Fundamentalism Reconsidered: Religion 
and the Political Order, vol. III. (New-York: Paragon 
House, 1989), pp. 288-301.
Maier, C.S. (ed.) Changing Boundaries of the Political: 
Essavs on the Evolving Balance Between the State and 
Societv. Public and Privet in Europe. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987).
Mannheimer, R. and Sani, G. II Mercato Elettorale: 
Identikit dell' Elettore Italiano. (Bologna: IL 
Mulino,1987).
Maor, M. 'The Dynamics of Minority Rule: A Bargaining 
Based Theoretical Framework', Paper presented at the 
Joint Sessions of Workshops of the ECPR. Bochum, April,
1990.
Maor, M. 'The 1990 Danish Election:An Unnecessary 
Contest?', West European Politics, vol. 14, no. 3, July
1991, pp. 209-214.
Maor, M. 'Barriers to Entry into a Political System: A 
Theoretical Framework', Unpublished MA dissertation, Tel 
Aviv University, 1988.
Marradi, A. 'Italy: From 'Centrism' to Centre-Left 
Coalitions', in: Browne and Dreijmanis (eds.) Government 
Coalitions in Western Democracies. (New-York:
Longman,1982), pp. 33-70.
Martin, P.G. 'Strategic Opportunities and Limitations: 
The Norwegian Labour Party and the Trade Unions', 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review. Vol. 28, No. 1, 
October 1974, pp. 75-88.
McKenzie, R.T. British Political Parties: The 
Distribution of Power Within the Conservative and Labour 
Parties. (London: Heinemann, 1955).
Merkl, P.H. (ed.) The Federal Republic of Germanv at 
Forthv. (New-York: New-York University Press, 1989).
Merkel, W. Die Sozialistische Partei Italians.
(Bochum: Brockmeyer,198 5) .
Michie, A. and Hoggart, S, The Pact: The Inside Storv of
367
the Lib-Lab Government. 1977-8. (London : Quartet Books,
1978).
Miller, K.E. Government and Politics in Denmark. 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1968).
Mitra, S. 'The National Front in France: A Single-Issue 
Movement', West European Politics, vol. 11, no. 2, April 
1988, pp. 47-64.
Newmann, S. (ed.) Modern Political Parties. (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1956).
Norton, P. Dissension in the House of Commons 1974-1979. 
(Oxford:Clarendon Press,1980).
Norton, P. 'Organization of Parliamentary Parties' in: 
Walkland, S.A. (ed.) The House of Commons in the 
Twentieth Century: Essavs by Members of the Studv of 
Parliamenarv Group. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), pp. 7-68.
Olsen, J.P. Organized Democracv: Political Institutions 
in a Welfare State - The Case of Norway. (Bergen:
Universitetsforlaget, 1983).
Olson, M. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods 
and the Theory of Groups. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1971).
Owen, D . A United Kingdom: An Argument and a Challenge 
for a better Britain. (Harmondsworth: Penguin,1986).
Paci, M. La Struttura Sociale Italiana. (Bologna: II 
Mulino, 1978).
Padget, S. and Burkett, T. Political Parties and 
Elections in West Germanv: The Search for a New 
Stability. (London: C. Hurst, 1986).
Paggi, L. and D'Angelillo, M. I Comunisti Italiani e il 
Riformismo. (Torino:Einaudi,1986).
Panebianco, A. Political Parties: Organization and 
Power. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
Parisi, A. (ed.) Democristiani. (Bologna: II Mulino,
1979) .
Parisi, A. and Pasquino, G. (eds.) Continuita e 
Mutamento Elettorale in Italia. (Bologna: II Mulino,
1977) .
Parisi, A. and Pasquino, G. 'Changes in Italian 
Electoral Behaviour: The Relationships Between Parties 
and Voters', in: Lange, P. and Tarrow, S. (eds.) Italy
368
in Transition: Conflict and Consensus. (London: Frank
Cass,1980), pp. 6-30.
Pasquino, G. (ed.) II Sisteina Politico Italiano. (Bari:
Laterza,1985).
Pasquino,G. 'Partiti, Societa Civile e Istituzioni', in 
Pasquino, G. (ed.) II Sisteina Politico Italiano. (Bari:
Laterza,1985), pp. 1-30.
Pasquino, G. 'Party Government in Italy: Achievements
and Prospects', in: Katz, R.S. (ed.) Partv Governments:
European and American Experiences. (Berlin, New-York: De 
Gruyter,1987), pp. 202-242.
Pasquino, G. 'Mid-Stream and Under-Stress: The Italian 
Communist Party', in: Waller, M. and Fennema, M. (ed.) 
Communist Parties in Western Europe: Decline or 
Adaptation. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1988), pp. 26-46.
Pasquino, G. 'Italian Christian Democracy: A Party for 
all Seasons', West European Politics, vol. 2, no. 3, 
October 1979, pp. 88-109.
Paterson, W.E. and Thomas, A.H. (ed.) Social Democratic 
Parties in Western Europe. (London: Croom Helm, 1977).
Paterson, W.E. and Thomas, A.H. (eds.) The Future of 
Social Democracv: Problems and Prospects of Social 
Democratic Parties in Western Europe. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1986).
Pedersen, M.N. 'The Defeat of All Parties: The Danish 
Folketing Election, 1973' in: Lawson, K. and Merkl,
P.H. (eds.) When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative 
Organizations. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1988), pp. 257-281.
Pedersen, M.N. 'The Danish 'Working Multiparty System': 
Breakdown or Adaptation?' in: Daalder, H. (ed.) Partv 
Svstems in Denmark, Austria, Switzerland. The 
Netherlands, and Belgium. (London: Frances Pinter,
1987), pp. 1-60.
Pedersen, M.N. 'Consensus and Conflict in the Danish 
Folketing 1945-65', Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 
2, 1967, pp. 143-166.
Penniman, H.R. (ed.) Italy at the Polls: The 
Parliamentary Elections of 1979. (Washington, D.C.: 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research,1981).
Penniman, H.R. (ed.) Italy at the Polls: The 
Parliamentary Elections of 1976. (Washington, D.C.:
369
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research,1977).
Pinto-Duschinsky, M. 'Trends in British Political 
Funding, 1979-84', in: Alexander, H.E. (ed.) Comparative 
Political Finance in the 1980s. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), pp. 177-211.
Powell, E.G. Jr. 'Party Systems and Political System 
Performance: Participation, Stability and Violence in 
Contemporary Democracies', American Political Science 
Review, vol. 75, no. 4, December 1981, pp. 861-880.
Powell, G.E. Contemporary Democracies: Participation. 
Stabilitv and Violence. (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 1982).
Pridham, G. Political Parties and Coalitional Eehaviour 
in Italv. (London: Routledge,1988).
Pridham, G. (ed.) Coalitional Behaviour in Theorv and 
Practice: An Inductive Model for Western Europe. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
Przeworski, A. and Teune, H. The Logic of Comparative 
Social Inquiry. (Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieger, 
1970 [Reprint 1985]).
Pulzer, P. Political Representation and Elections in 
Britain. (London: Allen and Unwin,1967).
Putnam,R.D. The Comparative Study of Political Elite. 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976).
Putnam,R .D. The Belief of Politicians: Ideology, 
conflict and democracy in Britain and Italv. (New-Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1973).
Putnam, R.D. 'The Italian Communist Politicians' in 
Elackmer, D.L.M. and Tarrow, S. (eds.) Communism in 
Italv and France. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press,1975), pp. 173-220.
Pye, L. and Verba, S. Political Culture and Political 
Development. (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1965).
Ranger, J. 'Le Decline du Parti Communiste Français' 
Revue Français de Science Politique, vol. xxxvi, no. 1, 
February 1986, pp. 4 6-63.
Rokkan, S. 'Electoral Systems', in: Sills, D.L. (ed.) 
International Encyclopedia of the Social Science. (New- 
York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 6-21.
Rokkan, S. Citizens, Elections. Parties. (New-York:
370
David McKay, 197 0) .
Rokkan, S. and Urwin, D.W. (eds.) The Politics of 
Territorial Identity. (London: Sage, 1982) .
Rommetvedt, H. 'Parties and Governments in Norway',
Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR Joint 
Sessions of Workshops, Bocum, 1990.
Roscue, J . The Italian Communist Partv 1976-81: On the 
Threshold of Government. (London:Macmillan,1982).
Rose, R. (ed.) Electoral Behaviour: A Comparative 
Handbook. (New-York: Free Press, 1974) .
Rose, R. and I. McAllister, Voters Begin to Choose; From 
Closed-Class to Open Elections in Britain. (London:
Sage, 1986).
Rose, R. and Mackie, T.T. 'Do Parties Persist or Fail? 
The Big Trade-off Facing Organizations', in: Lawson, K. 
and Merkl, P.H. (eds.) When Parties Fail: Emerging 
Alternative Organizations. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1988), pp. 533-560.
Rostow, D. 'Scandinavia: Working multiparty Systems' in: 
Newmann, S. (ed.) Modern Political Parties. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press,1956), pp. 169-193.
Ryan, A. (ed.). The Philosophv of Social Explanation. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).
Sanders, D. and Herman, V. 'The Stability and Survival 
of Governments in Western Democracies', Acta Politica. 
Vol. 12, 1977, pp. 346-377.
Sani, G. 'Le elezioni degli anni 1970: terremoto o 
evoluzione?', in: Parisi, A. and Pasquino, G. (eds.) 
Continuita e Mutamento Elettorale in Italia. (Bologna:
II Mulino, 1977), pp. 67-102.
Sarlvik, B. 'Coalition Politics and Policy Output in 
Scandinavia: Sweden, Denmark and Norway', in: Bogdanor, 
V. (ed.) Coalition Government in Western Europe.
(London: Heinemann, 1983), pp. 97-152.
Sarlvik, B. and I. Crewe, Decade of Dealianment: The 
Conservative Victory of 1979 and Electoral Trends in the 
1970s. (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1983).
Sartori, G. 'Concept Misformation in Comparative 
Politics', American Political Science Review, vol. 64, 
no. 4, December 1970, pp. 1033-1054.
Sartori, G. Parties and Partv Svstems: A Framework for
371
Analysis. Vol. 1. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1976).
Schain, M.A. 'The National Front in France and the 
Construction of Political Legitimacy', West European 
Politics. vol. 10, no. 2, April 1987, pp. 229-252.
Schelling, T.C. The Strategy of Conflict. (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960).
Sills, D.L. (ed.) International Encyclopedia of the 
Social Science. (New-York: Macmillan, 1968).
Sjoblom, G. Partv Strategies in a Multioartv System. 
(Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1968).
Smith, G. 'A System Perspective on Party System Change', 
Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 1, no. 3, July 
1989, pp. 349-364.
Steel, D. A House Divided: The Lib-Lab Pact and the 
Future of British Politics. (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1980).
Steel, D. Against Goliath: David Steel's Storv. (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989).
Stout, M.L. 'Guillotine Procedure and the Structure of 
Conflict in the British House of Commons' Unpublished 
Ph.D dissertation. The University of London, 1981.
Strom, K. Minority Government and Majority Rule. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
Strom, K. 'Policy Concerns and Party Behaviour in 
Norway', Paper prepared for presentation at the Joint 
Sessions of Workshops of the ECPR. Bochum, 1990.
Strom, K. 'Minority Governments in Parliamentary 
Democracies: The Rationality of Nonwinning Cabinet 
Solutions' Comparative Political Studies, vol. 17, no. 
2, July 1984, PP. 199-227.
Strom, K. 'Deffered Gratification and Minority 
Governments in Scandinavia', Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 4, November 1986, pp. 583-607.
Strom, K. 'Party Goals and Government Performance in 
Parliamentary Democracies', American Political Science 
Review, vol. 79, no. 3, September 1985, pp. 738-754.
Suleiman, E.N. (ed.) Parliaments and Parliamentarians 
in Democratic Politics. (New-York: Holmes and Meier, 
1986) .
372
Svasand, L. Politiske Partier. (Oslo: Tiden Norsk,
1985).
Svasand, L. 'The Institutionalization of Political 
Parties in England and Norway in Late Nineteenth 
Centuray', Institute of Sociology. University of Bergen, 
May 1975.
Svensson, P. 'Party Cohesion in the Danish Parliament 
During the 70's', Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 
5, new series, 1982, pp. 17-42.
Tarrow, S. 'Three Years of Italian Democracy', in: 
Penniman, H.R. (ed.) Italv at the Polls: The 
Parliamentarv Elections of 1979. (Washington, D.C.: 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research,1981), pp. 1-33.
Tarrow, S. 'Historic Compromise or Bourgeios Majority: 
Eurocommunism in Italy, 1976-1979', in: Machin, H. (ed.) 
National Communism in Western Europe: A Third Wav to 
Socialism?. (London: Mathuen,1983), pp. 124-153.
Taylor, M. and Herman, V. 'Party Systems and Government 
Stability' American Political Science Review, vol. 65, 
no. 1, March 1971, pp. 28-37.
Taylor, M. and Laver, M. Government Coalition in Western 
Europe' European Journal of Political Research, vol. 1, 
no. 3, September 1973, pp. 205-248.
Thomas, A.H. 'Social Democracy in Denmark', in:
Paterson, W.E. and Thomas, A.H. (ed.) Social Democratic 
Parties in Western Europe. (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 
pp. 234-271.
Thomas, A.H. 'Social Democracy in Scandinavia: Can 
Dominance be Regained?', in: Paterson, W.E. and Thomas, 
A.H. (eds.) The Future of Social Democracv: Problems and 
Prospects of Social Democratic Parties in Western 
Europe. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 172-222.
Thomas, A.H. 'Liberalism in Denmark: Agrarian, Radical 
and still Influencial', in: Kirchner, E.J. Liberal
Parties in Western Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), pp. 282-283.
Torgersen, U. 'The Formation of Parties in Norway: The 
Problem of Right-Left Differences', Scandinavian 
Political Studies. Vol. 2, 1967, pp. 43-68.
Urwin, D.W. 'Norway: Parties between Mass Membership and 
Consumer-Oriented Professionalism:, in: Ware, A. (ed.) 
Political Parties: Electoral Change and Structural 
Response.(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 183-204.
373
Vacca G. Tra Compromesso e Solidarieta: La politica del 
Pci neali anni '70. (Roma: Editori Riuniti,1987).
Valen, H. and Katz, D. Political Parties in Norway. 
(Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1964).
Valen, H. Valg og Politikk: Et Samfunn i Endrina. 
(Oslo:NKS-Forlaget, 1981).
Valen, H. and Rokkan, S. 'Norway: Conflict Structure and 
Mass Politics in a European Periphery', in: Rose, R.
(ed.) Electoral Behaviour: A Comparative Handbook. (New- 
York: Free Press, 1974), pp. 315-370.
Valen, H. 'Norway: Decentralization and Group 
Representation', in: Gallagher, T. and Marsh, M. (eds.) 
Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The 
Secret Garden of Politics. (London: Sage, 1988), pp. 
210-235.
Vallier, I. (ed.) Comparative Methods in Socioloav: 
Essavs on Trends and Applications. (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1971).
Verba, S. 'Cross-National Survey Research: The Problem 
of Credibility', in: Vallier, I. (ed.) Comparative 
Methods in Sociology: Essavs on Trends and Applications. 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 
339-356.
Von Beyme,K . Die Parlamentarischen Reaierunassvsteme in 
Europa (Munich: Piper, 1970).
Von Beyme, K. Political Parties in Western Democracies. 
(Aldershot: Gower, 198 5).
Walkland, S.A. (ed.) The House of Commons in the 
Twentieth Centurv: Essavs bv Members of the Studv of 
Parliamenarv Group. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979).
Waller, M. and Fennema, M. (ed.) Communist Parties in 
Western Europe: Decline or Adaptation. (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell,1988).
Ware, A. (ed.) Political Parties: Electoral Change and 
Structural Response.(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 
183-204.
Warwick, P. 'The Durability of Coalition Governments in 
Parliamentary Democracies', Comparative Political 
Studies. vol. 11, no. 4, January 1979, pp. 465-98.
Wertman, D. A. 'The Christian Democrats: Masters of 
Survival', in: Howard R. Penniman (ed.) Italv at the
374
Polls ; The Parliamentarv Elections of 1979. (Washington, 
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research,1981), pp. 64-103.
Wertman, D. A. 'La Partecipazione Intermittente. Gli 
Iscritti e la Vita di Partite', in: Parisi, A. (ed.) 
Democristiani. (Bologna: II Mulino, 1979), pp. 61-84.
Willoch, K. Statsminister. (Oslo: Schibsted, 1990).
Wright, V. The Government and Politics of France. 3rd 
edition, (London: Unwin Hyman,1989).
Zuckerman, A.S. The Politics of Faction: Christian 
Democratic Rule in Italv. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press,1979).
ARCHIVES
Facts on File.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives. 
H.C. Deb.
NEWSPAPER\MAGAZINES
The Guardian 
The Economist 
Liberation 
Le Monde 
The Times 
Panorama 
Nationen
375
